Arthur Danto's philosophy of art by Lafferty, Michael Gerald
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/42211
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Arthur Danto's Philosophy of Art 
By 
Michael Gerald Lafferty 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
l1nivL'r~ity of \\'arwick. Dcparttllcnt of Philosophy 
\ 1av 2006 
~ 
Contents 
List of Illustrations and Sources 
Acknowledgements, Declanltion and Note on the Text 
Abstract 
Introduction 
Section I Danto's Philosophy of Art and Philosophy of the History of Art • 1 
Section I I The Structure of the Dissertation • 6 
('hapter One, ()anto and the Artworld Theory 
St.:ction I Introduction, Art as Mimesis, Mirror Images • 11 
St.:ction II I mitation and Reality Theories of Art • 16 
Section III The Is of Artistic Identification • 22 
Section IV Problems with the is of Artistic Identification • 29 
St.:ction V The Artworld Concept • 36 
Section VI Theories of Art and the Style ~ latrix • .+6 
Section V I I But is it Art'? • 52 
Sl,ctionVIII Conclusion· 57 
Chapter Tw()~ ()anto and the Comparison of Indiscernible Counterparts 
Section I Introduction • 67 
Sl'ct ion II I ndisn~rnihk' Countl'rparts I· xamined • 70 
Sl,ction III Joseph \1ar~nlis's Criticism • 9., 
Sl'cti(ln IV rhl' .\rt\\orld and thl' Institutional Theory • 102 
Sl'dion \' C'nndusion • 109 
Chapter Three, Art as Rhetorical Ellipsis: .\letaphor. Expression and Style 
Section I Introduction • 123 
Section II Art as Rhetorical Ellipsis Introduced • 125 
Section III An Objection Considered • 136 
Section IV Metaphor, Expression and Style • 146 
IVa. Rhetorical Ellipsis Continued • 147 
IVb. Metaphor • 157 
IV c. Expression • 169 
IVd. Style • 175 
Section V Conclusion • 184 
Chapter Four, Conclusion: Towards a Definition of Art 
Section I Introduction • 195 
Sect ion II The Spectrum of Artistic Presence • 198 
Section III Intentionality and Intensionality • 215 
Section IV Art as an Inflected Concept • 219 
Bibliography • 224 
Illustrations • 242 
List of Illustrations and Sources 
Illustration 1 
Andy Warhol and his Brillo Boxes sculpture, 1964. silk-screen on plywood. 
installation at the Stable Gallery. New York. opening day. 21st ApriL (Source. 
Bourdon, 1989. p.186). 
Illustration 2 
Ilelen Chadwick, Vanity, 1986, Cibachrome. Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery. 
(Source, Waterhall Gallery of Modern Art. no date, no pagination). 
Illustration 3 
Robert Rauschenberg, Bed, 1955. oil and pencil on pillow, quilt and sheet, Museum 
of Modern Art, New York, (Source, Archer,1997. illustration 1). 
Illustration 4 
('laes Oldenburg, Bedroom Ensl!mhle, 1963, wood, vinyl, metal, artificial fur. cloth 
and paper. National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa, (Source, The 20th C'enturr Art 
Book, 1996, p.347). 
Illustr .. tion 5 
Picter Bruegel the Elder. Landscape with the Fall of Icarus. oil on canvas. Musees 
Royaux des Beaux-Arts de Belgique. Brussels. (Source, Hanfling. ed .. 1992, colour 
platc 4). 
Illustration 6 
Andy \\'arhoL Brillo Boxes, 1964, silk-screen on plywood. installation at the Stable 
Gallery, New York. (Source, Archer, 1997, illustration 8). 
Illustration 7 
I.oran·s diagram ofCczannc's Portrait (?(.\1adame C(;2annl!, (Source. Loran. 196~. 
p.8). I\n illustratiull of Lichtenstein's Portrait (?( .\fadamt.' ('t;2lU1m'. 1 ()()2. \1agna 
on C~U1\as. 68 x )() ". is in Cnplans.1972. p.74. iII.14). 
Illustration 8 
Sherrie Levine, After Walker Evans (/936). 1981. photograp~ (Source. Chadwick. 
1996. ill 239, p.384). 
Illustration 9 
Kazimir Malevich, Red Square (Painterly Realism of a Peasant Jroman in Two 
Dimensions). 1915. oil on canvas, State Museum of St Petersburg, 53 x 53 cm. 
(Source, Malevich, 2000. p.163). 
Illustration 10 
Damien Hirst, beautiful, kiss my fucking ass painting, 1996. gloss household paint 
on canvas, 213.4 cm diameter. The Saatchi Gallery, London. (Source. Sensation: 
Exhibition Catalogue, 1997. p.99). 
Illustration 11 
Julian Opie, Outdoor project for Volkswagen\Stadt Wolfsburg, 2000. (Source, Opie, 
2001. p.18. 
Illustration 12 
G. F. Barbieri, called Guercino. Saint Luke Di5playing a Painting of the Virgin. 
1652-3, oil on canvas, 87 x 71 ". the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, Kansas City, 
Missour, (Source, Web Gallery of Art, 
'- http://www.kfki.huJ~arthp/htmVg/guercinol1l>). 
Illustr.ltion 13 
Gerard Terborch, L 'Instruction Paternelle now also known as Gallant 
('onn'rsalion. c.1654. oil on canvas. 71 x 73 cm, Rijksmuseum. ;\mstcrdam. 
(Source. RUksmuseum Amsterdam: Highlights/rom the ('olleclion, 1995. p.56). 
lIustration 14 
Andre Racz. l 'nlil/ed (nger Li(\), 1991. Quill and black ink. pastel and gouache. 
91.4 \: 66 cm.. collection of Juan Andres Racz. (Source. 
<-httP:'llllllila-rydcLsi.cdujournaL!\ 1 ~n~/danto.html». 
Illustration 15 
Rembrandt van Rijn., Bathsheba with King David's Letter. 1654. oil on canvas. 1..+2 
x 142 c~ Paris. Musee du Louvre. (Source. Brown, Kelch & van Thiel. 1991. 
p.243). 
Illustration 16 
William Hogart~ The Harlot's Progress. Number Six, Moll's Funeral. 1732. 
engravings, originals lost in a fire, (Source, 
<http://bugpowder.comlandy/ebc.hogarth.harlot.html>). 
Illustration 17 
Urn from Yangshao, earthenware with black and purple painted decoration. 3..+cm, 
c. 5000-1500 BCE, (Source. Rawson, 1992, p.221). 
Illustration 18 
Mel Ramos, Ode to Ang, 1972, oil on canvas, 178 x 94cm. \\'ilp Collection. 
Dusseldorf, (Source, Britt, 1999, p.332). 
Illustration 19 
Sophie Calle, Love Leiter from Appointment with Sigmund Freud, 1998. Calle was 
invited to exhibit in the Freud Muse~ London. (Source, Calle, 2003. London. no 
pagination). 
Illustration 20 
I;raneo B. / Miss }'ou, performance at The Bar. Binningham, 26th May 2000, 
(Source, From ..t rkhipov (0 Zittel. 2002. pp.16-7). 
Acknowledgements 
I would particularly like to thank my supervisor, Professor Stephen Houlgate. for his 
advice, support and encouragement throughout the last four years and ~1r. \1artin 
Warner for his criticism and suggestions. I have already had the opportunity. at the 
conferences at Murcia (2003) and Cork (2004), to thank Professor Danto personally 
for two things. First, for generating, through his writings, my interest In 
philosophical aesthetics. and second, for his wide-ranging discussions with me at 
those conferences about the nature of art. 
Declaration 
I declare that this thesis is my own work and I confinn that it has not been submitted 
fi)f a degree at another university 
Note on the Text 
References to the sources listed in the bibliography are given in the parentheses 
following quotations, in the footnotes and in the list of illustrations; the date of the 
work. page number. and author where this is not obvious. are listed. In the 
bihliography if the date of the first publication is shown. and the original is diflicult 
to consult. the most widely-available reprint is also listed. The page numbers in the 
latter caSl'S refer to the reprint. In the quotations ellipses indicate omissions from the 
original text except where stated. 
Arthur Danto's Philosophy of Art 
Abstract 
The thesis is a critical examination of Danto's philosophy of art. It bcgins \\"ith his 
article 'The Artworld' where he proposes a special is of artistic identification to 
distinguish artworks. Danto' s idea of the artworld is discussed, a historical and 
contextual theory of art which arose from his attempt to explain the ditlerence 
between Warhol's Brillo Boxes sculpture and an indiscernible stack of cycl)day 
Brillo boxes. It is argued that Danto unsuccessfully attempts to shore up his art \\orld 
concept with the special is. 
The technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts, from Danto' s 
book The Tran\jiguration of the Commonplace, is examined. It is argued that the 
technique is philosophically redundant. but it is a redundant premise whieh has been 
added to a valid inference (Danto' s historical and contextual yic\\ 0 f art: his artworld 
theory) therefore. this does not make the original inference invalid. 
Danto's treatment of metaphor. expression. and style is shown to result 
in 1()Uf claims. First, artworks embody rhetorical ellipsis. Second. artworks sharL' 
features of metaphor: they are intensional (with an s) in structure and cannot be 
paraphrased. Third, a work of art expresses what it is a metaphor for by the way it 
depicts its su~icct. Fourth, artworks embody style. 
rhe conclusion, has two parts. The first part gives a summary of the 
criticism of Danto's theory of art: (1) there are logical inconsistencies in his concept 
of the is of artistic identification and in his use of indisccrnible counterparts. (2) his 
theor) sutlers by being o\L'r-inclusiye and (3) he uses circular arguments. The 
second part is based on a response to the criticism: it provides a definition of art. 
This has three elements. first. an argument is proposed for a spectrum of artistic 
preSL'nCL' in which all human act iyity and artefacts Gill be placcd. Second. there is an 
acceptancL' of Danto' s yie\\ nf art (or artist ic presence) being both intentional (\\ ith 
a t) i.illd intensional (with an s): however. by applying these concepts to a spectrum. 
the problem of 0\ er-inclusi\elK'SS is a\oided. Finally. it is argued therc can he no 
\\ hollv non-circular account nf art. 
Introduction 
Monks, I will teach you Dhamma - the Parable of the Raft - for crossing 
over, not for retaining. Listen to it, attend carefully. and I wiU speak. 
Majjhima-nikiiya 1, 134-5 (Conze, 1990, pp.87-8) 
I. Danto's Philosopby of Art and Ph ilosophy of tbe Histor)' of Art 
Arthur Danto's writings on art can be placed in three categories: first, philosophy of 
art, second, philosophy of the history of art and third, art criticism. The dissertation 
deals exclusively (or, as I shall explain shortly, almost so) with the first of these: it 
provides a critical examination of Danto 's philosophy of art. I could proceed without 
further comment, having stated my objective, but I shall very bricfly explain in the 
introduction why I believe Danto' s philosophy of art underlies the other two 
categories. The last category - art criticism: notably Danto's writing as art critic of 
The Nation magazine - I leave with no further comment; it incorporates ideas from 
the other two categories from which it is largely derivative. The second category, 
Danto's philosophy of the history of art, encompasses three major themes: first, his 
loosely Hegelian view of art history and its related concept of the end of art, second, 
a theory of the philosophical disenfranchisement of art (Danto's historical survey of 
the relationship between philosophy and art), and finally, his recent writings on the 
ahuse of beauty: a development of the disenfranchisement theme. 
Danto. as I shall explain shortly, uses his theory of the cnd of art, 
part of his philosophy of the history of art, to support his philosophy of art. It is 
necessary. therefore. to comment on the relationship betwcen his philosophy of art 
and the first of these three themes in his philosophy of the history of art: his con(l~pt 
of the end of art. Two questions arise: frrstly. does his theory of the end of art 
depend on the philosophy of art. and. \ice vcrsa. docs the philosophy of art dl'\~nd 
on his theory of the end of art? I believe the answer to the first question is yes. and 
the answer to the second is no; I shall explain briefly why in the remainder of this 
section of the introduction. These answers, I believe, justify my view of Danto' s 
philosophy of art as the underlying category of his writings on art and explain my 
focus on his philosophy of art as the subject of the dissertation. The second section 
of the introduction outlines my approach to the subject and the structure of the 
dissertation. 
How does Danto link his philosophy of art with his philosophy of the 
history of art? His philosophy of art is an attempt to define art in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. If any condition a applies to all art, then a is a necessary 
condition of art. Danto believes a major problem with this approach is how we can 
be sure that in the future there will not be some new type of art which fails to satisfY 
condition a. The condition a would cease to be a necessary or, obviously, a sufficient 
condition of art. This is where Danto invokes his philosophy of the history of art. His 
bold claim is that the history of art has ended: that pop art has shown that anything 
can now become art; this marks the end of the modernist narrative of art and indeed 
the end of the whole history of the concept of art as a narrative. The historical 
development of the concept of art - not the history of art as such - is over. A history 
of art after the end of art can still be written and can take the fonn of a narrative; 
such a narrative history would not, however, trace any changes in what it means to 
be a work of art. Danto argues that whatever condition is proposed as a definition of 
art it must now include the possibility of anything becoming art and, therefore, be 
immune to counter-examples. 
I shall now briefly outline Danto' s theory of the end of art. He traces 
two narratives in the history of art. I First, the search for verisimilitude in art: the 
IThese two narratives are explained in detail in chapter three 'Master Narratives and Critical 
Principles' and chaptl-r four 'Modernism and the Critique of Pure Art: the Historical Vision of 
Clement Greenberg' of After the End of Art (Danto, 1997a). 
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search for the correct depiction of the visual world by artistic imitation. particularly 
in painting. Danto calls this the Vasarian narrati\e. and its era runs from the 
Renaissance through to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Danto 
makes the point that although Vasari's famous book was called The Lives of the 
Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors and Architects, it was the painters who created 
the historical narrative with their successive and improving attempts at mimesis. He 
sees this era ending with the invention of photography~ particularly cinematic 
photography and the realisation that ahhough imitation had been the main aim of art 
it could not now be a necessary feature of art. Danto believes that towards the end 
of the Vasarian era painting had largely achieved its goal of mimesis and that. 
coincidentally, this role had been taken over by photography. Art had to find a new 
narrative, and the one which gradually emerged was modernism: this emerging 
narrative involved the reflexive questioning of the nature of art from within art itself 
So Danto' s second narrative is the development of modernism seen as an increasing 
move towards self-reflection in art; he labels this the Greenbergian era - again after 
another writer on art: Clement Greenberg. In the Greenbergian era Danto identifies a 
foundationalist approach where each individual form of art was seen as striving for a 
purity of expression through a process of self-examination of its own techniques and 
materials. Greenberg traces this through the development of modernism culminating 
in abstract expressionism. Danto believes this second narrative ends with pop art and 
the realisation that anything can become art. This realisation becomes apparent when 
we look at two indiscernible objects. one a work of art the other an everyday thing. 
and when we notice that the difference between the two cannot be identified as a 
visual difference (see illustration 1). A theory of art is needed which addresses the 
non-discernihle or non-trumifest features which must distinguish art from non-art. 
This is whcre the link betwcen Danto's philosophy of art and his 
philosophy of the history of art lies. If his philosophy of art can accommodate the 
possihility of anything tx"'('oming art. his theory of the end of art providc~ a way of 
indemni"·in).! his ddlnition nf art. with its nCl'cssarv and sufticicnt conditions. a~ain"t 
~ ~ . 
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any future counter-examples. As I ha\'e mentioned. his theory of the end of art 
proposes that there can be no further development of the concept of art: since 
anything can become art, there can be no further changes to what can count as art. If 
the history of art is over, ahhough new works of art will continue to be produced. 
none will have the ability to nullify Danto's essentialist definition. He says: "ha"ing 
reached this point [the end of art] ... art has exhausted its conceptual mission. It has 
brought us to a stage of thought essentially outside history, where at last we can 
contemplate the possibility of a universal definition of art and vindicate therewith the 
philosophical aspiration of the ages, a definition which will not be threatened by 
historical overthrow" (Danto, 1986, p.209). In other words, no new de\'dopments in 
art can possibly emerge in the future which would derail Danto' s definition: we have 
all the evidence we require to produce a real (essentialist) definition of art because 
the narrative history of art is at an end. I note here that Danto's stated need to 
indemnifY his philosophy of art against future counter-examples is a result of his 
strong essentialist position in relation to defining art. 
In the conclusion I return to this point and suggest that other approaches 
to defining art, including the one which I propose, avoid Danto's concern for 
providing such an indemnity. I do not intend to explain the development of Danto's 
philosophy of the history of art in detail here, but a crucial point is that it arises out 
of and relies on the technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts. We have 
reached 'the end of art'. Danto believes, because pop art has raised the question of 
what art is in terms of indiscemibles.2 As I shall explain in the next chapter. Andy 
Warhol's Brillo Boxes sculpture (see illustration 6) alerted Danto to the fact that we 
can have two indiscernible objects one of which is an artwork and one not. The 
lesson of pop art is that anything can become art without this making a visually 
2. [he End of Art' is the titk llf Danto's 1984 essa~ which is reprinted in Dan to, 1986. pp.81-115; 
h~ lISl'S the term in a Illosl'l~ I kgclian scnSl' more an:urately he is rl'lL'rring to the l.~nJ of the 
histllr\ of art. 
discernible difference to the object, and if anything can become art, art's 
developmental history is complete. In other words, no matter how many new works 
of art are produced in the future, they will not alter what it means to be a work of 
art; art as a concept will not come to be anything new. Art will still be produced in 
its post-historical period, but it will have no over-arching narrative structure: the 
historical development of the concept of art is over. There is an ambiguity in the idea 
that anything can become art. On the one hand, it can mean that the concept of art 
becomes completely open: art becomes a meaningless concept because there is 
nothing peculiar to art and the history of art is irreducibly open-ended. On the other 
hand, it can mean that anything can now be understood to fall under the concept of 
art which has been definitively understood. Danto accepts the latter meaning; his 
contextual philosophy of art, as I shall explain, settles and closes the concept of art. 
Danto's philosophy of the history of art relies on the comparison of 
indiscernibles, but, as I shall explain in chapters two and three. his philosophy of art 
relies on the very same technique. Therefore the invocation of his philosophy of the 
history of art to support his philosophy of art is circular. In these later chapters I 
shall be explaining my concerns about the technique of comparing indiscernibles: 
how I regard it as philosophically redundant and telling us nothing that we do not 
already know about the artistic status of the objects under consideration. In other 
words, in using the technique of comparing artworks with indiscernible everyday 
objects, the decision about what an artwork is must already have been made before 
the thought experiment can take place. For Danto, an artwork is defined by its 
context: it has a history and acquires a provenance. and it should be noted that these 
features are non-discernible features. As a method, comparing indiscernibles in this 
way is inextricably linked to an essentialist distinction about what art is. Noel Carroll 
sums this argument up: "'10 invoke indiscernibility in a characterization of a 
philosophy of art history that is meant to defend the possibility of essentialist theory 
is circular; for it supposes the viability of essentialist theory - by dint of its 
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assumptions about indiscenubility - in the course of an argument whose vef\ 
conclusion is ostensibly that essentialist theory is viable" (Carroll 1993. p.98). 
I return to the two questions which I posed at the beginning of this 
section: does Danto's theory of the end of art depend on his philosophy of art, and. 
vice versa, does his philosophy of art depend on his theory of the end of art'? The 
answer to the first is yes. Danto's concept of the end of art relies on the technique of 
comparing indiscernible counterparts, but invoking this technique presupposes an 
essentialist definition of art. Therefore the concept of the end of art relies on Danto's 
definition of art. His end of art (hence also his philosophy of the history of art) and 
his philosophy of art both rely on comparing indiscernibles. but the crucial point is 
that Danto's use ofindiscernibles presupposes his definition of art, and this definition 
is his philosophy of art. The answer to the second question is therefore. in my 
opinion, no: Danto's philosophy of art. contrary to his own view, cannot rely on his 
philosophy of the history of art for its indemnity and must stand or fall on its own 
merits. This philosophy of art and its methodology underpin the concept of the end 
ofart upon which Danto's philosophy of the history of art rests. The purpose of my 
dissertation, therefore, is a critical examination of Danto's philosophy of art. 
II. The Structure of the Dissertation 
Before I outline the structure of the dissertation I need to make three points. First. 
throughout his earlier writings Danto makes frequent reference to the tenn 
"aesthetic': referring to the aesthetic sense, to aesthetic predicates. properties. and 
responses. However. his discussion. certainly in The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, is restricted to the consideration of works of art: there is no mention 
of the suhlime in nature for instance. I follo\v Danto in using 'aesthetic' to reter 
exclusivdy to artworks in my discussion. Danto, of course. is well a\\arc of the 
greater scope l)f the word "aesthetic', and he does discuss Kant's treatment of the 
aesthetic scnsc- all judgements of taste including those relating to hoth \\orks pf art 
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and nature - at some length in the final chapter of his recent book The Abuse oJ 
Beauty.3 I also discuss this distinction briefly in the conclusion when I examine the 
concept of fme art: I specifically use Kant's taxonomy of the aesthetic sense as a 
comparison with both Danto's and my own view. 
Secondly, and in a similar ve~ Danto refers to . art' . . fine art' , 
'works of art' or 'artworks' throughout his writings: he makes a clear distinction 
between art and non-art. In the conclusion I put forward a very different vie\\' of the 
nature of art which questions the veracity and utility of this art/non-art duality. 
Again, however, throughout the main body of the dissertation I follow Danto in his 
use of the term 'art' which I later argue to be unsustainably restricted. Finally. a 
word about the illustrations: I refer frequently to particular works of art in the 
dissertation; I have provided illustrations only where I believe the work referred to is 
likely to be unfamiliar or where I am referring to some specific detail of the work. As 
some works are referred to several times, the illustrations are collected at the end of 
the dissertation. 
The dissertation is a critical examination of Danto's philosophy of art. 
I t concentrates on his two most important and influential publications in this field: 
the much-anthologised 1964 article 'The Artworld' and his 1981 book The 
Tran.~'1iKUr(Jtion of the Commonplace. My critique is in three chapters. The first 
chapter examines Danto's earliest work on aesthetics: his article 'The Artworld' 
where Danto begins hy outlining two theories of art: IT (the imitation theory) and 
RT (the reality theory). His aim is to show that art cannot be purely a matter of 
imitation. and he introduces the first of his indiscernibility thought experiments. the 
two indiscernihle hut quite different paintings VCH'/on's First Law and .\cH'Um's 
71,i,.d Law. into the discllssion. lie proposes a special is of artistic identitication to 
e:\plain the difference hct\\een art and non-art. and I outline my criticisms of the 
concept: it uses imprecise language. it is too e:\clusi\'e and it is internally 
3[)anhl, .200';1, (haph,'r 7. 'Th~ Ikautiti.JI and the Sublime', 
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inconsistent. I examme Danto's concept of the artworld which arose from his 
attempt to identifY and explain the difference between Andy Warhol's Brillo Boxes 
sculpture and an indiscerruble stack of everyday Brillo boxes (see illustrations 1 and 
6, both incidentally show the SCUlpture, not everyday Brillo cartons). 
I identifY five, later increased to six, principles of art which make up 
Danto's philosophy of art: a complex, hybrid theory which I summarise as 
embodying intentionality (with a t) and intensionality (with an s). Intentionality (with 
a t) entails expression, representation and interpretation within a historical context 
(historical reflexivity). Intensionality (with an s) suggests that art cannot be 
paraphrased and that its interpretation is in a sense inexhaustihle~ art embodies 
rhetorical ellipsis and it shares certain structural features with metaphor. Danto 
moves on to discuss artistic predicates and explains how our idea of art 
accommodates new predicates: he uses his concept of the style matrix - a form of 
truth table. He illustrates how new forms of art arise with the acceptance of new 
artistically-relevant predicates: a process involving the introduction of additional 
columns in his style matrix. 
I address an obvious objection to Danto's approach: what if the 
ready-mades and other examples of contemporary art which he uses are simply not 
art at all. I reject this objection, and I put forward arguments to counter it. I argue 
first, that the objection rests on an assumption of a degree of formalism in its view of 
art: the existence of some formal or "aesthetic' quality in the work. Second, I argue 
that the objection ignores that these objects have already been accepted as art hy the 
artworld. However, this reliance on the artworld to identifY art leads to another 
objection to Danto's theory: the claim that his argument relies on an unacceptable 
level of circularity. This is a claim which I endorse: it reappears and is discussed at 
sevcral points in the dissertation. and I explain my own view on the issue in the 
conclusion. Chapter one closes by looking at the link between the special js of 
artistic identification and the "artworld' concept. Danto. I arguc. attempts to shore 
up his artworld concept with the special is of artistic identificatio~ and I explain why 
I believe he fails in this task. 
Chapter two examines Danto' s technique of comparing indiscernIble 
counterparts. I concentrate on the first six chapters of The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace and discuss six of the twenty-three examples of indiscernibles that 
Danto uses to illustrate his arguments. From this discussion I identify six principles 
encompassing Danto' s philosophy of art: (1) art is the result of human endeavour by 
an artist, (2) artworks acquire a history and a provenance, (3) artworks embody 
meaning (they are expressive), which meaning is a result of the artist's intention, (4) 
that meaning requires a subject about which the artist projects a point of view by 
means of rhetorical ellipsis, (5) artworks require interpretation and finally, (6) they 
are produced and interpreted within a historical context. I then consider Joseph 
Margolis's criticism of Danto's technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts; a 
development of Margolis's criticism of the is of artistic identification which was 
introduced in chapter one. I also look at how George Dickie's institutional theory of 
art relates to Danto's theory of art noting that Dickie, by introducing his idea of art 
as an inflected concept, accepts the circularity involved in his own definition of art as 
inevitable. I conclude that Danto's technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts 
is philosophically redundant, but I believe it is a redundant premise which has been 
added to a valid inference (Danto's historical and contextual view of art: his artworld 
theory). Therefore, this does not make the original inference invalid. Danto's 
contextual and historical view of art is, I argue, a genuine insight, and the technique 
of comparing indiscernible counterparts is not required to demonstrate its validity. 
Chapter three is devoted to the final chapter of The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace 'Metaphor, Expressio~ and Style'. Danto introduces the 
concepts of rhetoric and ellipsis which he identifies as important features of art. 
Following on from this, he proposes that interpretation in art requires an element of 
filling-in or bridging the enthymematic gap. Danto's discussion here resuhs in four 
claims. First. artworks embody rhetorical ellipsis~ they also have complex internal 
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cognitive relationships where contextualism is involved both in their production and 
interpretation. Second. artworks have similar features to metaphors: they are 
intensional (with an s) in structure; they include reference to a representation and 
they cannot be paraphrased. Third, a work of art expresses what it is a metaphor tor 
by the way it depicts its subject; metaphoric transfer takes art\\orks beyond the 
literal. Fourth. artworks are expressive: they embody style. 
The conclusion to the dissertation. chapter four, is in two parts. The 
ftrst part is a summary of my criticism of Danto's theory of art. The criticism has 
three major elements: (1) I identifY logical inconsistencies in his concept of the is of 
artistic identiftcation and in his use of indiscernible counterparts. (2) I believe that 
Danto has failed to provide an adequate definition of art: his theory suffers hy being 
over-inclusive, and finally. (3) Danto's philosophy of art uses arguments which arc 
circular. The second part of chapter four is a response to the criticism of the fIrst 
part; it provides an outline of my own theory of art: towards a definition of art. This 
has three major elements. First, arising from my criticism of Danto 's insistence on an 
art/non-art duality, a proposal for the existence of a spectrum of artistic presence in 
which all human activity and artefacts can be located. Sccond. an acceptance of 
Danto . s view of art (or artistic presence on my vic\\) as being both intentional and 
intensional, but I argue that by applying these concepts to a spectrum of artistic 
presence I avoid the problem of over-inclusiveness in Danto' s account of art. Finall). 
I argue that there can be no wholly non-circular account of art~ I acccpt (~eorge 
Dickie's vic\\- of art as an inflected concept. 
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Chapter One 
Danto and the Artworld Theory 
The whole world can become aestheticized without 
there being any change in the world at all. 
Arthur Danto Mysticism and Morality (1976, p.86) 
I. Introduction: Art as Mimesis, Mirror Images 
In this chapter I examine Arthur Danto's theory of art put forward in his famous 
paper 'The Artworld' (1964). The paper marks the beginning of Danto's interest in 
aesthetics. 'The Artworld' together with his 1981 book The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace are the key documents in the development of Danto's philosophy of 
art and have become classics in the field of contemporary aesthetics. The ideas and 
concepts introduced in "The Artworld' are developed and refined in The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace: I discuss them in chapters two and three. For 
example, Danto introduces his technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts in 
the paper, and I address it briefly in section V of this chapter. I return to examine his 
more detailed exposition of the subject in chapter two. 
The paper starts with a discussion of art as mimesis using the mirror 
image as an example. Danto begins with two opposing views on the subject: "Hamlet 
and Socrates, though in praise and deprecation respectively. spoke of art as a mirror 
held up to nature" (1964, p.2(2). As usual in Danto's writings. we are gi\t~n no 
references. but the rele\'ant passages are easily identified. The mention of Socr~ltes 
and rnirrors refers to the beginning of Book Ten of Plato's Republic. The discllssion 
centres on the \\(lrk (If the mimetic artist and Plato's \'icw that such artists produce 
representations which arl' at two remo\'es from realit\'. Artists producl' 
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representations of articles made by craftsmen (beds are used as an example): the 
articles made by the craftsmen already being at one remove from reality: one remove 
from the essential Platonic form of the article. Plato's reference to mirror images is 
used in his attempt to devalue art. He does this by proposing that the same result as 
the representation produced by the artist can easily be achieved by using a mirror: 
"it's not difficult, and can be done in various ways quite quickly. The quickest way is 
to take a mirror and tum it round in all directions; before long you will create sun 
and stars and earth, yourself and all other animals and plants. and all the other 
objects we mentioned just now" (596d-e, 1955, p.372). To the objection that they 
would only be reflections comes the reply: "quite right ... and very much to the 
point. For a painter is a craftsman of just this kind, I think" (596e. 1955, p.372). 
Danto stays with the discussion of mirror images: the next examples 
which he discusses come from Shakespeare. Hamler s view of the nature of the link 
between mirror images and art is seen as more positive. There are three references to 
mirrors or glasses, as Shakespeare refers to them, in Hamlet (3'1'147. 3·2·18 and 
3'4'18). In each the glass does more than merely reflect: it reveals the truth by 
showing things as they really are, rather than how they seem to be. In Hamlefs 
interview with the Queen he says "come, come and sit you down, you shall not 
budgc. / You go not till I set you up a glass / Where you may see the innermost part 
of you" (J·-t·18-20). Danto sees Hamlet identifying one important property of 
mirrors overlooked by Plato: the ability to show us true images of ourselves. Danto 
also bclien~s that art servcs this second purpose: "so art. insofar as it is mirrorlike. 
reveals us to ourselves. and is. even by socratic criteria, of some cognitin~ utility 
after all" (1964. p.2(2). This cognitive view of art. that it in some way embodies 
knowledl-!l'. is a kev issue for Danto. and the remainder of the paper is an attempt to 
'- . 
explore and just it\ this \iew. But is Danto justified in choosing lIamlet as an 
e:\;.unple'! Does Shakespeare link mirrors directly to art in the way that Plato dl..'l'S in 
his discussion in the Rt..'puhlic? 1 n one of the rderences to mirrors in f1amld. 
Shakl'spearl' docs provide just such a direl't link ill art: the art of theatre. Ilamk·t 
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instructs the players (who are about to perform The Murder of Gonzago) in their art 
"to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature; to show the virtue of her own feature. 
scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure" 
(3'2'18-20). The purpose of the play within the play is certainly cognitive: to "catch 
the conscience of the king" (2'2'558). 
Danto finds another difficulty with Socrates' discussion. If art is imitation. 
as Plato avows, then mirror images, which are likewise imitations, must also be 
considered as art. Danto's logic is flawed here: the conc1usio~ that mirror images 
are art, does not follow from the two premises. However. leaving the point of logic 
aside, Plato, in Book Ten of The Republic, suggests that there is no ontological 
difference between mirror images and painting. The last quotation I used from The 
Republic makes this clear. I should mention in passing that, earlier in The Republic, 
Plato distinguishes between mimetic and narrative art. Elsewhere he also discusses 
other theories of art: for example poetry as divine inspiration in Ion and Phaedrus~ 
so for Plato not all art is mimetic. Danto is focusing on one aspect of Plato's theory 
of art. I 
Danto finds Plato's VIew on art ill Book Ten of The Republic 
untenable. Plato's theory of art requires that mirror images be art; Danto believes 
that mirror images are not art, and therefore the theory is flawed. His argument is 
that since mirror images are not art but they are imitations, being an imitation cannot 
be a sufficient condition of art. Danto suggests that because art, from the time of 
Socrates virtually to the present day, has been primarily engaged with imitatio~ this 
deficiency has not been noticed. Danto believes that this deficiency was not apparent 
lmtil the advent of photography which. with its ability to provide instant imitations at 
the press of a butto~ triggered the recognition of the shortcoming of the thenry of 
art as imitation. Danto does not explain why this is so~ we are left to assume that it is 
because photography is imitation but is not art. But he does not distinguish bet\\een 
--- ------ - - ---
Ilatt.-r Danto appears to acknowlaJg~ the compk\ ity of Plato' s view 01 art (s(''e 19R 1. p. I 1 ). 
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photography which is not art and that which is; remember he himself champions 
some photography, such as Robert Mapplethorpe's, as art (see Danto, 1995). I shall 
return to the question of why some photography is art shortly. Once accepted, Danto 
believes this shortcoming of Plato's theory quickly led to the rejection of imitation as 
a necessary condition of art. Danto mentions the achievement of Kandinsky as an 
example. He does not specify exactly which achievement, but presumably he is 
referring to the development by Kandinsky of the first purely abstract paintings in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. Danto makes the point that the situation 
now has been reversed: it is difficult for some work which displays mimetic qualities 
to be considered as art at all. 
In relation to the Socratic discussion Danto' s view is that the disputants 
know what the concept of art includes; he says: ''the aim is to match a real defining 
expression to a term in active use, and the test for adequacy presumably consists in 
showing that the former analyzes and applies to all and only those things of which 
the latter is true" (1964, p.202). In other words, it is a matter of finding a suitable 
definition for those articles which are already known to be art: ''their antecedent 
ability to do this is precisely what the adequacy of the theory is to be tested against, 
the problem being only to make explicit what they already know"( 1964, p.202). 
Danto points out the problem with this approach: in the present day it is 
no easy matter to distinguish what is and what is not art. Danto states his solution to 
this problem: the requirement for an artistic theory. A theory of art is required to 
enable us to distinguish what is artistic terrain, and the reason "lies in the fact that 
terrain is constituted artistic in virtue of artistic theories, so that one use of theories, 
in addition to helping us discriminate art from the rest, consists in making art 
possible" (1964, p.203). Put another way. Danto believes that the theories of art are 
in part constitutive of what art is, and thus it is theory that makes certain types of art 
possible. Before I move on, however. I need to mention two objections to this 
approach. Firstly, what about everyday, non-philosophical conceptions of art: surely 
not all art is reliant on theory. I address this issue in section VIII. the conclusion to 
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this chapter. I argue that all art can be related to a general cultural inheritance. hut I 
accept that there is an element of circularity in this response. Secondly. if theory 
makes certain types of art possible, this precludes a theory of art being \\TOng. For 
example, Plato's imitation theory as a theory makes mimetic art possible; so, contra 
Danto, it must be correct. This objection is addressed by Danto' s view that theory in 
part constitutes what art is. There are other elements of art which, as I shall explain 
in chapters two and three, Danto proposes as necessary conditions of art: theory 
alone is not enough to constitute art. This sole dependence on imitation theory, 
Danto believes, explains the problem with the Socratic approach to art. Plato's 
theory of art is deficient because, being reliant on mimesis, it includes mirror images 
within the realm of art; a place in which Danto believes they clearly do not belong. 
Again I should emphasise that Danto has chosen to discuss only one element of 
Plato's complex and wide-ranging theory of art. 
This marks the end of Danto' s introduction to the paper. He concludes 
with the blunt statement of his proposition: that to detennine what is art an artistic 
theory is required. The remainder of the paper provides his justification for this view. 
Summing up the introduction, Danto has attempted to discredit the mimetic theory 
of art. His argument is twofold: firstly, that the imitation theory is too inclusive: it 
includes both mirror images and, although not explicitly stated, all photography 
within art. Secondly, it is too exclusive: it excludes abstract art, for instance. This 
assumes of course that abstract art and other non-mimetic artforms are indeed art; 
this subject is discussed in detail in section VII of this chapter 'But is it Art?'. 
The tirst part of Danto's argument, the problem with the Socratic 
defmition of art being too inclusive, is reasonable. Most people would agree that 
holiday snaps and mirror images are not art. Howen~r, it is possible to ha\'e art 
which consists of both photography and a mirror image: the late Helen Chadwick's 
scU:portrait Vanity is a well-known example (illustration 2). Danto's theory will 
ha\'c to explain hnw this is JX)ssiblc. The second part of the argument: how it is 
possihlc h.l havc a theory of art which includes abstract art. has simply hcL'n 
identified at this stage; we await the justification. We were reminded of Kandinsky's 
achievement, but, so far, it has not been explained why a theory should enable us to 
consider abstract art as being art. We will also need to know how to distinguish 
photographic art, like Chadwick's, from holiday snaps. The theory will have to 
acconunodate the vast array of new art fonns: for instance ready-mades. video art. 
performance art, outsider art, body art and appropriational art. We must be provided 
with a theory to explain if and why these things are art. I move on in the next section 
to examine how Danto develops this idea of artistic theory. He begins by examining 
two existing theories of art: imitation theory and reality theory. He has of course just 
dismissed the imitation theory but in his re-examination of it, as I shall explain. he is 
interested in the change from imitation theory to reality theory. At this stage I should 
point out that Danto's artistic theory did not achieve its full development and 
refinement until 1981. with the publication of The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, seventeen years after · The Artworld' article. 
II. Imitation and Reality Theories of Art 
In this section Danto begins with the issue of how we would deal with the discovery 
of a completely new class of artworks - a group of objects that were newly created 
or newly found and that were quite different from our accepted view of art. 
Although Danto asks us to visualise a completely new set of objects, we can readily 
think of many exanlples from the history of twentieth-century art that would fit this 
scenario: in fact, he chooses one example himself, from the world of painting. to 
look at in detail: the post-Impressionists. Danto's idea is that the treatment of new 
artworks has parallels with the situation in science where some recentl: discovered 
facts do not fit with the current scientific theory. He suggests that the (initially 
tempting) way of accommodating this wayward evidence in scien(l'. thl' line of least 
resistance. which allows us to retain a \\dl-regardcd and valuable theory. is hy wa: 
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of auxiliary hypotheses. I believe there is a major flaw with this analogy which I will 
explain shortly; for the present I continue with Danto' s exposition. 
Danto returns to the theory of mimesis in art and gives it a title: the 
Imitation Theory of Art (IT). He goes on to say that IT has suffered from the 
imposition of auxiliary hypotheses, and he proceeds to explain how this has 
happened. He examines the move away from purely mimetic art in the work of the 
post-Impressionists. The example he discusses is the widespread contemporary 
auxiliary hypothesis which was added to IT: the suggestion that those responsible for 
these 'aberrant' objects were tricksters, charlatans or simply inept. Although Danto 
does not go into detail, there is plenty of well-documented historical evidence to 
substantiate the claim that the post-Impressionists were regarded by many 
contemporary critics as incompetents or pranksters.2 He then asks us to suppose that 
this auxiliary hypothesis can be proven to be mistaken. And this supposition is not 
unreasonable: we can discover, for instance, that the post-Impressionists (Danto 
stays with this example) were quite capable of producing mimetic art in the current 
academic manner. Also that they were not trying to make money or mischief by 
deception and that they had an unquestionable belief in the importance and 
seriousness of their work. If the auxiliary hypothesis fails. what then is required? 
Danto says that what is needed is a new theory which will accommodate all the old 
examples of art, and, in addition, allow the new examples to be taken up into the 
domain of art. Again. Danto asks us to compare the situation in art to that in science 
where at certain stages a well proven theory is o\'erthrown: what Danto calls a 
conceptual revolution has taken place.3 
2 I tlui:-- I,enw's rnil'\\ 'The I:xhibition of the Impressionists' is a famous example reprinted in 
lIarrison, Wood and Gaiger, 1998, p.573-76. The critical response to Manet's painting is another 
well-dlx'umentl.'(j e'\ample. SLoe Hamilton, 1954. 
3 Although hl' dlX'S not rnentinn him in the paper, the inspiration for this idea omlL"S Irom Thoma ... 
Kuhn. Danhl ad,nowkdgl.~ his debt to Kuhn's The ,,'(nlcllIrC l~tSClt'nlific Rt.'\·o/lIIions in [)-,mtl). 
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Danto applies this idea of a completely new theory, a conceptual 
revolutio~ to the development of post-Impressionist painting. Using the then current 
theory of art (IT) these new post-Impressionist paintings would have to be dismissed 
as inept, shoddy, unfinished or as some kind of tasteless joke. Danto explains: ""to 
get them accepted as art , .. required not so much a revolution in taste as a 
theoretical revision of rather considerable proportions, involving not only the artistic 
enfranchisement of these objects, but an emphasis upon newly significant features of 
existing artworks, so that quite different accounts of their status as artworks would 
now have to be given" (1964, p.203). Another result of this conceptual revolution 
was that other objects, until then not considered as being art, were brought into the 
artistic fold. Danto gives the examples of the tribal masks and Chinese pottery that 
were transferred from anthropological museums to art museums. He emphasises that 
nothing has been taken out of the fine art fold; it is that new items have been added. 
The question of whether anything can cease to be art is addressed in chapter two; in 
summary, my answer, based on Danto's contextualism, is a qualified no. We will see 
how an artwork acquires a provenance and a history from which it cannot escape. It 
could however, if it was a ready-made, be used again for its original purpose: 
perhaps its provenance and history may be unknown or forgotten. 
Danto qualifies the previous discussion: he acknowledges that he 
provides a simplified view. In fact, there were several replacing theories around at 
the time of the post-Impressionists, but he is concentrating on one particular theory 
which was very clearly and explicitly put forward and promoted as a replacement 
theory for IT. The theory in questio~ which he calls The Reality Theory of Art 
(RT). is based on the idea that ""the artists in question were to be understood not as 
unsuccessfully imitating real forms but as successfully creating new ones. quite as 
real a..'i the forms which the older art had been thought. in its best examples. to he 
JQ99a, p.I-3. Kuhn's conct.T't of scientific progr~ as a St.~ies of paradigm shifts is also mentioned 
in Danlo. 1986, p.202. 
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creditably imitating" (1964, p.204). This Reality Theory of Art (RT), as Danto refers 
to it, was formulated by Roger Fry and Clive Bell who championed the 
post-Impressionists in Britain in the early part of the twentieth century.4 Fry, in 
1917, summarised the achievement of cezanne, Gauguin and Van Gogh as being 
''the re-establishment of purely aesthetic criteria in place of the criterion of 
conformity to appearance - the rediscovery of the principles of structural design and 
harmony" (1961, p.19). Danto does not look at the theory in any detail; he does not 
look at either the 'art as expression' element in Fry's writing or the development of 
the concept of 'significant form' in Bell's. Danto's only aim at this stage is to 
provide an example of a theory of art which does not rely on the principle of mimesis 
and which has superseded the imitation theory. 
The theory he chooses (RT) serves this purpose well. Danto explains 
how "one might almost interpret the crude drawing in Van Gogh and Cezanne, the 
dislocation of form from contour in Rouault and Dufy, the arbitrary use of color 
planes in Gauguin and the Fauves, as so many ways of drawing attention to the fact 
that these were non-imitations, specifically intended not to deceive" (1964, p.204). 
However, we must note that here Danto assumes, incorrectly I believe, that the 
purpose of all figurative art before the post-Impressionists was deception; with a few 
exceptions such as trompe l'reil, figurative art does not exclusively aim to deceive. 
Danto fails to distinguish between the rare cases of mimetic art which aims to 
deceive and figurative art which can serve other purposes besides imitation: amongst 
other qualities it can be didactic, decorative or tragic. Returning to RT, these new 
entities are not intended to be imitations but new creations in their own right. Danto 
takes Van Gogh's Potato Eaters as an example; here we have not an imitation of 
potato eaters but a new entity: a non-imitation which has "as much right to be called 
a real object as did its putative subjects" (1964, p.204). In other words, Danto 
4 Roger Fry coined the term post-Impressionism for an exhibition at the Grafton Galleries in 1911. 
He chose it as the most vague and non-committal he could think oft See Fry. 1961. p.227. 
19 
believes that this new theory (RT) has enabled the work of the post-Impressionists. 
as well as other objects such as tribal art and Chinese pottery, to be accommodated 
in the category of art from where, using IT, they would have been barred. The 
ontological status of artworks has been changed: the Socratic theory of mimesis has 
been shown to be no longer adequate. I have previously mentioned. however. that 
the theory of mimesis is only one aspect of Plato's view of art and that for Plato art 
serves other purposes as well; Danto fails to acknowledge the breadth and 
complexity of the Socratic discussion of art. 
The difficulty with Danto' s approach lies where it begins: with his 
analogy. He asked us to "suppose one thinks of the discovery of a whole new class 
of artworks as something analogous to the discovery of a whole new class of facts 
anywhere, viz., as something for theoreticians to explain" (1964, p.203, emphasis 
added). But facts are not the same as artworks; Danto's mistake is to treat them as 
the same; his mistake is a mistake of category. Scientific facts, which Danto chooses 
for his analogy, are discovered and must be accommodated within a theory. This, of 
course, is an over-simplification but here I only intend to show the difference in 
status between facts and artworks. Artworks are created not discovered. I will have 
to return later to discuss the special case of ready-mades and why they should still be 
considered as being 'created'. Danto has already accepted, in the quotation above, 
that these objects are a whole new class of artworks. He calls them that quite 
bluntly; they are already artworks. The new theory is used to explain why they are 
works of art: why they enjoy the special status of artworks. The theory comes after 
it has been decided that these new objects are indeed works of art. Danto is thus 
begging the question: he has assumed the very point that is at issue. In other words. 
he has already accepted that these things are artworks: the theory is put in place 
afterwards to justify why this is so. This process is appropriate for accommodating 
scientific facts but not with explaining why a new set of objects should be considered 
as artworks. 
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This problem points to a wider issue: the difficulty of providing a 
definition of art, indeed, if such a definition is possible. Any successful definition of 
art would have to be immune to any future counter-examples. Put in another way_ 
for a definition to be successful it must be able to accommodate any potential new 
work of art that may be encountered. In the introduction I have already considered 
this in relation to Danto's philosophy of the history of art; I will return to the 
problem of the definition of art in chapter three when I look at Danto's fully 
developed philosophy of art. In the conclusion I will also look at the issue of 
whether it is either necessary or possible to arrive at a definition of art. At present. I 
am simply pointing out a problem with Danto's analogy between the reception of 
new artworks, as they relate to art theory, and of new scientific facts, as they relate 
to scientific theory. I continue with Danto's exposition of RT. 
Danto believes that we must use Reality Theory not Imitation Theory in 
order to understand the art that surrounds us today. We must assume that he 
includes everything which is now considered art: all the historical works now in our 
museums and galleries as well as contemporary art which he concentrates on. He 
chooses two examples of mimetic art, where perhaps IT might have been thought 
appropriate, to illustrate the inability of IT to explain the works in question. He 
discusses the paintings of Roy Lichtenstein and Jasper Johns pointing out that, 
although they are seemingly straightforward imitations of everyday images, they are 
new entities: new works of art. For example, Roy Lichtenstein's paintings are 
obviously huge blow-ups of comic strip panels. Danto makes the point that an 
illustration of a Lichtenstein painting in an art book is indiscernible from a 
photograph of Milton CanitI's original panel for the comic strip. Danto argues that 
what makes the Lichtenstein painting a new entity is the huge scale; the painting is 
not an imitation - was never intended as an imitation - of the SIt'\'{' Canyon 
character in the comic lxwk. It is a new creation. and we must use RT to explain it: 
an explanation in terms of IT will tell llS nothing about the essential quality of the 
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work. Note that for the fIrst time in the discussion the issue of indiscernibilitv, which 
will feature so prominently in Danto 's argument. has been raised. 
Danto, with a waggish reference back to Plato' s discussion of beds, 
ends the discussion of RT by looking at two artists, Robert Rauschenberg and Claus 
Oldenburg, both of whom have used real beds as part of their artwork (se'c 
illustrations 3 and 4). Danto makes the point that, although they are vastly expensive' 
as beds and that they live in art galleries, they could be mistaken by someone as 
being just beds. Danto invents the hard-headed character Testadura to act as a 
philistine: '"he [Testadura] attributes the paintstreaks on Rauschenberg's bed to the 
slovenliness of the owner, and the bias in the Oldenburg bed to the ineptitude of the 
builder or the whimsy, perhaps, of whoever had it 'custom made' ,. (1964, p.205). 
The important point that Danto makes is that they could still sef\~ as beds: 
Testadura could sleep in them. If he did so he would be mistaking art for reality. But 
the artworks, by courtesy of the very theory itself (RT), have their own reality. 
Danto poses some questions: ''they [the birds who tried to peck Zeuxis' grapes] 
mistook art for reality, and so has Testadura. But it was meant to he reality, 
according to RT. Can one have mistaken reality for reality? Ilow shall we describe 
Testadura's error? What, after all, prevents Oldenburg's cr~ation from being a 
misshapen bed?" (1964, p.205). Danto has highlighted a clear difference between 
Fry's use of the word reality and the everyday use of the word to distinguish the 
presence of oqjects. He decides that this is the same as asking what it is that rnak~s 
these items art: how do you distinguish a real bed from one of Oldcnburg's or 
Rauschenherg's works of art? It is this question which he attempts to answer with 
his idea ofthc is of artistic identification. I examine this concept in the next section. 
III. The 1.\" of Artistic Identification 
I>mlto cont inues using his exanlple of the bcd. lie reminds us that the two examples 
nf lx'ds in art whiL'h he u~'s. OIJenburg's Bedroom Fn\t.'mhle and Rauschenlx'rg' s 
Bed, could be used to sleep on. In this particular fonn of art they are not images of 
beds but actual beds. How is Danto's character Testadura to distinguish beds in art 
from beds which simply serve the purpose for which they are normally used? Danto 
makes the obvious point that one cannot discover that a bed is not, after all, a bed. 
This leads him to the first part of his explanation: he points out a parallel with the 
Strawsonian concept of individuals.5 It should be noted that Danto asks us to 
assume the correctness of Straw son's view here; he does not give us any justification 
or argument. Danto suggests that mistaking a work of art for a bed is rather like 
"mistaking a person for a material body when the truth is that a person is a material 
body in the sense that a whole class of predicates, sensibly applicable to material 
bodies, are sensibly, and by appeal to no different criteria, applicable to persons" 
(1964, p.205-6). However, a person is, in this Strawsonian view, not just a material 
body but an enduring entity with a material body and also with psychological 
properties; the two sets of features being inseparable. In other words, just as one 
cannot discover that the bed in Oldenburg'S Bedroom Ensemble is not a bed, 
similarly, one cannot discover that a person is not a material body. 
Danto notices that, in the two works he is discussing, the beds in 
question are only part of the artwork. The Rauschenberg bed is a compound 
creation~ it is a bed smeared with paint: Danto calls it a 'paint-bed'. Here Danto 
points out, again. the parallel with P. F. Strawson's account of persons. According 
to Strawson, a person is not just a material body with thoughts added but a complex 
irreducible whole: an individual. In his account Danto is suggesting that works of 
art, like individuals, are in a sense primitive and cannot be reduced to their 
constitutive clements; in a strong sense they are irreducible. I return to a similar 
argument in chapter three: Danto's view that artworks are intensional (with an') in 
structure and cannot be paraphrased. Danto then generalises in an attempt to 
characterise artworks. but he is quite specific that he is discussing a special class of 
5 As outlined in his bt.:xlk Indi~·iduu/.\'. sec Strawson. 1959. 
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artworks: those that contain real objects as part of their make-up. He explains: '"not 
every part of an artwork A is part of a real object R when R is part of A and can, 
moreover, be detached from A and seen merely as R even though it would not be 
incorrect to say that A is R, that the artwork is a bed. It is the 'is' which requires 
clarification here" (1964, p.206). Danto builds his argument on this last point: that 
there is a special use of the word is involved, and he believes that it is a use which 
occurs predominantly in the discussion of artworks. 
Danto begins by clarifying what this special use is not: it is "not the is of 
either identity or predication; nor is it the is of existence, of identification, or some 
special is made up to serve a philosophic end" (1964, p.206). He gives a number of 
examples; I will discuss one: the painting The Fall of Icarus by Pieter Bruegel the 
Elder (see illustration 5). Danto imagines pointing out the figure of Icarus to a 
companion in the gallery. At first glance the painting seems to be a traditional 
pastoral composition; the title perhaps alerts us to look for something more. Closer 
inspection reveals the unfortunate Icarus plunging to his death, but the image of 
Icarus is tiny in relation to the whole painting. Danto uses this need for the tiny 
figure, 'that white dab' as he refers to it, to be pointed out to many viewers as an 
example of his special use of the word is. He explains that in pointing out to his 
companion that the white dab is Icarus ''we do not mean, in these instances, that 
whatever is pointed to stands for, or represents, what it is said to be, for the word 
'Icarus' stands for or represents Icarus: yet I would not in the same sense of is point 
to the word and say 'That is Icarus' " (1964, p.206). Danto completes his 
explanation and here I quote the final section in full. 
The sentence "That a is b" is perfectly compatible with "That a is not 
b" when the first employs this sense of is and the second employs 
some other. though a and b are used non-ambiguously throughout. 
Often, indeed. the truth of the first requires the truth of the second. 
The first. in fact. is incompatible with "That a is not b" only when the 
is is used nonambiguously throughout. For want of a word I shall 
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designate this the is of artistic identification; in each case in which it is 
used, the a stands for some specific physical property of. or physical 
part ot: an object; and, finally, it is a necessary condition for something 
to be an artwork that some part or property of it be desigrub1e by the 
subject of a sentence that employs this special is. (1964, p.206) 
Danto is saying, using an example of my o~ that the special is of artistic 
identification when used to point to a painting of a book and saying 'that is a book' 
is compatible with saying 'that is not a book but a painting'. However, a similar use 
of is could apply to a photograph of a book or the written title of a book, and both 
would also be compatible with saying 'that is not a book'. As I shall explain in the 
next section, this is one of my criticisms of Danto's is of artistic identification: it 
applies to such a wide range of other things that it is of little use in distinguishing art. 
At the end of the last quotation we have the statement of the first part of Danto' s 
definition of art: he provides us with a necessary condition of art. I will be looking at 
criticism of this idea in the next section; for the present I continue with the unfolding 
of Danto's theory. 
Danto moves on to his famous example of the two identical paintings. 
He proposes a hypothetical commission for two paintings: one painter is asked to 
produce a work illustrating and entitled Newlon's First Law, the second is asked to 
produce a work called Newton's Third Law. Both paintings turn out to be identical 
and are illustrated on the next page.6 
6Danto, I Q64. p.107. Danto labels the illustrations .·f and B. He then refers to the painters as A and 
B. but in the tl)lIl)win~ paragraph he again refers to the paintings as A and B. H~ is, contusingl~. 
lI'.ing A and B as the nallll'S of both the painters and their rl.~pecti\"e works. 
A B 
The two painters, as we would expect, explain their work in completely different 
ways. B explains his work as the opposition of two masses: one pressing down the 
other pressing up; this relates to Newton's third law (if one body exerts a force on 
another, there is an equal and opposite force, or reactio~ exerted by the second 
body on the first). A explains his work as a line of the movement of a single particle 
through space; this relates to Newton's first law (a body continues in a state of rest 
or unifonn motion in a straight line unless it is acted on by an external force). 
Danto notes a feature of both paintings: that the black line crossing the 
centre of the white canvases goes right across the paintings from side to side. In the 
case of picture A "'the path goes from edge to edge, to give the sense of its going 
beyond" (1964, p.207). In the case of B he says: "to regard the middle line as an 
edge (mass meeting mass) imposes the need to identify the top and bottom half of 
the pictures as rectangles" (1964, p.207). In passing, I mention a very odd feature of 
the illustration that Danto uses: the fact that the horizontal line. inexplicably and 
totalJy at odds with the whole argument. docs not meet the edge of the picture: it 
does not do l'xad Iy what Danto says it must. 7 Danto goes on to explain a number of 
------ -----
7 This is the case in the original article in The JournaJ (~l Philosophy, and it {X:cur" in e\'cry other 
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other possible and quite plausible explanations of the paintings. The line could 
indicate the edge of one mass (either the top or bottom rectangle) giving the pictures 
a strong spatial or three-dimensional interpretation. Or the whole area of the picture 
could be a flat surface 'Which the line is above (Jetjlight), or below 
(Submarine-path), or on (Line), or in (Fissure)" (1964, p.207). He then proposes 
two other interpretations where the line is extended through space: the line becomes 
a plane. Unlike the interpretation from painter B, the space could extend beyond the 
edge of the rectangle: the viewer being in the same space. Or it could be a plane 
within the confines of the rectangular space of the picture. So, at this stage, Danto 
has given us ten different interpretations of the paintings. 
He makes three general points. Firstly, that the interpretations, or 
identifications as he calls them, in several instances require us to consider the 
existence of other interpretations. For example the interpretation with the mass at 
the top of the painting and the void at the bottom requires us to consider the 
reversal: the mass at the bottom and the void at the top. Secondly, some 
interpretations seem to suggest further similar interpretations and that these form a 
group: for example, those based on reading the picture as a flat surface. Thirdly, 
another strong feature is that one interpretation usually precludes others: the 
readings tend to be incompatible with each other. The several readings could 
therefore be considered as separate artworks: "even though each artwork contains 
the identical real object as part of itself - or at least parts of the identical real object 
as parts of itself' (1964, p.208). Danto also makes the point that senseless 
interpretations are possible but, of course, would be unjustifiable. Finally, he points 
out how each interpretation creates, what is in effect, a different world giving as an 
example a poetic reading of the painting: as a clear sky reflected in a perfectly 
smooth expanse of water (interpretation number eleven). 
reprint of the article I have encountered. The mistake is corrected in 1he TransjiguraJion of lhe 
Commonplace where Danto uses the same example. See Danto. 1981. p. 121. 
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Danto now brings Testadura back into the argument who complains that 
all that he can see is the white canvas with a black line. And he is quite correct; that 
is all there is to see.8 Danto explains: ''we cannot help him until he has mastered the 
is of artistic identification and so constitutes it a work of art. If he cannot achieve 
this, he will never look upon artworks" (1964, p.208). Danto' s last interpretation of 
the painting, number twelve, is a purely abstract one entitled No.7 by its artist. This 
artist is adamant that all there is to see is paint. Danto asks the question: how can 
this interpretation be different from Testadura's? Danto's answer contains the basis 
of his fully-fledged theory of the 'artworld'. The abstract painter has, according to 
Danto, rejected any of the approaches that have been identified; he has eschewed any 
literal interpretation and is using the medium in its own right. The manifestation of 
the paint on the canvas is the essential quality of the artwork. But he has achieved 
this position through working within an atmosphere of art history. He relies on 
theories of art and his knowledge of past and recent artworks. It is his background 
and his knowledge of contemporary art which has enabled him to achieve this 
position. He requires this knowledge to be in a position to reject all the other 
interpretations: to return to what he considers the true reality of paint on canvas. 
Danto provides us with a summary of his theory and it is here that he introduces the 
tenn 'artworld'. 
His [the abstract painter's] identification of what he has made is 
logically dependent upon the theories and history he rejects. The 
diflerence between his utterance and Testadura's "This is black paint 
~U1d white paint and nothing more" lies in the fact that he is still using 
the is of artistic identification. so that his use of "That black paint is 
black paint" is not a tautology. Testadura is not at that stage. To see 
something as art requires something the eye cannot decry [sic 1 - an 
------ -- -------
8 rhe relevance of Dantu's supt..'fscription becomes apparent: "HAMLI T: Do you see nothing 
tht.-re'? I GER IRUDE: Nothing at all: yl't all that is I see", Hamiel, )·4·131-2. 
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atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an 
artworld. (1964, p.209)9 
In the first two sections of 'The Artworld' paper Danto has discussed 
the two theories of art, IT and RT, and he has outlined his idea of the special is of 
artistic identification. He has also introduced his concept of the " artworld " . In the 
final two sections he goes on the examine the artworld concept in more detail. At 
this stage I need to point out that Danto sees his two ideas, the is of artistic 
identification and the artworld, as being interdependent. This is evident from the 
quotation above and similar statements supporting this interdependence appear later 
in the paper. The implication is that the artworld concept requires the is of artistic 
identification to succeed. In the next section, section IV, I will look at criticism of 
the is of artistic identification. The criticism shows, I believe, that the idea of the is 
of artistic identification is inherently flawed. I return to look at the artworld concept 
in section V; I also examine the link between the is of artistic identification and the 
artworld in the conclusion to this chapter. 
IV. Problems with the Is of Artistic Identification 
The concept of the is of artistic identification is open to three areas of criticism: 
firstly, it relies on imprecise use of language, secondly, that it is too exclusive and 
thirdly, it is internally inconsistent. I shall consider each of these in turn. I begin with 
Danto "s imprecise use of language recalling that in introducing the is of artistic 
identification he discussed two works of art incorporating real beds. He said '1he 
artwork is a bed" (1964, p.206); it is this use of is that Danto identifies as the is of 
artistic identification. The problem here is that this usage of is is quite common, and 
it is not used uniquely for identifYing art. Taking the example in the quotation above. 
it is simply a coUoquial shortening of a sentence something like: 'the major feature of 
9 The wrong word is used in this quotation: it should be descry rather than decry. 
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this artwork is that it incorporates a real bed.' There is a metonymic element 
involved here; there is a substitution of a feature of the artwork for the artwork itself 
when discussing the work in question. But this elliptical use of language does not 
help us to identify any essential qualities of artworks. 
To explain why, I will return to another of Danto's examples: Pieter 
Bruegel the Elder's painting The Fall of Icarus. I repeat what Danto has to say 
about the figure of Icarus: "in the gallery I point for my companion's benefit, to a 
spot in the painting before us and say 'That white dab is Icarus.' We do not mean. in 
these instances, that whatever is pointed to stands for, or represents, what it is said 
to be, for the word 'Icarus' stands for or represents Icarus: yet I would not in the 
same sense of is point to the word and say 'That is Icarus' " (1964, p.206). Danto 
misses an important distinction here. In cases like the example of Icarus we have 
more than one way of representing objects: we have visual representation using 
images and representation using words. Contrary to what Danto tells us. the white 
dab does represent Icarus to us visually just as the word 'Icarus' represents Icarus to 
us in a linguistic way. The problem I have identified here is that Danto's special use 
of is has many other manifestations outside the identification of artworks. I see a 
picture of a car and say "that is a Morgan': I am using this same sense of is here. The 
picture is not a car nor is it an artwork. In this case. and in the case of The Fall of 
Icarus. the is Danto is referring to is no more than the is of representational 
identification. To give another example: looking at some holiday snaps I can say 
"that white spot is me standing in front of the Eiffel Tower.' The use of is here is 
Danto's use, but it is the is of representational identification. In fact, this use is so 
widespread that it seems to be of very little value in doing what Danto claims that it 
does: idcnti6'ing art. Calling it the is of artistic identification gin~s it a particularity 
which is unjustified. Danto does say that it is a necessary condition of art, but it is in 
sllch widespread use outside art that it fails to serve any useful purpose. In other 
words the is of artistic identitication is too inclusive to be of any help in deciding 
what is art. 
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If the first difficulty suggests that the is of artistic identification is too 
inclusive; the second difficuhy I identify suggests the opposite problem: that the term 
is too exclusive. If this special use of is, in the is of artistic identification, is purely 
representational, as Danto's example of The Fall of Icarus suggests. can it really be 
a necessary condition of an artwork? What about non-representational art? What 
about the example Danto uses of the 10th Street abstractionalist who painted So. -
which I discussed in the previous section? William Kennick in commenting on 'The 
Artworld' paper says: "Danto admits that there are such things as 'pure 
abstractions,' but he does not take their existence as showing that his claim [about 
the special use of is] is false. For he holds that to say such things as 'this is black 
paint and nothing more', which one would suppose is to employ only the "is' of 
ordinary identification, is still to use the 'is' of artistic identification" (1964, p.586). 
In this view the is of artistic identification is too exclusive. Put in 
another way, Kennick believes that Danto has conflated two meanings of is within 
his concept of the is of artistic identification: the representational meaning initially, 
when discussing The Fall of Icarus, but the is of straightforward identification when 
he is considering abstract art. It is interesting to note that it is at this very point in the 
discussion, when Danto begins to discuss abstract art. that he first introduces the 
artworld concept. It is at this moment that he tacitly accepts that the is of artistic 
idcntification and the artworld concept are interdependent. Danto needs the concept 
of the artworld, the atmosphere of theories and art history, to explain abstract art. 
and he bolsters up the is of artistic identificatio~ at this stage, by linking it with the 
artworld concept. I will return to this question of the interdependence of the two 
ideas latcr in the chapter. 
I move on to the third area of criticism of the is of artistic identification: 
that it is intcrnally inconsistent. Joseph Margolis belie\'cs Danto's theory to be tlatly 
incohcrcnt: that the argument he uses results in the unreality of artworks. I should 
point out why Margolis hclic\cs his objection is so important. The wording hc rekrs 
to is Dantu' s only definit inn of the is of art ist ic identification. I'he n:uson wh\ 
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Margolis scrutinises it so closely is that Danto returns time after time to invoke the 
special is. but this is his only definition of it. To explain Margolis"s objection I need 
to return to Danto's exact wording; discussing the is of artistic identification it will 
be recalled that he said: ''the sentence 'That a is b' is perfectly compatible with "That 
a is not b' when the fIrst employs this sense of is and the second employs some 
other, though a and b are used non-ambiguously throughout. Often. indeed. the 
truth of the first requires the truth of the second. The first. in fact. is incompatible 
with 'That a is not b' only when the is is used non-ambiguously throughout"" (1964. 
p.206). I have emboldened the 'a and b' and the" is' to highlight that the first use of 
'non-ambiguously throughout' refers to the a and b, whilst the second use refers to 
the is. This is an important distinction as will be seen. 
Margolis comments on this passage: "I draw your attention, however. to 
two features of what Danto says. First, he says (in effect) that "That a is b' may be 
true, in the sense of the' is of artistic identifIcation' if and only (f "That a is not b' is 
true in (say) the sense of the' is' of existence and/or identity. I do not see how that 
can be gainsaid. Danto means that. in asserting the fIrst, one is never speaking {~l 
what is, as such, real, but only "making' attributions (in the sense of the" is of artistic 
identification') (~f what is. independently, real or exists (but is not an art\\ork)'" 
(1998, p.366). In other words, "that a is b' is compatible with "that a is not b' when 
the first is is the is of artistic identification. For example, in looking at a bucolic 
landscape painting I say "that white blob is a sheep' which is quite compatible with 
saying "that white blob is not a sheep' because I know it is not a real sheep. Danto 
takes this further: he says that "that a is h' is incompatible with "that a is not h' only 
\\ hen the is is used nonambiguously in each case. In other words. if I use the is of 
artistic identification in both cases, I cannot say that the white blob is a sheep and is 
not a sheep. The \\ord "only' is important here: it leads to a necessary condition or 
the truth of the is of artistic identification. So in the second case ('a is not h'). if the 
is is not the is of artistic identification. to be compatible it must be some other usc of 
j\. From this ~targolis deduces that I).mtn is saying that "u is h" (using the j.\ of 
artistic identification) is true if and only if "a is not b' (using is in some other way). 
Hence we have a necessary condition of using the is of artistic identification: it can 
be used only when the artwork is not the real thing (the subject of the artwork) to 
which the special is refers. The is of artistic identification is therefore limited to 
making attributions about this real thing (the subject of the artwork) which is itself 
not the artwork. Danto is saying that viewing something (some part or property of 
it) using the is of artistic identification is a necessary feature of art and this is why. as 
I have already mentioned, Margolis believes his definition is so important. In 
summary, Margolis's first point is that the sentence 'that a is b' where the is is the is 
of artistic identification, is a statement making a secondary attribution about what 
really exists (the subject of the artwork) not the artwork itself. 
Margolis moves on to his second point. I again need Danto's full wording 
which follows on directly from the previous quotation: ""for want of a word I shall 
designate this the is of artistic identification; in each case in which it is used, the a 
stands for some specific physical property of, or physical part of, an object; and, 
finally, it is a necessary condition for something to be an artwork that some part or 
property of it be designable by the subject of a sentence that employs this special is" 
(1964. p.206, bold face added). The crucial word in this part of the quotation is 
'object' (which I have emboldened); note that the 'object' here, as we are told in the 
first part of the quotation, stands for or refers to some real thing which is not the 
artwork. Margolis comments on this part of Dan to's quotation: ""he says that one can 
speak in this way only if. in speaking of an artwork, one restricts what one is 
speaking of to what confonns with the 'is of artistic identification' and only if what 
is 'identified' in that sense is 'some specific physical property of. or physical part of, 
an [existentl object [that is not. as such, an artwork], .. (1998. p.366). The square 
hrnckets in this quotation are Margolis's own. So. in talking of artworks, using the is 
of artistic identification. we arc referring to physical objects so that. Margolis argues. 
we cannot assign lilly intentional properties to them: the physical o~;ects do not and 
are unahlc to possess such properties. I f we are referring to ph~ sical objects 
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Margolis also notes that they must be perceptually discernible properties of those 
objects and not perceptually discenuble properties of artworks because on Danto' s 
argument there are none to see beyond those of the physical object. 
In this sense Margolis believes that Danto, in using the is of artistic 
identification, has "somehow lost the existence and reality of artworks!" (1998. 
p.367). Margolis explains that artworks, using this definition, must "lack the 
intentionally complex properties we impute to 'them' (whenever we treat physical 
objects as artworks, by way of the 'is of artistic identification'). Artworks cannot be 
physical objects, for the simple reason that the first 'possess' (within the imaginative 
idiom of the 'is of artistic identification') properties that the second really (and 
necessarily) lack" (1998, pp.367-8). He concludes: "if artworks happen to be 
sensorily indiscernible from real things, but exist, then artworks must be discernible 
in some sense; and if there is no discernible difference that marks an artwork as 
really different from a thing that is not an artwork, then there are no artworks unless 
(following Leibniz's well-known account) artworks are identical with 'real' things. 
(Which on the argument is false)" (1998, p.369). 
Put another way, when I use this is to identifY artwork, the artwork 
(or part or feature of it), the a in the quotations, refers to some physical part or 
property of the object. The a in the quotations, say the white blob (in my example 
above), stands for a physical entity or component of an object (in my example the 
sheep). Margolis believes that Danto's argument proposes that in identifYing 
artworks. we must use the is of artistic identification (because it is a necessary 
condition), and, in doing so, we must refer to some physical property of the real 
thing which exists but is not an artwork. Margolis believes that. on Danto's 
argument. in speaking of art we are speaking of some aspect of a physical thing. but 
in treating it this way. using the is of artistic identification. Danto is imputing to it 
(this a'ipect of a physical thing) "intentional properties that it does not and cannot 
possess" (Margolis. 1998. p366). This is ~cause. in using the special is. I am 
al".a\'s referring imaginativel~ to something which exists but is not t~ artwork. It: as 
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Danto states in his argument, artworks or parts of artworks are real things they 
cannot also possess the intentional properties (what Danto later calls 'aboutness') 
which he, Danto, believes they must. In other words, in speaking of artworks, as I 
am speaking of a physical part or property of a real thing, I must be speaking about 
something which is discernible perceptually in the real thing. Therefore I cannot be 
referring to the perceptual properties of artworks because the only perceptually 
discernible properties, on Danto' s argument, are in the real thing. 
In summary, Margolis's second point is that in speaking of artworks, 
usmg the is of artistic identification, we are speaking only of the perceptual 
properties of physical objects and therefore cannot assign intentional properties to 
them. Both Danto and Margolis agree that artworks have intentional properties, 
therefore Margolis believes that Danto has lost the reality of artworks in his 
definition. 
It may be argued that Margolis is putting too much emphasis on the 
exact wording of Danto's definition of the special is: after all, Danto does say 
elsewhere, and quite clearly, that works of art are real things interpreted in terms of 
the special is of artistic identification. Later in The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace Danto says: "one may be a realist about objects and an idealist about 
artworks; this is the germ of the truth in saying without the artworld there is no art" 
(1981, p.125). Margolis would accept Danto's view that artworks are real things 
created and interpreted in an artistic context; his argument here is specifically about 
Danto's special is: that it is of no use (because of its internal incoherence) in 
explaining what this specific artistic context (rather than any other context) is. 
Margolis~s argument, and I agree with him on this, is not against Danto's contextual 
theory of art (which he largely accepts) but with his insistence on using what 
Margolis considers the flawed concept of the is of artistic identification. 
Margolis's argument now moves on to concentrate on the question of 
indiscernibility. However. before I can address this issue adequately. I need to 
explain Danto's concept of the artworld and look at his further use of indiscemibles 
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in his 1981 book The Transfiguration o/the Commonplace. I will do this in the next 
chapter and also return to Margolis's argument in this wider context. 
I have discussed three criticisms of the is of artistic identification; first, 
it uses imprecise language and is too inclusive, second, it is too exclusive and finally. 
Margolis's argument that Danto's concept is internally incoherent. I endorse all three 
criticisms and believe that the concept is fundamentally flawed. My concern is 
heightened because, as I shall explain, Danto relies on the is of artistic identification 
to support other concepts. In the following section I go back to 'The Artworld' 
paper and look at Danto's explanation of the artworld concept. As promised, I will 
discuss the link between the is of artistic identification and the artworld concept in 
the conclusion to this chapter; this is the first occasion where Danto invokes the 
special is to support another concept. 
V. The Artworld Concept 
Towards the end of section III, I explained how Danto introduced the artworld 
concept into the discussion. In section IV, I left this concept to discuss problems 
connected with the is of artistic identification. I return now to Danto' s explanation 
of the artworld concept. Recapping, Danto introduced the idea in this way: "to see 
something as art requires something the eye cannot decry [sic] - an atmosphere of 
artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld" (1964, p.209). Danto 
begins his discussion with the example of Andy Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture (see 
illustration 6). The work consists of nothing more than high stacks of facsimile Brillo 
cartons buih up from the floor of the gallery. 10 
---- -----------
10 Exhibited by Warhol tn the Stable (~allery. Last 74th Street. Manhattan. "i~\\ York. The 
exhibition opened on 21 st April 19M. Danto's 'Amorld' article was published just six months 
ailer the opening of the l'\hibition. 
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The question Danto raises is: why do we consider Warhors Brillo Box 
sculpture as being art when the real article in the shop is not? An initial objection 
might well be to say that Warhol's boxes are not art. Danto seems to be aware of 
this objectio~ although he does not mention it explicitly. He brushes the implied 
objection aside saying: ''they happen to be of wood, painted to look like cardboard~ 
and why not?" (1964, p.209). However, he does go some way towards providing a 
justification: he identifies three attributes which Warhol's Brillo Box shares with 
more traditional art. Firstly, he mentions that Warhol is producing extremely lifelike 
replicas of Brillo boxes in plywood. He suggests that this is a similar process to that 
used by traditional sculptors creating lifelike replicas of the human figure in bronze 
(he could have mentioned other materials: wood or polyvinyl), and interestingly the 
process is one that takes us back to a mimetic theory of art. Secondly. the replicas 
are technically accomplished: they are very skilfully made and painstakingly 
produced. They are hand-crafted and require technical ability in both joinery and silk 
screen printing. Thirdly, they are limited in number and, in common with many 
works of art, command a high price. I I I will have to return to this objection that 
Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture, or indeed a work of art made from real Brillo boxes, 
is not, perhaps, a work of art at all. The objection raises some significant 
philosophical issues that Danto does not address in the paper; I devote section VII of 
this chapter to the problem. 
Danto puts these issues aside; he asks if Warhol needs to make the Brillo 
boxes at all. Could he not just use regular Brillo boxes? With a question which looks 
forward to the title of his later book The Transfiguration of the Commonplace 
D8Oto asks: "is this man [Warhol] a kind of Midas, turning whatever he touches into 
the gold of pure art? And the whole world consisting of latent artworks waiting, like 
11 Danto says the cost of the boxes happens to be 2 x l()l their real life counterparts. If the cartons 
cost 55 in 1964 this would give the figure of51O.000: by today's prices a ridiculously low figure for 
a Warhol. 
37 
the bread and wine of reality, to be transfigured, through some dark mystery. into 
the indiscernible flesh and blood of the sacrament?" (1964. p.209). Danto uses the 
word transfiguration in explaining how everyday objects become works of art. I 
question his choice of word; transfiguration implies a change in the appearance of 
the object, both in its everyday and religious usages. Danto has correctly identified 
what has occurred to the everyday objects in his use of the metaphor of the Christian 
sacrament but has used the wrong word: the process is one of transubstantiation not 
transfiguration. The bread and wine continue to look the same, but the Christian 
belief is that their essence has been changed; they become the body and blood of 
Christ. The process is similar with the everyday objects~ their appearance is 
unchanged, but they have been transubstantiated into artworks. It is their essence not 
their appearance that has changed. 
With this issue, Danto has raised the vexed question of ready-mades: 
those everyday objects exhibited in galleries. in some cases exactly as they are. as 
works of art. His concept of the artworld will have to accommodate these articles as 
well as Warhol's facsimiles. Danto conflates the two issues of ready-mades and 
facsinliles in posing another question: "the impressive thing is that it [Warhol's Brillo 
Box sculpture] is art at all. But if it is, why are not the indiscernible Brillo boxes that 
are in the stockroom? Or has the whole distinction between art and reality broken 
down?" ( ] 964, p.209). 
In his attempt to answer this question Danto examines some hypothetical 
examples of ready-mades. He takes the instance of an artist exhibiting real Brillo 
boxes in a gallery, and he considers how we could criticise the display "as dull. 
repetitive. self-plagiarizing - or (more profoundly) claim that he is obsessed by 
regularity and r~petitio~ as in ,\farit'nbad. Or he piles them high, leaving a narrow 
path: \\ e tread our way through the smooth opaque stacks and find it an unsettling 
experience. and write it up a~ the closing in of consumer products. confIDing us as 
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prisoners: or we say he is a modem pyramid builder" (1964, p.210).12 He makes the 
point that we do not criticise the piles of cartons in the storeroom in these tenns. 
The reason, Danto believes, is because the storeroom is not a gallery; it is the fact 
that the boxes are displayed in a gallery that stops them from being mere real objects. 
In other words, Danto believes that we cannot consider the Brillo boxes in the 
gallery setting as Brillo boxes; their placement in the gallery has altered their status 
and the way we look at them. The artist has used the Brillo boxes as a material; an 
unusual material perhaps, maybe one that has not been used before, but nevertheless 
a material just as much as paint, plaster or plywood. In the examples he uses Danto 
says that the Brillo boxes are a sculptural material, and they are used to create what 
is a sculptural installation within the gallery. 
Of course there could be mistakes: an art gallery's annual delivery of 
Brillo boxes, stacked randomly and temporarily in the foyer, could be mistaken for 
an artwork. The resulting 'artwork' could be described by an unsuspecting critic, 
given to using high-flown language, as an insightful comment on the play between 
the repetitive nature of mass production and the stochastic patterns manifested in 
modem society. But there could be mistakes with more traditional art. An artwork in 
a gallery could be away on loan and be replaced by a replica. We may fail to notice 
the label informing us of the change and believe we are looking at the original. 
Elsewhere Danto discusses the case of Han van Meegeren (1997a, 
pp.206-7) 13 whose Christ at Emmaeus was painted with the sole intention of fooling 
the artworld establishment into believing that it was a genuine Vermeer. Once van 
Mecgcren had succeeded in this task his idea was to reveal the deception and be 
considered as great a painter as Venneer. He did succeed in the first part of his p~ 
12 The reference to Jfarienhad is to the 1961 Alain Resnais film L 'Annee Derniere a Harienbad 
with script by Alain Robbe-Grilld. 
IJDanto refers to him as Hans Van Meeg~ren instead of Han van Meegerm: the forger's star: j.., 
told in W)nne, 2006. 
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the painting was considered genuine by a Vermeer expert. but the immense value of 
his 'genuine' Vermeer distracted him from his original plan until its real provenance 
was discovered. Danto makes the point that the second part of van Meegeren's plaIL 
to be considered as great a painter as Vermeer, was doomed to failure. His 
'Vermeer' of 1936 had no relevance to the art of Europe just after the \\'eimar 
Republic; as Danto points out van Meegeren could mention Vermeer's style he 
could never use it: "he could but pretend to use it by pretending it was by Vermeer -
that is, as a forger" (1997a, p.206). Danto mentions style here intimating that it is 
innate to the individual. I shall return to discuss this in chapter three, section IV d: 
style is seen by Danto as an important attribute of art: it enables the artist to 
represent to others their own way of viewing the world. 
Danto believes that this difference, the change in status between everyday 
objects and works of art consisting of these objects, must be attributed to a theory of 
art. Placing everyday objects in a gallery embeds them in a world of artistic theory: 
an artworld. The important consequence of this move is that it now means that 
artworks cannot be identified purely by discernible features. It must be 
nOI1-liis('crnihle features which separate works of art from the everyday objects they 
resemble. Danto also brings the question of history into the debate: he believes that 
to understand art a knowledge of art history is required. The corollary to this being 
that the artist is producing an artwork at a particular moment in history cognisant of 
the artworks. both her own and those of other artists, and the theory surrounding 
their creation. Danto moves on to state his artworld concept in full: "what in the end 
makes the difference between a Brillo box and a work of art consisting of a Brillo 
box is a certain theory of art. It is the theory that takes it up into the world of art. 
and keeps it from collapsing into the real object which it is (in a sense of is other 
th .. m of artistic identification)"' (1964, p.2l0). This is all that Danto sa~ s ahout the 
artworld at this stage in relation to the status of artworks. In the tinal section of the 
papl'r he moves on to discllss what happens when new theories of art emerge and 
explains his idea of tht' style matrix. Belore I look at this section, I \\ ill do what 
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Danto has omitted to do: look in more detail at what exactly is implied in his 
artworld concept, and to tease out what it says about the ontological status of 
artworks. 
If it is theory that takes an everyday object from being just what it is, an 
everyday object, up into the artworld, what are the features or properties of the 
theory that enable this to happen? I am looking for a set of ideas or system of 
principles which will explain the instances of art that Danto has discussed and used 
as examples; I have identified five principles. The first one may seem trivial~ it is that 
art is a product of human endeavour: it has been designed, fabricated or arranged by 
the artist. But the non-trivial aspect I wish to emphasise is that this applies to 
ready-mades as well as more traditionally crafted artworks. Take Danto's example of 
the artist arranging actual Brillo boxes (rather than Warhol's carefully crafted 
facsimiles); how have these been 'produced' by the artist? The answer is that the 
artist has acquired them (they could be natural objects: found objects). negotiated 
with a gallery to exhibit them, decided how to display them, arranged the display and 
carried out the multitude of tasks necessary for an exhibition. She has obtained 
sponsorship, arranged publicity, organised a catalogue and has a budget to work 
within. It is this total process that constitutes the artwork; even in a case like this, 
arranging Brillo boxes, it is a product of considerable human endeavour. In deciding 
how to display them the artist has consciously chosen a particular arrangement. She 
might choose to fling them randomly across the gallery; but that would be a 
conscious choice made for a particular reason. In doing this, perhaps she would be 
trying to achieve what our unsuspecting critic thought the random stack of BriUo 
boxes in the foyer exemplified in his high-flown description. In this sense Danto' s 
view of art is traditional in that art is seen as the result of meaningful human 
construction or arrangement rather than the result of natural contingcnc: or of 
necessity. In the case of the rcady-mades. the work of art is not solely the object: it 
is the ohjl.~t. the rea~on for its display and the contextual interpretation it engenders 
as a statement ahout art. I nlight \\ ell argue that in this case the final product IS 
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trivial and superficial; this is quite an acceptable \'iew: all art does not have to be 
good art or great art. I could equally argue that much traditional art is trivial and 
superficial. Danto is concerned with the classificatory features of art; he is not 
offering an evaluatory theory at this stage. 
The second principle is that the artwork has acquired a histo[\ and 
therefore a provenance. The actual Brillo boxes in my trivial example have been 
irrevocably changed: they have been transubstantiated. They cease to be ordinary 
Brillo boxes, mere real things; they are now the Brillo boxes that were used in a 
certain exhibition in gallery X by artist Y. This mayor may not confer esteem and 
value on the articles; they mayor may not survive. But their status has been 
changed; they have ceased to be mere real objects. Duchamp's original signed snow 
shovel used in In Advance of a Broken Arm has disappeared; if it were to be found, 
and its provenance proven, it would no doubt command a seven figure sum and a 
place in one of the world's leading art galleries. There is no way today of repeating 
Duchamp's creative act of 1915 when he suspended the everyday snow shovel from 
the ceiling of his studio and produced In Advance of a Broken Arm. I could buy a 
snow shovel and hang it up to remind me of the act. In Advance of a Broken Arm 
was a particular creation at a particular time: it was not just a snow shovel. It was a 
complex creative act that can never be repeated anymore than van Meegeren could 
produce a new Vermeer in 1936. This change in status is, of course, not unique to 
artwork. Everyday objects can acquire value by virtue of their history. The 
rectangular piece of wood on my writing desk. acting as a paperweight. is valuable 
to me. I happcn to be interested in naval history and this piece of wood is teak from 
dcck of I I.M.S. Iron Duke. 
My third principle links the intention of the artist with mcanmg. 
Rt,turning to Danto's two painters A i.U1d B and their respective paintings, Sew/on, 
First I,aw and Sew/on's Third Law. it is evident from Danto's discussion of these 
two works that works of art emhody mei.U1ing. and the meaning is. in some wa~. a 
maniti:statilH1 of the intl'ntion of the artist. Rl'call how B e'plailll'd that his work is a 
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representation of Newton's third law of motion by his reference to the two equall~ 
opposed masses. There are at least eleven other possible interpretations of the 
painting. The viewer needs to know B's intention to be able to understand the 
picture. The meaning, as Danto has pointed out in the case of the his 10th Street 
abstractionist, could well be that there is no meaning in the traditional sense: that the 
artist is only concerned with the physical quality of the paint on the canvas. \\ nat if I 
did not know what the artist's intention was, or I was unsure? The answer is surely 
that this is unfortunate: I could never fully understand the artwork. Titian' s ~ (!nus of 
Urhino is a classic case where we are unlikely ever to fully understand the intention 
of the artist. The lack of documentation, the unresolved issues concerning the 
interpretation of the setting and the problems with the historical context conspire to 
make a definitive understanding of Titian's intentions unlikely to be achieved. 14 Of 
course this does not stop us appreciating the wonderful qualities it does have: 
beauty, colour and sensuousness. The fact that we will probably never fully 
understand Titian's intention also adds an enigmatic quality to our appreciation of 
the painting. In his later work, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, Danto 
develops the idea of this elliptical element in interpretation: the importance of what is 
not stated, what remains unknown and what the viewer must add to the process 
herself. Ellipsis assumes an important place in the development of Danto's theory of 
interpretation; I shall return to discuss the issue in the chapter three. 
Which brings me to the final two principles: the viewer must interpret the 
artwork and this interpretation takes place within a historical setting. Danto believes 
that interpretation is a necessary feature of viewing works of art. It is interpretation 
which provides a direct link between the artist's intention and the viewer discovering 
the meaning of a work. Artworks themselves generate interpretations. but the 
viewer. through their own interpretatio~ constitutes the artwork. Artworks call t()r 
interpretation to the extent that they are products of specific artistic intentions which 
_. --- ---- ----
.4 rhe issues in\olved arc explained in Rona GotTen's book on the subject, see Goffen. 1997. 
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may relate to manifest or non-manifest properties. Interpretation by the \ iewer does 
not therefore operate in an arbitrary manner; it brings out the object's 'O\\TI' 
character as an 'artwork' by discovering the artist's intention in relation to the 
artwork. Interpretation does not independently create an artwork, the artist creates 
the artwork but interpretation gives life to the work or lets it be seen for what it is. 
By interpreting a work of art we uncover its meaning, and one important element of 
this process is attempting to understand the artist's intention. The interpretation may 
tum out to be correct or it may be ill-informed and incorrect. In some cases the 
interpretation could be partially right, or the correct interpretation is impossible to 
identify - as I have explained in the case of The Venus of Urbino. I could quite easily 
understand someone looking at B's picture Newton's Third Law and, perhaps not 
knowing what Newton's third law was, deciding that the painting should be 
interpreted along the lines of one of the other interpretations I have discussed. They 
would have to accept that their interpretation was speculative and that others could 
exist; in fact we may see a painting's ability to generate different interpretations as 
one of the attributes of art. I shall return to discuss this point in chapter three. 
Someone unfamiliar with the story of Icarus would be puzzled by Bruegel's painting. 
and they may assume, mistakenly, that the figure landing in the sea has fallen from 
the ship or been pushed from the cliffs. Danto makes the point that the work of art is 
produced and viewed in a historical context. Talking about Warhol's Brillo Box he 
says: "it could not have been art fifty years ago. But then there could not have been, 
everything being equal, flight insurance in the Middle Ages, or Etruscan typewriter 
erasers" (1964, p.210). Understanding Warhol's Brillo Box requires an 
understanding of the deVelopment of the history of art up to 1964. This would 
include th~ development of Imitation Theory (IT), Realist Theory (RTL abstrdct 
expressionisnl and the radical change that Warhol and others introduced into art with 
the advent of pop art: an understanding of how elements and images of popular 
,uitufe were introduc~d into an artworld dominated for so long hy classical or 
religious i,onograph~ . 
There is a strong element of historicism in Danto's artworld concept: the 
view that cultural phenomena are determined by history. This applies to the yiewer 
and the artist; they both have histories which are brought to and constitute part of 
the artworld. I take an artist as an example: Warhol was situated in a particular 
historical context; this complex setting included a very particular cultural 
background and the fact that he had a range of very specific talents and influences. 
He had the experience of his previous work behind him and the opportunities open 
to him at that particular moment in the history of art. It was this unique combination 
of circumstances that made the Brillo Box sculpture possible in 1964. 15 
Summing up, I have identified five principles which feature in Danto's 
concept of the artworld. Art is (1) the result of human endeavour by an artist. (2) 
artworks acquire a history and a provenance, (3) artworks embody meaning (they 
are expressive), which meaning is a result of the artist's intention. (4) artworks 
require interpretation and finally, (5) they are produced and interpreted within a 
historical context. Danto sums up: ''the world has to be ready for certain things, the 
artworld no less than the real one. It is the role of artistic theories, these days as 
always, to make the artworld, and art possible" (1964. p.21 0). 
Danto returns to comment on the Platonic view of art as mimesis with a 
supposition on the difference between art and reality: "perhaps this [difference] was 
already dimly sensed by the early framers of the IT who, inchoately realizing the 
nonreality of art. were perhaps limited only in supposing that the sole way objects 
had of tx.'ing other than real is to be sham. so that artworks necessarily had to be 
imitations of real objects" (1964. p.210). I shall return to look at criticism of the 
artworld concept in the conclusion to the chapter. section VIII. I now continue with 
'U1 analysis of D.mto·s argument in the final section of the' Artworld' paper when~ he 
I S Warhol's background is covered in Bastian. 200 I and the three-part television seril.'S Andy 
Jl'a,.lIu/: 111(' ('omp/clc tiCIllf"l' SLTl'l..'nl.-d nn I3BC :! on 2;/\'O~. ,) :! (l~ and 10 2iQ:!. Danto make ... a 
looks at the relationships between the different theories that make art possible and 
how new theories occur. 
VI. Theories of Art and tbe Style Matrix 
Danto begins his discussion of this topic with an ambiguous and puzzling statement. 
In looking at the various theories of art, and how they relate to one another. he says 
that in doing so "I shall beg some of the hardest philosophical questions I know" 
(1964, p.211). Is Danto using begging the question in the common but incorrect 
usage of saying that the discussion simply follows on from the issues raised in the 
previous debate? Or is he using the phrase correctly, and saying that the arguments 
in his forthcoming discussion assume the very points at issue? In other words that a 
proposition is assumed in the course of ostensibly proving it. Perhaps Danto is 
forewarning us of one major difficulty with his artworld theory: that there is an 
element of circularity in the argument. I shall return to comment on this in the 
conclusion to this chapter and again in the conclusioI4 chapter four. 
The argument starts on a hesitant note: "1 shall now think of pairs 
of predicates related to each other as 'opposites'. conceding straight off the 
vagueness of this demode term" (1964, p.211). The term certainly does create 
difficulties as I shall explain. Danto distinguishes contradictory predicates from 
opposites saying contradictions apply to all objects in the universe whereas opposites 
apply to a limited set. An object must be a member of a particular set before either of 
a pair of opposites apply to it. He then clarifies the fact that opposites are not 
contraries; both statements may be false in the case of contraries. Danto then says 
that for the limited set of objects to which a particular pair of opposites apply the 
opposites have all the properties of contradictions. His argument proceeds: 
If F and non-F are opposites. an object 0 must be of a certain kind J\ 
bet()re either of these scnsihly applies~ but if 0 is a member of K. then 
() is either F or non-F. to the exclusion of the other. The c1a~s of pairs 
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of opposites that sensibly apply to the (0) Ko I shall designate as the 
class of K-relevant predicates. And a necessary condition for an object 
to be of a kind K is that at least one pair of K-relevant opposites be 
sensibly applicable to it. But, in fact. if an object is of kind K. at least 
and at most one of each K-relevant pair of opposites applies to it. 
(1964, p.211) 
Danto next looks at particular K-relevant predicates for the class K (artworks). He 
considers the hypothetical situation where all works of art haye been non-F: no work 
of art up to that particular time has been F. Danto suggests that it might not be 
realised that non-F is actually a K-relevant predicate. lIe takes another predicak G 
and supposes that all works of art up to now have been G: similarly, it might not 
have been realised that non-G was an artistically-relevant predicate. He takes this a 
step further and suggests that, because non-G was never considered as a relevant 
predicate, G might have been considered as a defining characteristic of the class 1\ 
(artworks). In other words, G has been considered a defining attribute of artworks 
whereas it is only one of a pair of artistically-relevant predicates, and it should never 
have been used as the basis of a sustainable definition. 
Danto now becomes specific: F is called is expressionist and non-F, is 
not expressioni .... '/. Similarly G becomes is representational and non-G, is not 
representational. He assumes that these are the only two K-relevant predicates in 
critical usc. A style matrix is constructed. along the lines of a truth table, showing all 
possiblc combinations of K-relevant predicates and their opposites. This is shown 
below ( 19h4, p.2] I): 
F G 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
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There are four possible combinations: each of the four rows indicate a style 
available, at that time, within the critical arena. Danto gives examples for each row: 
from top to bottom, Fauvism, abstract expressionism, classicism (Danto specifically 
mentions Ingres) and hard-edge abstraction. If K-relevant predicates are introduced 
to the matrix they will add to the number of columns. The number of possible styles 
(rows) will increase according to the series 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 ... (2 to the power of the 
number of columns in use). Danto then supposes that "an artist determines that H 
shall henceforth be artistically relevant for his paintings. Then. in fact. both H and 
non-H become artistically relevant for all paintings, and if his is the first and only 
painting that is H, every other painting in existence becomes non-If' (1964, p.212). 
As each new column is introduced the number of styles (rows) available is doubled. 
Danto sees an enrichment of the whole artworld, coupled with an increase in 
complexity, whenever a new relevant predicate is added to the matrix. 
As with any truth table, there will always be a bottom row containing 
nothing but minuses, and this, Danto believes, is the domain of purists who believe 
they have removed all but the most essential features of art. But, in fact, they occupy 
just one possible style combination amongst the many, equally relevant, 
combinations of artistically-relevant predicates which are available. These 
bottom-row purists take their place in the artworld as one possibility within a 
complex variety of styles; all possible combinations are within the same matrix and 
are therefore equally valid. He says: ~~strictly speaking, a black square by Reinhardt is 
artistically as rich as Titian's Sacred and Profound Love. This explains how less is 
more" (1964. p.212). 
Danto believes that individuals or institutions can. for reasons of taste. 
fashion or dogma. restrict the remit of the matrix. Each column which is removed -
say a museum decides it will only exhibit representational work - halves the nUIni:>er 
of styles availahle. But it will only apply to their particular situation: it is their 
decision taken on whatever grounds they propose. The artworld still has the full 
r,mgc of st~ lcs uyailahll' once all the artistically relcvant predicates have been 
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legitimated. The breakthrough comes with the addition of a new column: this occurs 
when an artist introduces a completely new artisticall: -relevant predicate. 
Kandinsky's introduction of abstract painting would be a good example of the 
introduction of a new column. This is. in fact. Danto' s column G (representational 
and non-representational); it doubles the number of possible styles available. 
It will be noticed that this introduction has two results. Firstlv. it allows 
other artists to occupy or colonise the new styles that are opened up, and secondly. 
it alters the critical framework (via the matrix) of every other existing work of art. 
For Danto, this is "'a remarkable feature of contemporary art, and for those 
unfamiliar with the matrix, it is hard, and perhaps impossible to recognise certain 
positions as occupied by artworks. Nor would these things be artworks \vithout the 
theories and the histories of the Artworld" (1964, p.212). So when pop art (and its 
concomitant opposite predicate non-pop art) entered the artworld the art\\ orld 
became richer and more complex by having the matrix doubled in size. The critical 
framework was enlarged and altered for all existing works of art. Although Danto' s 
essay 'The End of Art' was not published until 1984. I mentioned the theory in the 
introduction and I should briefly explain how it relates to the matrix. The end of art 
theory. which postulates that anything can become art, suggests that there can be no 
new predicates which will alter what is already included within the concept of art: 
what it means to be a work of art. However, we can reconcile this with the matrix: 
within the "final' concept of art and after pop art, we can still have new predicates 
emerging. for example 'land art' and its opposite 'not land art'. They emerge. take 
their place in the matrix but do not alter, cannot alter, what it means to be an 
artwork occause anything can he m1 arh\ork. Danto ends his paper hy referring hack 
to !Iamlet and the conceit that "Brillo boxes may reveal us to ourselves as well as 
anything might: as a mirror held up to nature. they might serve to catch the 
conscil'llcc of our kings" (1964. p.212).16 I assume, although it is not certain. that 
Danto is referring to the Brillo boxes that ha\e already been "transfigured' by Andy 
Warhol in his Brillo Box SCUlpture. 
Before I leave Danto's style matrix I shall point out two problems. The 
first was mentioned by Danto at the beginning of the discussion: the use of the tenn 
opposites and its vagueness. Danto says that within a given set of objects opposites 
behave as contradictories. The difficulty in applying this to works of art is that it 
assumes that there is a simple either/or distinction for any particular predicate. I shall 
take one of Danto's predicates as an example: is representational and its opposite is 
not representational. If I consider the four examples from painting that Danto 
identified for his style matrix, Fauvism, classicism, abstract expressionism and 
hard-edge abstraction, I find that the situation is not as neat as Danto suggests. 
Rather than either/or I could imagine a scale with is representational at the top and 
is not representational at the bottom. The four examples would occupy different 
positions. Classicism (Ingres) at the top with Fauvism somewhat below; hard-edge 
abstraction at the bottom with abstract expressionism very close but not quite at the 
bottom. A close inspection of Jackson Pollock's work, for instance, will reveal some 
representational elements, although this issue is admittedly still a controversial 
subject. 17 All other painters that I could consider would fit somewhere on the scale; 
quite a few would occupy positions mid-scale. 
Danto's simplification does not invalidate his message: that n~v, works of 
art ~nrich and broaden the scope of the whole field of artistic endeavour, but I 
qll~stion whether the quasi-logical approach he adopts adds any1hing to the 
argum~nt. I must also question Danto's approach here in reducing art to a collection 
of predicaks. At the beginning of section III of this chapter we saw that D .. mto 
suggested a parallel hctw~L'n artworks .. md Strawson's concept of the indi\idual: 
where an individual is SL'en as irreducible to a set of predicates. Fnr Strawson the 
~:(lIlSl'il'Ill'e of th~ k.ing.) 
17 Sl"C 'Reading .l;1I.:k.-.;nn I\llhx:k -\tlstral'tl~' in Krduss. 1986. rr221-42. 
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individual is a complex organic whole: an irreducible category of being. There is an 
element of inconsistency here in Danto's approach: earlier in 'The Artworld' paper 
he suggests the parallel between art and Strawson's concept of individuals; now, 
with his style matrix he separates art into discrete predicates. He fails to notice or to 
address the incompatibility between these two approaches. 
I now come to the second difficulty with Danto's style matrix. Although it 
explains, albeit with the reservations I have expressed above, that the artworld 
changes as it expands, it is silent on the question of how this occurs. Just how is a 
new work of art accepted as art? Who does the accepting? What is the process 
whereby a putative new artform is taken up into the artworld? The style matrix itself 
embodies the relatively modest claim that new art changes how we view the whole 
of art both past and present. 18 Danto's much more far-reaching claim is that a new 
18 Although Danto makes no mention of him in 'The Artworld' article, he later acknowledges his 
debt to T. S. Eliot for this way of seeing art in its historical context. In 1997 writing about the 
artworld concept Danto says: "I was thinking of the world of artworks as a kind of community of 
internally related objects. There is no question but that the inspiration for this way of thinking came 
from T. S. Eliot's essay 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' which had a great impact on me at 
the time" (1997a, pp.163-4). The key passage from Eliot's essay is: "no poet, no artist of any art, 
has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his 
relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, for contrast 
and comparison, among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical. 
criticism. The necessity that he shall conform. that he shall cohere, is not one-sided; what happens 
when a new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art 
which preceded it ... the whole existing order must be. if ever so slightly. altered; and so the 
relations. proportions. values of each work of art towards the whole are readjusted" (EIi~ 1995. 
p.SS). At the end of the essay discussing the task of the poet Eliot says: "he is not likely to know 
what is to be done unless he lives in what is not merely the present. but the present moment of the 
past. unless he is conscious. not of what is dead, but of what is already living" (Eliot., 1995. p.59). 
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theory is required, but the question remains: what is it about the new theory that 
enables it to confer artworld status? We need to understand the process whereby a 
new column (a new artistically-relevant predicate) is incorporated into the style 
matrix. To address this crucial point I shall have to return to some of the issues 
raised in section V about Danto's artworld concept. I also need to address the point 
made at the beginning of this section: that the artworld argument contains a degree 
of circularity. I do this in the conclusion: section VIII. Before this. however. I return 
to one of my promises: to look at the question of whether Danto has missed an 
obvious point - that much of this contemporary art may. in fact. not be art at all. 
VII. But is it Art? 
I begin the discussion with a brief comment on definitions of art. As I have 
explained, Danto attempts to defme art in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions: to provide a 'rear definition. It has, however. been argued that to search 
for a defmition of art in this way is misguided. The arguments are based on 
Wittgenstein's idea that a concept like game cannot be defined by a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions~ it is characterised by reference to a family-resemblance 
class. 19 Morris Weitz applied this idea to art~ his argument is set out in his 1956 
article 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics·.20 In summary. he puts forward the view 
that art is an 'open concept': that artworks are characterised as a family-resemblance 
class and that a 'real' definition of art is impossible. Danto. amongst others. rejects 
this view: he considers the concept of family resemblance to be totally inappropriate 
to works of art. He argues that family resemblance is a genetic quality which can be 
scientifically proven~ tamily members mayor may not look alike. This genetic 
criterion IS ohviollsly ahsent in art. and Danto believes the usc of the concept 
19 In Philmophicallm'nliglllio1l.\· sl,\.'tions h:'-77. 
20 Rcprintl-d in N~ill & Ridley. 1 (N:'. pp.183-Q2. 
'family-resemblance class' in relation to art is an illicit appropriation of the tenn. He 
also believes that the family resemblance approach is too slac~ too inclusive: 
anything, it could be argued with a little imagination, bears some resemblance to 
something else. However, if you try to qualify the family-resemblance class in some 
way to avoid this criticism you are delimiting or defining art: the very thing the 
theory says is impossible. This is a very brief summary of a widespread and famous 
debate in aesthetics;21 I revisit the issue of defining art in our conclusion, chapter 
four, and give my own view on the subject. 
I return to my question; but is it art? Danto assumes that the ready-mades 
and other new forms of art are indeed art, but might he not be mistaken in this 
assumption? I mentioned in section V three reasons why a work of art like Brillo 
Box might be considered art in a similar way to more traditional art: it is mimetic, it 
requires skill to produce and it has a high market value. B. R. Tilghman, in his book 
But is it Art? raises other issues; he argues that Danto is mistaken: "Danto is 
assuming that the readymades of Duchamp and the products of the conceptualists 
are works of art. One would think, however, that this assumption is one that wants 
arguing for; I know of no demand arising either out of logic or out of the history of 
art and its practices of appreciation requiring these things to be accepted as art" 
(1984, p.98). Tilghman questions whether this new art has any aesthetic value, a 
point he makes saying: "what, then, would one be missing if one took Brillo Box 
[Warhol's sculpture] merely as ... a Brillo box? ... It is not that one would be lacking 
in appreciation for there is no aesthetic character to appreciate. Nor would one be 
21 Danto discusses it briefly in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. 1981. pp.56-66. Maurice 
Mandelbaum provides a well-known rebuttal of the family resemblance approach in 'Family 
Resemblances and Generalisations Concerning the Arts', see Mandelbaum, 1995. Noll Carroll sums 
up the arguments in his introduction to Theories of Art Today 'Some Dialectical Backstory: the 
Nco-Wittgensteinian Challenge', see Carroll. 2000, pp.5-IS. 
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lacking any normal reaction to something of abiding human significance" (1984. 
p.118, the fIrst ellipsis is in the original text). 
I will consider three counter arguments to Tilghman's view. Firstly. that 
the works he objects to have already been accepted by the artworld. Secondly. that 
he assumes that art has to have aesthetic qualities of a formal kind, and finally, that 
Danto has provided an answer to the question in his artworld concept. I discuss the 
counter arguments in tum. The works I have been looking at, the ready-mades and 
Warhol's Brillo Box, are now widely regarded as being art by those participating in 
the artworld. Andy Warhol has undoubtedly assumed a position as one of the most 
well-known and well-regarded artists in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Duchamp's ready-mades appear as significant milestones in histories of modern art. 
There is clear evidence that these objects are widely accepted as art; they appear as 
star exhibits in museums of modern art, they are photographed. they appear in 
publications and are discussed in history of art courses throughout the world. This 
acceptance of ready-mades and pop art, I would suggest, is widespread and not 
limited to an artworld elite. For example, if one asks anyone with the slightest 
interest in art, who is the most famous artist of the second half of the twentieth 
century? the answer, in my experience, is usually Andy Warhol. The acceptance of 
ready-mades as art is of course not uncontested, but my argument is that they are 
widely accepted as art particularly by those operating within or interested in the 
aI1world. Tilghman's view. however. is that to consider these objects as art requires 
arguing tor~ he saw no demand from the history of art why they should be 
considered as art. But the history of art does provide such a demand: these objects 
have alremil' hl'c.'11 accepted into the artworld. They have an important place in the 
history of art. 
rhis cnunter argument to Tilghman's view is itself open to an ohiection: 
that it relies on the members of the artwnrld to confi:f artistic status on an ohject. 
and this rdiancl' on expert opinion is circular. Tills objection cannot hc denied 
logically. Ilowe\er. it is still a strong recommendation tln artistic status that a 
significant part of the cultural establishment, with the benefit of its members' 
knowledge and experience, believes that these objects are artworks. 1 return to 
conunent on part of Tilghman's quotation: "I know of no demand arising either out 
of logic or out of the history of art and its practices of appreciation requiring these 
things to be accepted as art" (1984, p.98). His point of logic 1 discuss in the second 
and third objections to his view, but his reference to the history of art is untenable: 
art history has accepted these objects as art, and that acceptance, however 
unpalatable it may be to Tilghman, is a matter offact. 
1 move on to the second objection to Tilghman's view: that he assumes 
that art must have an aesthetic quality, and he believes that ready-mades and 
Warhol's Brillo Box do not possess such a quality. Oanto does not accept this 
assumption. He believes that the aesthetic quality of art is detennined by its historical 
location and that this changes over time. Oanto says: "I am trying to state that the 
'aesthetic object' is not some eternally fixed Platonic entity. a joy forever beyond 
time, space, and history, eternally there for the rapt appreciation of connoisseurs. It 
is not just that appreciation is a function of the cognitive location of the aesthete, but 
that the aesthetic qualities of the work are a function of their own historical identity" 
(1981, p.III). 
For the justification of this view 1 must go back to his explanation of 
how a regular Brillo box could become a work of art. 1 explained in section V how 
Oanto believes Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture, or indeed real Brillo boxes arranged 
by his fictitious artist in a gallery, achieved the status of artworks. Oanto says it is 
because of an atmosphere of artistic theory: it is theory that allows these objects to 
be taken up into the artworld. One of the features of the theory was that the objects 
were taken up into the artworld within a specific artistic context at a particular 
moment in time. The aesthetic considerations at that moment in time will be different 
from any other moment: in many cases substantially different. The aesthetic 
considerations that apply to Warhol's Brillo Box are inapplicable to Bruegel's The 
Fall of Icarus. Tilghman is advocating aesthetic fonnalism: he believes that some 
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discernible aesthetic qualities must be present in a work of art; he belieyes that the 
aesthetic qualities that apply to the Bruegel are missing in the \\'arhol and that it i~ 
therefore not art. Danto is suggesting that a radically different set of non-discernible 
qualities apply to the latter. The issue between Tilghman and Danto is whether these 
non-discernible qualities of artworks which Danto identifies are able to constitute the 
objects as art. To address this adequately I need to consider the full development of 
Danto's theory of art; I do this in chapter three with a discussion of his treatment of 
metaphor, expression and style. 
The third counter argument to Tilghman's question is that Danto has 
provided an answer to the question with his artworld concept. How has he achieved 
this? Danto's artworld theory explains how an artist can 'transfigure' (to stay with 
Danto's questionable term) any object into a work of art. I explained in section V 
how Danto believes this happens and the scope of his explanation provides an 
answer to Tilghman's question: are these everyday items really art? Danto's artworld 
concept explains that when objects like Brillo boxes are taken up into the artworld 
they are no longer everyday objects: they have been transfigured; they have acquired 
a history and an artistic provenance. Asking if these objects are capable of being art 
has already been addressed by Danto: he explains how WI)' everyday object can 
become a work of art. This is the important point that Danto is stressing: any object 
can. potentially. become a work of art. If anything can be art, the question of 
whether any particular object is capable of being art is answered: yes, it can be art, if 
that status is conferred upon it by the process Danto has outlined in his explanation 
of the artworld concept. A consequence of this view is that there is no requirement 
tin any discernible aL~sthetic properties to be present or to be taken into account. I 
have Sh<')\\11 how Danto's viL'w is that it is the non-discL'rnibk properties that enahle 
these ohjects to he taken up into the artworld. This third response also rdics on a 
circular argument: saying what is art requires reference to a concept. the art\\ orld. 
\\hich ihl'if i~ defined hy referenn." to art. I shall return to examine this in more detail 
in t hL' next section and at!ain in the overall conclusion. chapter four. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
There are two objections to Danto's artworld concept that I have not considered so 
far. Firstly, if anything can be art, this approach is so inclusive it could accommodate 
some ludicrous possibilities. Secondly, there is surely some art which is not produced 
by artists; if it is not produced by artists how. on Danto' s argument. can it be art? I 
consider these objections in turn. 
The frrst objection to Danto's theory is obvious: if any object or 
statement can be taken up into the art wo rld, we must surely accept some quite 
outrageous proposals. For example an artist could decree that the whole world is art. 
Timothy Binkley in his paper 'Piece: Contra Aesthetics' (1977, pp.93-4) gives an 
example from contemporary art practice: Robert Barry's exhibition in Amsterdam in 
1969 in which nothing was exhibited; the gallery door was locked for two weeks. 
This idea of the inaccessible exhibition has reappeared in slightly different 
incarnations with monotonous regularity ever since; at least in 1969 it had an 
element of iconoclastic novelty. Binkley compares this example with another: the 
occasional Sunday painter who produces a few terrible water-colours. He considers 
that both Barry's intervention and the awful water-colours are indeed art, but the: 
are not very good art. Binkley. like Danto, believes that these examples are art 
because they have been given that status by artists. Likewise my fictitious artist who 
proclaims that the whole world is art is quite entitled to say that his statement is art. 
The fact is that most people would regard his "artistic' statement as trite and 
worthless. My fictitious artist's statement is certainly preposterous but there is no 
compelling reason why this should debar it from the ~1atus of art. The bct that 
Danto's theory can and. as I han~ explained. does allo\\ art to be tri\ialised. and to 
allow fi)f the inclusion of poor art. does not refute the theory .. \ny area of human 
endeanHlr can he tri\'ialised: art is no exception. I said het()re that the Brillo hoxes 
l'xhihited in a !:!allery would he changed fi)fever: the: would acquire a hi"tory. But 
this histon cnuld he dl'ciJl'dly worthkss. as in the case of our tictitiolls artist. In a 
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similar vein, it could be argued that, because of my fictitious artist's statement that 
the whole world is art, the artworld has been given a barely perceptible different 
history. Although the artist's statement would have a history, it would be a history 
that was of very little or, arguably, of no consequence. 
Duchamp's ready-mades have been labelled as examples of 
outrageous or trivial objects being given artwork status. However. it must not be 
forgotten that Duchamp's ready-mades have had enormous influence on the history 
of art. The development of art and its subsequent history has been irrevocably and 
significantly changed by Duchamp's works. Put another way, some works of art, and 
this applies to ready-mades as well as to traditional art, are significant and influential, 
others are worthless. What I have not addressed here is how Danto' s theory 
distinguishes good art from poor art: how we make value judgements about art. 
Danto does not cover the issue in 'The Artworld'. Danto's evaluative theory of art 
develops from two areas which I mentioned at the beginning of the introduction: 
firstly, his art criticism and secondly, his theme of the abuse of beauty. Both areas lie 
outside the scope of this dissertation, but in summary, the first is contextually based: 
a form of sophisticated subjectivism; the second a development of his 
disenfranchisement of art thesis. 
I move on to the second objection: if art status is conferred by artists, 
what about art that is produced by people who are not artists? I could return to my 
Sunday painter~ she might or might not consider herself to be an artist, but there are 
more problematical cases. What about art created by anonymous people outside the 
recognised professional artworld: outsider art. Jean Dubuffet coined the term art 
brut to cover this type of art: art produced by people with no training, with no 
regard of themselves as artists or perhaps from a culture with no separate concepts 
of art or artists. How can work like this be accommodated within Danto' s theory? 
Surely Danto is stipulating that conferral of artistic status is given by an artist within 
an artworld, and in art brut there is no artist; at least there is no one who would call 
themselves an artist. The answer is that Danto's theory allows for inclusion in the 
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artworld by virtue of an artefact's or action's creation for interpretation. Th~ 
interplay between the creator's intention - the expression of a point of vic\\ - and its 
interpretation allows a wider view of 'artist' to be accommodated in Danto's theory. 
It is the fact that this type of art needs to be interpreted that brings it into the 
artworld. and we have seen that interpretation is a key feature of Danto 's theory: art 
is interpreted by an audience. It is this feature which brings art hrut into the 
artworld. This aspect of Danto's theory is developed in the final chapter of The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace 'Metaphor, Expression and Style': art as 
rhetorical ellipsis; I address it in detail in chapter three. 
This issue has been clearly identified by George Dickie in his 
institutional theory of art which identifies art as "'any artefact ... which has had 
conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons 
acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)"' (1974, p.204). Danto 
does not highlight this aspect of his theory in 'The Artworld' paper but it is implied~ 
I have already mentioned his strong emphasis on interpretation throughout the 
discussion. There are other significant differences between Danto' s and Dickie's 
artworld concepts but, as they are not relevant at this point in the discussion. I leave 
them for the present; however. I do return to discuss the issue in the next chapter. 
Before I leave this objection I need to make two points. Firstly, although Danto does 
not address the issue of art brut in 'The Artworld' paper, looking at his later 
writings on the su~iect we can see that he has been a strong and continuing advocate 
of outsider art: he clearly sees it as inhabiting the artworld.22 Secondly, although this 
discussion has f<.)Cused on outsider art it raises issues that apply equally to the status 
ora wide rangl' off()lk art, tribal art and historical artefacts where most of the \\ork 
is either created anonymousl~ or hy non-prokssional artists. 
I no\\ return to an area of criticism of Danto's art\\orIJ theory which I 
have mentioned pre\ iously: that the artwork! concept emhodies circularity of 
n "'or ~\ampk ~l"t.· hi~ arlll'le- 'Outsider \r1' in Danto, 2000. pr,~-l:-q 
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argument. The criticism is that Danto's artworld concept always requires some 
reference to art to identify it. In other words, his definition of art relies on the 
artworld concept which concept itself requires a reference back to art to define it: 
the argument is therefore circular. In addressing this issue I consider three areas of 
criticism of the artworld theory. In each of these three areas of criticism I provide a 
counter argument, but it becomes clear that the counter arguments rely on a 
reference to some broad concept of cuhure which itself includes an element of art, 
and it is this reference that demonstrates and highlights the circularity in Danto' s 
argument. The three areas are: firstly~ that Danto believes that art requires a subject 
and that there may be art which has no subject matter at all. Secondly, Danto 
believes that art must be capable of interpretation, or identification as he calls it, and 
some art may not require any interpretation. Thirdly, that interpretation requires a 
knowledge of art theory and that some interpretations take place without the benefit 
of any such knowledge. 
The first area of criticism considers Danto' s view that artworks have 
a subject matter: they are about something. I have explained that Danto believes 
artworks embody meaning; they have a quality which he later calls 'aboutness~. The 
obvious objection to this is that there may well be works of art that do not embody 
any meaning at all: for example minimalist art. Danto picks this objection up later in 
his 1981 book The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. He considers an imaginary 
artist J who produces a monochrome painting which the artist insists is untitled and 
is about nothing at all. But Danto points out that J~s statement about nothing is itself 
a statement about something: it is a statement about minimalism. The artist's work 
was produced within a particular milieu in which minimalism was the subject of 
current speculation; this debate has a well-documented history, and J's work and the 
history of its production are inescapably embedded within this historical context. J 
was working in an atmosphere of artistic theory in which the debate about 
minimalism was a central issue. Danto makes the point that the difference between a 
sheet of primed board and JOs painting - assuming they are indiscernible - is that the 
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board is a thing "and things, as a class lack aboutness just because they are things. 
'Untitled/ by contrast, is an artwork, and artworks are ... typically about something" 
(1981, p.3). Danto here is relying on the fact that "Untitled' is saying something 
about the artworld; the probl~ and it reappears in several places, is that his 
argument is circular. He is relying on the concept of the artworld to explain his 
concept of aboutness in this problematical area where there is no obvious subject 
matter to point to. 1's painting is about the artworld, that atmosphere of artistic 
theory as Danto defines it, and the fact that it is about the artworld gives it its status 
as art unlike the indiscernible primed board which is about nothing. So Danto is 
using the artworld concept to identify one of his constituent features of art. In other 
words, he needs the concept of the artworld to define what is an artwork. He is 
begging the question. 
A similar argument applies to another of Danto's requirements for 
something to be an artwork: that it must be capable of interpretation or identification 
as he calls it. This is my second example of circularity of argument manifesting itself 
in the artworld concept. I have explained that Danto believes that works of art 
require interpretation, but an objection surely is that there are some works of art that 
do not require any interpretation at all: art that we respond to on a purely sensuous 
or emotional level. Simple folk music is an example that springs to mind; arguably 
this does not require any interpretation. A counter argument suggests that however 
basic and non-referential the work of art is seen to be, it is produced and enjoyed in a 
cultural setting. It is this enjoyment within a cultural setting which can be considered 
as interpretation in a wider sense of the word. The simplest folk music, to use my 
example above, is enjoyed or interpreted within a specific cultural setting. In other 
words, it is this cultural milieu. a combination of environment. tradition. experience 
and teaching. which enables the folk music to be made and appreciated. 
There is still a problem of circularity here. The word culture already 
implies an artworld. Culture already includes art as part of its definition: as a 
manifestation of the intellectual and artistic achievement of a community. We can 
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explain the context of folk music and the circumstances of its de\ ciL)pment and 
appreciation, but the explanation fails to tell us whv it is art. \\'e have failed to 
escape from the concept of culture which presupposes an art\\ orld. Culture includes 
art but the defInition of art requires the concept of culture; again the argument is 
circular. Notwithstanding the argument above about cultural embeddedness. there 
does seem to remain a basic level of artistic experience that does not require any 
interpretation. It is the first-hearing or first-seeing impact of some art that seems to 
operate at a physiological level and sub-cultural depth. 
I shall now consider the third criticism of the artworld concept: that it 
requires a knowledge of art theory on the part of the viewer or interpreter. Danto is 
suggesting that interpretation depends on a knowledge of art history: I repeat his 
summary: "To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry [sic] -
an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld" 
(1964, p.209). This knowledge, as I have explained in the case of art hrul. may be 
provided by the interpreter alone and not necessarily by the artist; it may be, and 
usually is, provided by both. But do we need this knowledge of the history of art to 
interpret art? Are there not situations where this is not the case? Most people would 
accept Rembrandt's The Night Watch as being a work of art without having any 
theory of art to substantiate the opinion or indeed without being able to locate the 
picture clearly in any well-defmed history of art. The counter argument involves 
some referral to a form of general cultural inheritance and knowledge. but this is a 
nehulous and ill-defined concept. Note that it still contains a rderence to culture 
which. as I have already explained. itself contains. within its definition. an clement of 
artistic achievement: again I find the argument is circular. I have identified a 
significant clement 0 r circularity in Danto' s argument. hut is it a viciolls circularity: 
docs it irrcparahly damage his case'? I will return to this point to discuss just ho\\ 
damaging the circularity is in the conclusion. chapter four. I n the nc'\t chaptcr I shall 
also consider a view of art. hy Georgl.' Dickie. which accepts and al'Commndatl.·s this 
circularity. I now look at another criticism of the artworld concept: that it sufter~ 
from a lack of definition. 
The lack of definition or clarity is evident in two areas. Firstly. we are 
never given a clear view of what an art theory is. We are never clear whether We are 
dealing with epistemological or ontological issues. We have Danto's IT and RT 
explained at the beginning of the paper which suggests an art historical approach to 
theory: applying those theories already in existence. Danto does say that: "it is in 
terms of RT that we must understand the artworks around us today" (1964. p.204). 
We also have new theories explained by reference to Danto's idea of conceptual 
revolutio~ when the older theories fail to accommodate new developments in art. 
But Danto moves o~ later in the paper, to identify features of theory that imply a 
more essentialist role: to provide the basis for the identification of the defining 
features of artworks. It is never clear what the status of the theories we are using is 
supposed to be; are they historical and epistemological theories like IT and RT or 
essentialist theories aiming to address the question of the ontological status of art'! 
Rather than a new theory of art, is Danto, particularly with his sty k matrix, 
providing us with a theory about theories of art and their importance? 
The second area where this lack of definition arises is in relation to the 
nature of the link between Danto's theory and art itself What exactly is the nature of 
this link between art theory and art? Is it a contingent link or one of logical 
necessity'! When he is discussing the historical context of new works of art Danto 
claims that it is the role of artistic theory to make art possible: for example \\'arhol's 
Bril/o Box sculpture. he believes. was only possible in 1964 because of the artistic 
theories emerging at that time. This lack of clarity on this point suggests that Danto 
is not distinguishing his philosophy of art from his philosophy of the histllry of art: an 
issue I have already discussed in the introduction. \\'illiam Kennick points to this 
confusion \\ hen he comments on Danto' s view that art theories make art possihk: "I 
do not kno\\ what sort of necessity is at issue in this claim: that is. whdher Danto' s 
\\ ords C\prl'SS a cont ingent \'iew ahout the rdation tx.'tween art theory and art. l)r 
whether they express a logically necessary relation between the concepts of art and 
of art theory" (1964, p.586). As I have already shown, Danto rejects essentialism., 
the view of art as "some eternally fixed Platonic entity" (1981, p.lll), but his own 
claim about the possibility of a definition of art is essentialist. Also, ahhough I have 
not examined it in detail, his philosophy of the history of art is essentialist: his claim 
that because the history of art has ended, there can be no possibility of future 
counter-examples to overthrow his definition of art. His is a quasi-Hegelian claim: 
that the true nature of art has not always been manifest but has gradually become 
apparent over time. So Danto is rejecting certain aspects of essentialism and at the 
same time accepting others. This uncertainty or vacillation, as I shall explain in the 
next chapter, is what provokes and underlies Joseph Margolis's criticism of Danto's 
theory of art. 
An issue I promised to return to is the nature of the link between 
Danto's two concepts: the is of artistic identification and the artworld. I have 
identified a substantial degree of circularity in Danto's artworld concept: art is 
defined by reference to the artworld which in turn has to be defined by some 
reference back to art. This latter reference can be direct, say by reference to artists, 
or indirect, with reference to a concept like culture which itself includes an element 
of art. Direct or indirect I believe there is an unacceptable degree of circularity in the 
argument. Danto attempts to use his is of artistic identification to break this 
circularity. He links his special is of artistic identification directly to the artworld: 
"the Brillo box of the artworld may be just the Brillo box of the real one, separated 
and united by the is of artistic identification" (1964, p.210), and again when 
Testadura can only see black and white paint: ''we cannot help him until he has 
mastered the is of artistic identification and so constitutes it a work of art" (1964. 
p.208). 
However, we are never told how the is of artistic identification and the 
artworld are linked. This is apparent if I reconsider the previous two quotations. In 
Testadura's case the link seems to be an imaginative one: Testadura would require 
64 
an imaginative leap to see the white oblong with a horizontal line as an\' of th~ 
possible interpretations Danto discusses. Indeed he could come up with his 0\\ TI. sa\' 
Arctic Landscape. In the case of the Brillo Boxes sculpture. Testadura would just 
see cartons for packing scouring pads. To see it as pop art, as a way of incorporating 
images from popular culture in gallery art, would require historical or conk\:t ual 
knowledge. Perhaps this lack of precision should come as no surprise: in section IV 
of this chapter I have exposed the shortcomings of the special is the first of which 
was its use of imprecise language. In one of Danto's examples (The Fall (?f Icarus) 
Danto's special is was shown to be no more than an is of representational 
identification. In another example (the 10th Street abstractionisfs painting entitled 
No. 7) it was shown to be an is of historical location. The latter approach. the is 0 f 
historical location, is undoubtedly capable of wider application than the is of 
representational identification; it is capable of dealing with completely' new forms of 
art and also art which has no representational element. I t has the ability to include all 
the new forms of contemporary art, and, as anything can be art. it is immune to 
counter-examples. But it pays a heavy price; Danto' s special is is too inclusive in this 
sense of historical location. All objects have a historical situation which is unique to 
them - TIula Hoops for example - but this does not qualify them as art: at least as 
Danto understands the term art. Danto's attempt to shore up his artworld concept 
with the use of the is of artistic identification has been shown to fail. The is of 
artistic identificat ion is inadequate for the task Danto demands of it. 
Danto never relinquishes his use of the special is of artistic identification: 
it appears throughout his later work. What he does do is to attempt to refine his 
ddinition of art. I Ie does this by expanding on the concept of indiscernihle 
counterparts and hringing in the idea of rhetorical ellipsis: exploring the roles of 
metaphor. expression and style in art. I n the next two chapters I shall look at these 
concepts: indiscernihility in chapter two and rhetorical ellipsis in chapter three. They 
arc discussed in his 1981 book 711e Tr(Jn~f;guralion l?( Ihe ('ommonplan': writkn 
seventeen years after 'The Artworld' article. The book provides an extended and 
considerably refined version of Danto' s philosophy of art. 
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Chapter Two 
Danto and the Comparison of Indiscernible Counterparts 
The woods are lovely. dark and deep. 
But I have promises to keep. 
And miles to go before I sleep. 
And miles to go before I sleep. 
Robert Frost l 
I. Introduction 
In the last chapter I examined Arthur Danto's 1964 paper "The Artworld." In that 
paper Danto outlines his idea of how the creation and appreciation of art is 
dependent on a background of theory and knowledge. He looks at how artistic 
theories develop and change; Danto illustrates his argument with two examples. the 
imitation Theory and the Reality Theory. before going on to explain his idea of the 
style matrix lmd how art accommodates and accepts new theories. He introduces lilld 
explains two key concepts underlying his philosophy of art: firstly, the special wa: of 
looking which is used primarily to identifY art. the is of artistic identification. and 
secondly. the on:rarching concept of the artworld: that "atmosphere of art ist ic 
theory. a knowledge of the history of art'· ( 1964. p.209). In my discussion I tollo\\ed 
I )anto's explanation and unfolding of these two ideas lilld outlined my criticism of 
-~ .. --~ 
I rtll.'Sl' arl' tht: last four lirlL'S llf '~\oppin~ b~ \\oods on a ~rlll\\~ F\cnin~' \Irns\ Il)~~. p.14~). "-l"C 
also tt)()tnott: (, to this chapter. 
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them. In this chapter I follow the subsequent development of Danto's philosophy of 
art in his 1981 book The Transfiguration of the Commonplace 
In this later book Danto's two key concepts. the is of artistic 
identification and the artworld, remain as foundations of his theory of art· in its first 
. . 
six chapters the book is very much a development and refmement of the ideas put 
forward in the earlier paper - I return to discuss the final chapter of The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace later. However, the debate is now dominated 
by the technique of comparing sets of indiscernible counterparts: this becomes the 
central tool in the development of Danto 's argument. In the' Artworld' paper I hme 
pointed out that Danto made limited use of the comparison of indiscemibles as a 
technique to explain his theory of art: the two identical paintings Newton's First Law 
and Newton's Third Law were used as a key example of the technique in action. 
Another example was the explanation of the difference between \\'arhors Brillo Box 
sculpture and ordinary Brillo boxes. In this later work, The Tran.~liKlIralion q( Ihe 
Commonplace. the examination of indiscernible counterparts dominates the 
discussion, and Danto includes many examples throughout the book to illustrate his 
arguments. I shall devote the next section of this chapter to looking at a selection of 
the examples used by Danto and an examination of the underlying concept of the 
comparison of indiscernible counterparts. Danto is economical in his use of examples 
and extensively re-uses and re-works his previous subjects: the discussion of the t\\O 
paint ings mentioned above, for instance, receives a much fuller and extended 
discussion. But. as I shall explain. he also introduces a number of new examples. 
I n the first part of the discussion I examine six examples of Danto' s 
indiscernible counterparts by relating each of them to particular ekments of his 
philosophy of art. For the purposes of my debate I adopt a refinement and 
tiHlllulation of the issue of indiscernibility put t()f\\ard by John Andrew Fisher in his 
1995 papcr "Is {'here a Problem of Indiscl'mible Counterparts?' (199:'). Fisher. in a 
sllccessful mv\ e to L'larit~· the debate, subdivides the isslle nf inJiscerniblc 
counterparts into three separate anJ 4uitc distinct claims: (I) e\'Cf\ real thing can 
h8 
have an indiscernible counterpart which is an artwork, (2) e\cf\ artwork can have an 
indiscernible counterpart which is a different artwork and lastly. (3) e\"t~r: artwork 
can have an indiscernible counterpart which is an ordinary thing. 
I also examine how Danto uses different examples to justify the various 
principles underlying his theory of art. It will be recalled that in the last chapter I 
identified five such underlying principles in Danto's theorY: m\ aim will be to show 
how the examples relate to and support these principles. Before I begin this 
discussion I intend, by way of anticipation, to add a new principle to the previous list 
of five: making a new total of six. The reason for this anticipatory move is that in the 
next chapter I discuss the final part of The Tran.~liguralion of the Commonplacc 
where this new principle - the idea of art as rhetorical ellipsis - is introduced. I 
f()llow Danto's sequence in unfolding his philosophy of art by treating this issue at 
the end: after the discussion of indiscernible counterparts~ however, it does seem 
sensible to treat this additional principle with the original tive -- \\hich were 
introduced in the previous chapter - as a group. 
The second part of my discussion of the topic of indiscernible 
counterparts is critical~ I outline and comment on an area of criticism of Danto' s lise 
of the technique tormulated by Joseph Margolis. His concern with Danto's is of 
identification was discussed in the last chapter. and I promised to return to it. I also 
intend to redeem a further promise from the last chapter: I will show how Danto' s 
theory differs from the institutional theory of art advanced by George Dickie with 
which it initiallv seems to share much common ground. I examine in particular ho\\ 
one of Fisher's sub-claims - (2) every artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart 
which is a different artwork -- provides an argument against Dickie' s institutional 
theory. at least as it is commonlv misunderstood hv Danto and Richard \\'ollheim 
- .'
amongst others. I exanline the reasons for this misunderstanding. 
The conclusion to the chapter examines a further distinction hct\\een 
oroad and narrow indiscernioility identified by fisher. I then pn)\ide a rc\il'\\ of my 
discussion and arguments on Danto's use of indisl'l'fnible COllntL'rparh in his 
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philosophy of art. In the next chapter I move on to an examination of the final 
chapter, chapter seven, of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. The first six 
chapters of the book are very much a development and expansion of the ideas put 
forward in the 'Artworld' paper. The last chapter, however, as I have briefly 
mentioned, brings in new material; it discusses the issue of art as rhetoric: 
particularly the use of expression, metaphor and style. Danto believes that rhetorical 
ellipsis is an important distinguishing feature of art: this follows from his view of art 
as embodying meaning and therefore involving interpretation. However, I now begin 
the work of this chapter: an examination of Danto' s use of the technique of 
comparing sets of indiscernible counterparts. 
II. Indiscernible Counterparts Examined 
The issue of indiscernible counterparts dominates Danto' s 1981 book The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Danto sees this as the key issue dominating 
not only the philosophy of art but philosophy itself: "all philosophical questions, I 
have argued, have that form: two outwardly indiscernible things can belong to 
different, indeed to momentously different, philosophical categories" (1997a, p.35).2 
This far-reaching claim is outside the scope of our dissertation but I should point out 
that Danto sees a close connection between his wider philosophical theories and his 
theory of art; for Danto the two are inextricably bound together: "art is typically 
thought to be marginal to philosophy, a kind of ontological frill, whereas it is in my 
2 A footnote explains that this wider subject is developed at length in Danto' s 1989 book 
Connections to the World (1997b in the bibliography). His first use of indiscernible counterparts 
was not in a specifically aesthetic context, although it involved a work of literature. Its use appears 
for the first time in his 1968 book Analytic Philosophy of History (see 1985. pp.172-81). It 
concerns a thought experiment about the possibility of a book written in 1815 entitled The Battle of 
Iwo Jima which contains an exact description of the 1945 conflict. 
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view absolutely central to thinking about subjects - especially subjects having to do 
with our own philosophical nature, to which the pertinence of the concept of art 
seems initially remote" (1999b, p.ix). 
It was the advent of a particular piece of pop art that alerted Danto to 
the significance of the indiscernibility issue in the aesthetic arena: Andy Warhol's 
Brillo Box sculpture of 1964. It suggested to him the question: why should Warhol's 
Brillo Box sculpture be considered as art when an indiscernible stack of everyday 
Brillo cartons is not? He sums up the situation: "it seems to me that pop, however 
unlikely it may have appeared to those unsympathetic with it (to most of my friends 
who were artists, for example) had finally discovered the true form of the 
philosophical question about art" (1999a, p.S). It is Danto' s attempt to answer this 
philosophical question - how do you account for the difference between a work of 
art and an indiscernible everyday object? - that leads him to the technique he uses 
throughout The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: "it was this insight that 
equipped me with the method I use in my book" (1981, p. vii). The method referred 
to is the comparison of sets of indiscernible counterparts. 
In The Transfiguration of the Commonplace Danto discusses some 
twenty-three examples of indiscernible counterparts in detail with other instances 
mentioned in passing.3 In this section I will look at six of these examples in my 
3. list the twenty-three examples below together with page references to Danto, 1981. 
(I) The imaginary gallery of nine indiscernible red canvasses, pp.1-3. 
(2) Six instances of Christ's raised ann in Giotto's tableaux on the North wall of the Arena Chapel, 
Padua (although strictly speaking these are not indiscernibles), p.4. 
(3) Two identical beds one of which is a work of art. pp.II-3. 
(4) The first can opener and an indiscernible sculpture produced at exactly the same time. p.29. 
(5) Rembrandt's Polish Rider and an accidentally produced although indiscernible count~ 
p.31. 
(6) The two indiscernible extracts mmtioned in Borges' short story Pierre .\lc!nard: one by 
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Cervantes the other by the fictitious author Menard, pp.33-9. 
(7) Three indiscernible ties: by Picasso, a child and a forgery of the one by Picasso, p.39-40. 
(S) Two indiscernible piles of hemp, an artwork by Robert Morris and an everyday pile of hemp, 
although coming from Antwerp in the seventeenth century, p.45. 
(9) Duchamp's In Advance of a Broken Arm and an everyday indiscernible snow shovel, p.45. 
(10) A photograph of the World Trade Centre and an indiscernible accidentally produced 
photograph, p.4S. 
(11) Wittgenstein's example of a calculus formula and an indiscernible tribal decoration, p.49-50. 
(12) Two marbles: one a portrait of the other, p.SO. 
(13) A thumbtack and a work ofart consisting ofa thumbtack, pp.92-3. 
(14) Duchamp's Fountain and an indiscernible urinal, p.93. 
(15) Six stained ricepaper panels and an indiscernible work of art, pp.l 00-1. 
(16) A Lichtenstein brush stroke painting of 1965 and an indiscernible canvass produced in IS65. 
p.l13. 
(17) Two indiscernible paintings, Newton's First Law and Newton's Third Law, p.120-3. 
(IS) Aaron Kurilotrs Laundry Bag installation and an indiscernible everyday laundry bag, p.132-3 
(see Artforum, III:S, 10th May 1965). 
(19) The Manhattan Telephone Directory for 1980 and an indiscernible experimental novel 
Metropolis Eighty, pp.136-S. 
(20) Three indiscernible drawings of Mount Fujiyama by i) Hiroshiga, ii) an electrocardiogram and 
iii) a mechanically drawn artwork, pp.140-1. 
(21) Loran's diagram of Cezanne's Portrait of Madame Cezanne and Lichtenstein's painting, 
Portrait of Madame Cezanne, which is indiscernible from the diagram, pp.142-4. Danto gives the 
date of Lichtenstein's work as 1963; in Coplans' monograph on Lichtenstein it is given as 1962. 
(22) Two indiscernible stories about a homicide case produced by a 'literary' writer and a Newsday 
crime reporter. both called M, pp. 144-6. This example takes its inspiration from Truman Capote's 
1966 book In Cold Blood. an exam ination of a real-life murder case written in the form of a novel. 
(23) Andy Warhors Brillo Box sculpture and everyday Brillo boxes, p.44 and p.20S. 
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examination of Danto's theory. The six examples are: (i) Danto's famous gallery of 
nine indiscernible red canvasses, (ii) Rembrandt's Polish Rider and an accidentally 
produced ahhough indiscernible counterpart, (fu) the two indiscernible extracts 
mentioned in Borges' short story Pierre Menard: one by Cervantes the other by the 
fictional author Menard, (iv) Kurilofrs Laundry Bag installation and an 
indiscernible, everyday laundry bag, (v) the Manhattan Telephone Directory for 
1980 and an indiscernible experimental novel entitled Metropolis Eighty and finally 
(vi) Loran's diagram of Cezanne's Portrait of Madame Cezanne and Lichtenstein's 
1962 painting, Portrait of Madame Cezanne, which is indiscerruble from the 
diagram. I shall identifY how Danto uses these examples to explain aspects of his 
philosophy of art as it is embodied in his concept of the artworld. 
It will be recalled that in the previous chapter (section V) I identified 
five principles underlying Danto' s philosophy of art: (1) art is the result of human 
endeavour by an artist, (2) artworks acquire a history and a provenance. (3) 
artworks embody meaning (they are expressive), which meaning is a resuh of the 
artist's intention, (4) artworks require interpretation and finally, (5) they are 
produced and interpreted within a historical context. I intend to examine how 
Danto's examples of indiscernible counterparts are used to support his arguments in 
relation to each of these principles. 
Before I begin, I intend to add an additional principle to the list of five 
mentioned above. This additional principle comes from the discussion in the final 
chapter of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace entitled "Metaphor, 
Expression, and Style.' This discussion follows the first six chapters of the book 
which are devoted largely to the question of indiscernibility. but as comparing 
indiscernibles is Danto's key technique, I believe it should be used to test all the 
principles~ I therefore bring this new principle into the discussion in anticipation of 
the final chapter. It remains a moot point why Danto did not begin the book with his 
discussion of the rhetorical nature of art contained in his final chapter. but I follow 
his sequence in discussing it after indiscernibility: it is the subject of my next chapter. 
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The additional principle I introduce in anticipation follows on from my 
principle (3) that artworks embody meaning (they are expressin~). \\ hich meaning i~ 
a result of the artist's intention. I therefore propose to insert it as a new principle (-+) 
and renumber the final two. The new principle (4) is that the presence of meaning in 
artworks requires a subject matter about which the artist projects a point of \iew hy 
means of rhetorical ellipsis. This concept will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter; I should, however, provide a brief explanation here. Danto believes that art 
is expressive by nature; it aims to effect a change in its recipient. It is therefore 
essentially rhetorical; its aim is to persuade: to bring about a change in the 
perception of the viewer. He also believes that one of the most powerful rhetorical 
tools is that of ellipsis; the traditional elliptical trope is the enthymeme. which, being 
a truncated syllogism, embodies ellipsis. The recipient is required to complete what 
is missing: to bridge the enthymemetic gap. This process draws the recipient into the 
interpretive process, and it is this involvement, Danto believes. which gives 
rhetorical ellipsis, and hence art, its considerable power. As I shall explain in the next 
chapter. Danto develops this principle, of the artist projecting a point of view. into 
the concept of style which, he believes, usually involves a reliance on the use of 
metaphor. The final list of principles thus reads: (1) art is the result of human 
endeavour by an artist, (2) artworks acquire a history and a provenance. (3) 
artworks embody meaning (they are expressive). which meaning is a result of the 
artist's intention. (4) that meaning requires a subject about which the artist projects a 
point of vie\\' by means of rhetorical ellipsis, (5) artworks require interpretation and 
finally. (6) they are produced and interpreted within a historical context. 
To give a degree of precision to the discussion 1 intend to follo\\ a 
retil1L'ment of Danto's original claim - that artworks have indiscernihle counterparts 
- provided hy John Andrew Fisher in his 1995 paper "I s There a Problem with 
Indiscernihle Counterparts.,4 hsher divides the original claim into three separate and 
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quite distinct sub-claims: (1) every real thing can ha\e an indiscernible counterpart 
which is an artwork~ (2) every artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart which 
is a different artwork and lastly, (3) every artwork can have an indiscernible 
counterpart which is an ordinary thing. The distinction between sub-claims (1) and 
(3) perhaps requires a brief explanation. In sub-claim (1) the artwork follo\\'s the real 
thing in time: the real thing is anterior to the artwork; in sub-claim (3) it is the other 
way round: the artwork is anterior to the ordinary thing~ the significance of the 
distinction will become apparent later. I shall also introduce later in this section a 
further important division of sub-claim (1): I shall introduce sub-claim (1 a) that 
every representation can have an indiscernible counterpart which is both a 
representation and an artwork; I shall leave the explanation of this additional 
distinction for the present. I shall examine how each of these three claims is 
supported by the examples of indiscernibles Danto has chosen. For instance. 
sub-claim (1) - every real thing can have an indiscernible counterpart which is an 
artwork - is supported by example (iv) KurilotYs Laundry Bag installation and an 
indiscernible everyday laundry bag. Sub-claim (2) - c\cry artwork can have an 
indiscernible counterpart which is a different artwork - is supported by example (iii) 
the two indiscernible extracts mentioned in Borges' short story Pierre Ale nard, and 
sub-claim (3) - every artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart which is an 
ordinary thing - is supported by example (ii) Rembrandt's Polish Rider and an 
accidentally produced counterpart. I shall then return to examine how the three 
sub-claims support the six principles underlying Danto's philosophy of art. 
Bet()re I move on to examine the examples. two points need to be 
discllSSt'd. Firstly. Danto's use of the term 'indiscernibility' requires clarification and 
second I: . the basic proposition underlying Danto's usc of the term 'indiscernibilit; , 
is that any material o~iect can have an indiscernible counterpart. I discuss each of 
these in tUTI1. 1'0 begin with the tirst point. I need to explain what Danto meiU1S \\ hen 
he ll~'S the term 'indisl'ernibilitv·. Danto mentions Lcihniz's law and goes on to 
explain that his l'oncept of indiscl'nlihility Joes not invoh e a conflict with the la\\. 
Danto is using indiscernibility in an everyday sense whereas Leibniz is concerned 
with the ontological constitution of objects.S The difference is important and I will 
explain it by looking at some examples. Danto uses indiscemibility to refer to the 
manifest properties of objects: for example, two postage stamps are, for Danto, 
indiscernible but as indiscernible counterparts are clearly quite distinct and separate 
objects. Danto regards the two stamps as indiscernible, but he is not denying. (1) 
that they are separate objects and (2) that there may well be a way of distinguishing 
them by philatelic or scientific investigation. Microscopic inspection may well be able 
to tell me the exact location of each stamp from a particular sheet: chemical analysis 
of the ink and paper may tell me which factory produced the stamps and when. 
There is therefore no suggestion that the stamps are indiscernible in the way in which 
the logical principle of Leibniz's law demands: there is no conflict with Leibniz's 
law. Danto's use of indiscernibility is a different issue; he explains: "it is a 
consequence of a theory of Leibniz that if two things have the same properties they 
are identical, and that identity means that, for every property F. a is identical with h 
in case, whenever a is F, so is b. It must follow that if the works in question have all 
the same properties, they must be identical. But Borges' point [he refers here to the 
two indiscernible extracts mentioned in Borges' short story Pierre Menard] is that 
they do not. They have only in common those properties that the eye as such might 
identifY' (1981, pp.34-5). 
The distinction becomes apparent if I consider a pair of objects from one 
of Danto's own examples - Duchamp's Fountain and a urinal: a similar model from 
the same manufacturer that Duchamp used in his ready-made. They look the same 
hut clearly arc distinct objects: they occupy separate locations in space. As a tinal 
example I consider two firebricks, one of \\hich has been used as a murder \\l'apon. 
In Danto's terms they are indiscernible: no amount of inspection will re\ L'al tlK' 
ditlcrence. llowc\'l~r t()rcnsic examination would rc\eal which had been used tll[ the 
~Sl"C fix ~',al1lpk ("orrl·spondc.'!/l·l' H'ir}, 1malJld. ::!..t.II. Lcibni/. 1998. p.11 O. 
murder: they are different but the difference is apparent only in their non-manifest 
properties. Interestingly in this example either or both the bricks could be works of 
art: say, taken from Carl Andre's firebrick sculpture, Equivalent VIII, 1966, whose 
allusive title refers to this very issue of indiscermbility. John Fisher puts this point in 
another way: "note that this relationship does not require absolute indiscernibility. 
that is, the sharing of all properties, both relational and nonrelational ... Rather, all 
that Danto requires is that the two items share nonrelational properties that are of 
typical interest for an item of a given type" (1995, p.468). The existence of these 
forms of indiscernibles should come as no surprise; I am, of course, surrounded by 
examples of indiscernible objects of the type that Danto is referring to: tyres in a 
garage, postage stamps and washing machines; many of the articles that surround me 
in my daily life have indiscernible counterparts. 
The second point is that underlying Danto's whole approach is the 
assumption that any material object can have an indiscernible counterpart. In the 
examples I have mentioned above this is obvious; I use indiscernible postage stamps 
every day, but can I generalise this into a principle that covers every physical object? 
Oanto believes I can, as some ofhis examples clearly show; for instance, one which I 
shall be discussing later: Rembrandt's Polish Rider and an accidentally produced 
although indiscernible counterpart. I can think of examples of highly complex 
indiscernible objects, orchids of the same species, aircraft carriers of the same class. 
identical twins, battle tanks and cloned sheep. An indiscernible counterpart of any 
object or landscape is conceivable even if some may be highly unlikely; there is no 
reason why an indiscernible counterpart of any physical object could not exist. This 
is the principle underlying every thought experiment that Oanto subsequently uses. 
The principle equally applies to sounds, actions and texts. Taking the example of 
texts, it is quite easy to conceive of three indiscernible postcards with a message 
reading 4meet me at the Lion at 7.00 p.rn. tomorrow' referring to completely 
different people and places: a pub, the battlecruiser H.M.S. Lion and a performance 
of The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. Oanto concentrates on examples from the 
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visual arts, but four of his examples are based on indiscermble texts: the most 
famous has its origin in Borges' story Pierre Menard.6 I shall return to discuss this 
issue of principle in the conclusion to this chapter when I pick up on the point that 
nothing in this underlying proposition relates the principle of indiscermble 
counterparts specifically to artworks. For the present I continue with my 
examination of some of Dan to's examples. 
I intend to examine six of Danto's examples of indiscernible 
counterparts; initially I shall look at how they relate to Fisher's three sub-claims 
about indiscernible artworks. Following this, I consider how they are used to support 
the six principles I have identified in Danto's philosophy of art. I begin with 
Kurilofr s Laundry Bag: the installation was created from a laundry bag displayed on 
a mounting board complete with a label telling the viewer it was a laundry bag. This 
joins other examples of ready-mades that Danto discusses and takes us to the first of 
Fisher's sub-claims - every real thing can have an indiscernible counterpart which is 
an artwork. The lesson Danto draws from the ready-mades is that any everyday 
object can become an artwork in certain situations. Fisher states the argument: "if it 
is possible to do something to any ordinary thing or (mere) artefact to make it into 
an artwork, then it follows that any ordinary thing or artefact could have an IC 
[indiscernible counterpart] that is an artwork. (Because it can have an IC which is 
not an artwork which is converted into an artwork.)" (1995, p.4 72). The important 
consequence of this claim for Danto's theory is that it indicates that works of art 
cannot be distinguished by discernible properties. If a work of art includes a laundry 
bag, as does Kuriloff's Laundry Bag, I will be unable to distinguish it from an 
un-transfigured everyday laundry bag simply by looking at it. Danto uses this 
6-rhe others being numbers (11). (19) and (22) in the list above (footnote 3). The superscription to 
this chapter is also an example Danto mentions in a later work: he makes the point that. although 
the last two lines of the poem use the same words. the meaning is completely different. This 
distinction was pointed out to him by Vladimir Nabokov. see Danto. 1992, p.66. 
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argument to reject theories of art, such as aesthetic fo~ where artworks are 
marked by some perceptually distinguishable property such as a special 'aesthetic' 
quality or form. Danto's argument rests on the rhetorical question: if artworks 
cannot be distinguished by their manifest properties how can any essential quality of 
art rest in those manifest properties? If every real thing can have an indiscernible 
counterpart which is an artwork, any recourse to a manifest property, such as 
'significant form', to distinguish the artwork as art fails. However, it is important to 
distinguish Danto' s claim - that works of art cannot be distinguished by discermble 
properties - from two others. 
Firstly, Danto is not claiming that every object is an artwork; as I explained 
in the last chapter, Danto believes there must be a transfiguration: the object must be 
taken up into the artworld. In the case of Laundry Bag the transfiguration is 
apparent in a number of ways; the setting, an art gallery; the fact that it is mounted, 
which laundry bags are usually not, and that it is labelled. Danto points out that the 
very labelling in this piece is an important part of the artistic statement: "the work 
looks as if it were part of an exhibit for people from outer space ... To label an object 
so banal and familiar is to dislocate it, to distort the environment" (1981, p.133). An 
objection springs to mind which is that Laundry Bag, by the very visible fact of its 
mounting and labelling, is clearly discernible from its everyday counterpart. Danto is 
aware of this and addresses the objection; he chooses an example where there is no 
label, nothing visible which tells us that it is an artwork. In the example he uses - a 
remarkably prescient choice, in view of Tracey Emin' s notorious work some 
eighteen years later - the artist J insists that his bed, without J having altered it at all. 
is a work of art. But J is an artist and his Bed is a statement about the status of art 
objects even though as Danto says: "J would say that it was about nothing, had no 
interpretation" (1981. p. 133). This statement by J is sufficient. in Danto' s view. to 
transfigure the unaltered bed into a work of art. The objection is addressed because. 
although there has been no visible alteration to the bed, the intention of the artist to 
create a work of art out of his statement about the bed achieves the transformation. 
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J's bed is now not merely a bed but the bed which was the subject of r s statement 
about art. The bed is no longer just a bed: it is the subject of 1's polemic statement 
which is intended to make a point about the status of the art object; in this case, I 
must say, a rather trite statement. Danto' s point is that in this example there is no 
manifest property involved: the bed has, however, acquired an artistic history. a 
provenance, however trivial I refer back to Danto's six principles of art which I 
identified earlier in this section; number three of which says that artworks embody 
meaning (they are expressive), which meaning is a resuh of the artist's intention. In 
this example J has an intention: he expresses a meaning which is embodied in his 
statement about his bed. Noel Carroll makes this point well with another example. 
He imagines an artist populating a gallery with everyday items in an exhibition called 
Exhibition of Real Things. The artist's aim is to remove the elitism and privilege of 
fine art; he is as Carroll says "a great demotic leveller" (1993, p.82). The collection 
and display of these objects has, using Danto's term, transfigured them; Carroll goes 
on to say: "and yet his [the demotic artist's] collection does not comprise a 
collection of mere real things; for his collection is charged with meaning. It is a 
polemic. Given its context in a continuing debate, it signifies like a gesture" (1993, 
pp.82-3). 
The second claim I distinguish from Danto's view - that works of art 
cannot be identified by discernible properties - is the quite separate and plausible 
claim that any real thing can become the object of aesthetic consideration. Danto is 
well aware of this distinction; in a later work he says: 
In some sense Warhol's Brillo Box was 'inspired' by the ordinary 
Brillo boxes it so precisely resembled. But that did not turn the 
ordinary packing cartons into works of art. even if a case can be made 
that Warhol elevated them as objects of aesthetic consciousness. 
A nything can become an object of detached aesthetic scrutiny - the 
teeth of a dead dog to cite an example of St. Augustine 's, the purpled 
eyelids of his dead wife. as was the case of Claude Monet. These of 
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course were real things, in contrast with works of art or artefacts. but 
whatever the appearances, the distinction between art and reality. lik~ 
the distinction between artwork and artefact is absolute. (1992, p. 94) 
Danto here is following a Kantian view of what constitutes an aesthetic judgement 
and of what can be subject to aesthetic consideration. Aesthetic judgements or 
judgements of taste outlined by Kant in Part One of The Crilque of Judgment would 
include the beautiful and the sublime, natural as well as man-made objects. Again. 
Danto's distinction between artwork and artefact has much in common with the 
taxonomy of art outlined by Kant in section 43 of the third Critique. Danto follo\\s 
Kant in never explicitly setting out why aesthetic judgements exist: he follo\\s the 
Kantian acceptance of the empirical basis of these aesthetic phenomena. I return to 
discuss Kant's taxonomy of art in more detail in the conclusion. chapter four. In his 
paper' Art and Meaning' 7 Danto gives a very thorough, critical appreciation of the 
Brillo box design and explains why he believes it to be an outstanding example of 
packaging design. He attributes its excellence partly to the fact that it was the work 
of James Harvey. a fine artist by training and an exponent of abstract expressionism. 
who moved into the field of commercial art. However. Danto here is extolling the 
Brillo carton's excellence as a package design not as a work of art: the absolute 
distinction remains. 
This second clainl- that anything can be the subject of aesthetic scrutin: -
is clOSl" to another idea: that when we look at these everyday items as art \\ ~ 
consider them as il they were artworks. But there is an important distinction: 
Fisher's sub-claim - that every real thing can have an indiscernible counterpart which 
is an artwork - is saying clearly that th~ object of scrutiny really is an art work and 
not that it is to be regarded llS ~( it were ~m artwork. The as it claim has such hroad 
generality that it seems to take us no hlrther forward in identifying or particularising 
art than the claim that ~mything can be \'il'\\L'd from an aesthetic point of \'il'\\. 
7 rhc paper is puhlishl-d in Danlll. 2000; the rl'l~rcnl'c is to p. \ \ \. 
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Before I move on from Fisher's first sulrc1aim I shall look at two other of 
Danto's examples which support this sulrclaim - that every real thing can have an 
indiscerruble cowrterpart which is an artwork. The first is the Manhattan Telephone 
Directory for 1980 and the possibility of it having a number of indiscerruble 
counterparts. Danto's reason for this choice is quite specific: he uses this example to 
make the point that its indiscernible counterparts could belong to different artistic 
genres. The artwork he explains could be "a folio of prints, a nove~ a poem, or 
perhaps, in the spirit of novel notation, the score for a musical composition - by 
Luciano Berio? - in which the names are to be chanted" (1981, p.136). He goes on 
to provide a detailed and plausible explanation of the circumstances surrounding the 
production of the experimental novel Metropolis Eighty which happens to be an 
indiscernible counterpart of the Manhattan Telephone Directory for 1980. Danto 
ends his discussion of this example with the speCUlation "that the phenomenon of 
confusable counterparts belonging to distinct ontological orders arises only when at 
least one of the confusable things bears a representational property: where at least 
one of the counterparts is about something, or has a content, or a subject, or a 
meaning" (1981, pp.138-9). I return to this point shortly when I examine how 
Danto's examples support the six principles of art embodied in his artworld theory. 
The second example, before I move on to Fisher's next sub-claim, picks 
up on the point made in the last quotation about the question of representation. It is 
here that I shall introduce the division of sub-claim (1) which was mentioned earlier: 
it will be recalled that sub-claim (la) states that every representation can have an 
indiscernible counterpart which is both a representation and an artwork. My second 
example concerns Roy Lichtenstein's 1962 painting Portrait of Madame Cezanne 
which. at a hugely different scale. reproduces a well-known diagram by the art critic 
Erie Loran purporting to identify the compositional structure underlying Cezanne"s 
painting (see illustration 7).8 Danto makes the point that a reproduction of Loran's 
8Amazingly. Loran accused Lichtenstein of plagiarism and the issue caused quite a stir in the 
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diagram and a reproduction of Lichtenstein's painting are indiscernible. The figure of 
the Loran diagram, ahhough it remains just a diagram, is, nevertheless, an illustration 
of a representation: because a diagram, clearly, represents something. However. the 
illustration of Lichtenstein's painting represents a work of art which is also a 
representation. Here we have indiscernible counterparts both of which are 
representations, but only one is a work of art. Danto concedes the point that 
accepting both are representations gets us no further towards identifying why only 
one is an artwork. He makes the point that both, as representations, have content 
and meaning, but ''unless we wished to claim that artworks have some special 
content, or some special kind of content, which sets them off from other 
representations altogether, the appeal to content would get us nowhere" (1981. 
p.143). I shall return to this issue later in this section when I consider the full 
implications of sub-claim (la) that every representation can have an indiscernible 
counterpart that is both a representation and an artwork. For the present I continue 
with the examination of Dan to's examples of indiscernible counterparts. 
My fourth example comes from the very beginning of The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace; it is one of Danto's most famous thought 
experiments: he envisages a gallery composed entirely of indiscernible red 
rectangular canvasses. There are nine in total and they are: (1) a painting envisaged 
by Kierkegaard, with astonishing prescience in 1843, of the Israelites crossing the 
Red Sea,9 (2) a psychological work entitled Kierkegaard's Mood, (3) a tongue in 
artistic press of the time. The original diagram appeared twenty years ear1ier in Loran's book 
Cezanne's Composition. See Loran, 1963, p.8S and Coplans, 1972, p.74, i11.14. 
~is appears in the 'Diapsalmata' from Either/Or, Kierkegaard, 1944, p.22. The extract reads: 
" The resu1t of my life is simply nothing, a mood. a single colour. My result is like the painting of 
the artist who was to paint a picture of the Israe1ites crossing the Red Sea. To this end, he painted 
the whole wall red. explaining that the Israelites had already crossed over, and the Egyptians were 
drowned." 
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cheek Moscow landscape called Red Square, (4) a minimalist work with the same, 
Wholly-appropriate title, Red Square, ahhough it bears the same title for completely 
different reasons, (5) a Buddhist metaphysical painting, Nirvana, based on the 
concept of 'red dust': the deprecatory Buddhist name for the everyday world: the 
Samsara world of illusion, (6) Red Table Cloth by a disciple of Matisse, (7) a canvas 
grounded in red by Giorgione, (8) a red-painted surface and finally (9) an anti-art 
statement by the artist J entitled Untitled. It will be noticed that the first six and the 
last are works of art whereas (7) and (8) are everyday objects, ahhough (7). the 
canvas grounded by Giorgione, is of considerable interest to art historians. 
This gallery of indiscernibles enables me to consider the second and 
third of Fisher's sub-claims. The first six canvases and the last canvas, the works of 
art, are used to support the second sub-claim: that every artwork can have an 
indiscernible counterpart that is a different artwork. It is clear that, although these 
seven canvasses are indiscernible, they have completely different subjects; they are 
about different ideas and have quite distinct meanings. They are not interchangeable; 
each painting has its own history and provenance: they were produced at a specific 
time within a specific cultural context. The paintings are produced by different 
artists, have their own titles and were created with quite different motives and 
intentions on the part of the artists. They are, clearly, distinct works of art: canvas 
(3) Red Square is a completely different work to (4) Red Square; despite sharing the 
same title: the thinking and circumstances behind their creation are radically far 
apart~ the meaning of their titles is quite different. 
Danto requires a theory of art that will account for these differences, and 
I shall discuss later how these examples measure up against the principles underlying 
his concept of the artworld. As I explained in the previous chapter. the artworld 
concept brings in a strong element of theoretical background in relation to works of 
art: the context of their creation, their situation within the development of art history 
and the history of their own production and appreciation. An immediate objection to 
Danto's approach is that. although these examples of indiscemibles may happen in 
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thought experiments, they simply do not occur in practice: in the everyday artworld. 
But of course they do: one very clear example being appropriational art. Sherrie 
Levine has re-photographed and repainted famous works of art: the photographs of 
Walker Evans (see illustration 8) and paintings by Kasimir Malevich for example. 
Levine's appropriational work probes some of the most basic assumptions about art 
and gender: questions of male authorship are explored; the idea of distancing the 
artwork from originality and the deliberate avoidance of self-expression figure 
strongly in her work. 
Levine's work leads into another example of the occurrence of 
indiscernibles in the artworld. As I have mentioned, Levine appropriates Malevich' s 
work which itself provides us with our next example. One of Malevich's original 
paintings is a very good example: Red Square (Painterly Realism of a Peasant 
Woman in Two Dimensions), 1915, (see illustration 9) is remarkably close visually to 
anyone of Danto's imaginary red canvasses; it even shares the first part of its title 
with Danto's imaginary canvasses (3) and (4). But Malevich's painting has its own 
history and meaning; his Red Square canvas is deeply mystical reflecting his interests 
in 1915: the links between geometrical symbolism, colour symbolism and spirituality, 
the parallels with the tradition of Russian icon painting, his interest in the Russian 
landscape and the life of the peasants and his involvement with the Suprematist 
movement. Malevich's monochrome canvasses have an important place in the 
development of twentieth-century art. Here there are two examples of artists 
producing powerful work and having significant and important places in the history 
of twentieth-century art; I could slot our chosen examples of their works neatly and 
seamlessly into Danto' s thought experiment. 
Before I return to the gallery of indiscernibles and move on to discuss 
sub-claim three, whic~ as I have already mentioned. some of Danto . s red canvasses 
also support, I will discuss another of Danto ' s examples which illustrates sub-claim 
two: that every artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart which is a different 
artwork. This example comes from the field of literature: the Borges' short story 
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Pie"e Menard, Author of Don Quixote. The story was written in 1936; it concerns a 
fictitious author Pierre Menard who sets out to, and does indee<L write extracts that 
coincide exactly with passages from Cervantes' Don Quixote. The climax is reached 
when two identical passages, one by Cervantes the other by Menard, are compared 
by the narrator and found to be completely different works of art. Borges writes: 
"the fragmentary Don Quixote of Menard is more subtle than that of Cervantes. The 
latter indulges in a rather coarse opposition between tales of knighthood and the 
meagre, provincial reality of his country; Menard chooses as 'reality' the land of 
Carmen during the century of Lepanto and Lope" (1965, p.48). 
Borges is making the same point as Danto does with his seven red 
canvasses: that indiscernible paintings, or in this case texts, can be completely 
different works of art. In discussing this example Danto makes it quite clear that we 
are talking about discernible properties: "they have only in common those properties 
that the eye as such might identify. So much the worse for the properties that meet 
the eye, then, in individuating works of art" (1981, p.35). Danto credits Borges with 
the first realisation, certainly in relation to literary works, that indiscernible artworks 
could occur. He also credits Borges with identifying that the two extracts not only 
have different histories themselves but also a different relationship to the history of 
literature: which fact serves to individuate the works. He explains, in discussing the 
two stories in Borges' example, that ''the works are in part constituted by their 
location in the history of literature as well as by their relationship to their authors" 
(1981, pp.35-6). 
I now return to Danto's gallery of indiscernibles and examine the two 
remaining canvasses (7) and (8) whic~ it will be recalled, were not works of art: the 
canvas grounded by Giorgione and the red-painted surface; an everyday artefact. 
These two examples serve to support the third of Fisher's sub-claims: that every 
artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart which is an ordinary thing. I shall also 
consider the last of Danto's examples which I have chosen to discuss: Rembrandt's 
Polish Rider and the indiscernible non-artwork object produced accidentally by paint 
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being dumped on a centrifuge and the resulting spray hitting a surface: this example 
also supports sub-claim three. 
The two non-artwork canvasses, the grounded red canvas and the red 
surface, can easily be envisaged occurring and being indiscernible with the seven 
other works of art: the circumstances of their production could be regular 
day-to-day events. The accidental paint splat which looks like The Polish Rider 
would be, in Danto's words, "a statistical miracle" (1981. p.31) but still a possibility. 
Other examples, lying between these two extremes, are easy to imagine happening: a 
ruler covered with black paint could fall across a white canvas to produce an 
indiscernible counterpart to another of Danto 's examples: either Newlon's Firs! Law 
or Newton's Third Law. There is a similar position with literary works; I can think of 
a wide range of possibilities: from the everyday occurrence to the highly improbable. 
A well-known example of the latter being the possibility of typing monkeys 
reproducing the complete works of Shakespeare; as an example of the former I 
might easily envisage a short poem bye. e. cummings or Edwin Morgan being 
produced accidentally on a word processor. 
The point I must make, and Danto alludes to it in his example of the 
canvas grounded by Giorgione, is that these non-artworks also have a history and a 
reason for being produced, however superficial it might have been. Or in the case of 
the accidentally produced items, there must be a set of causal circumstances allowing 
t{)[ the possibility of their production. The ordinary red surface, Danto's can\as (8), 
must have been produced for a reason: it could be quite mundane: as a colour sample 
or perhaps as an experiment to find the coverage of the particular paint used. The 
Giorgione as Danto points out. although not a work of art, is of considerable interest 
to the art historian: enabling her to examine the grounding, material. support and 
kchniques used hy a tillnous artist in preparing to create a work of art. \-.ven the 
indiscernible counterpart to Rembrandt's Polish Rider is not pur~l: accidental: the 
equipment must have hcen there t{)r some purpos~. e\~n it: as Danto says. whol'vcr 
was inn) Ivcd \\ as doing. it "just to SL'l' what \vould happen" ( \9X 1. p.3 I ): the pf()Cl'S~ 
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as Danto describes it does not involve an artist and the result is not an artwork. But 
a similar experiment could well have been perfonned by an avant-garde artist, 
perhaps a forerunner to Damien Hirst, experimenting with spin paintings; the result 
would then have been an artwork which might coincidentally looks exactly like 
Hirst's 'beautiful, kiss my fucking ass painting' (see illustration 10). Hirst used a 
centrifuge technique remarkably close to the one Danto suggests in his thought 
experiment to create this canvas. Again, I find that there is nothing here which 
enables me to identify art - except that it is carried out by an artist and this is a 
circular argument - and this brings me to the next part of the discussion which 
examines how Danto's examples support his concept of the artworld. I now move on 
to look at how the examples of indiscernible counterparts which I have just 
discussed support Danto' s theory of art. 
At the beginning of this section, I set out a revised list of six principles 
which, as I explained in chapter one (bear in mind I added one more), underlie 
Danto's concept of the artworld. The six principles are: (1) art is the result of human 
endeavour by an artist, (2) artworks acquire a history and a provenance, (3) 
artworks embody meaning (they are expressive), which meaning is a result of the 
artist's intention, (4) that meaning requires a subject, about which the artist projects 
a point of view by means of rhetorical ellipsis, (5) artworks require interpretation 
and finally, (6) they are produced and interpreted within a historical context. I 
promised to return to examine how the examples of indiscernibles support these six 
principles. So far, I have chosen six of Danto's examples of indiscernible 
counterparts and examined how they support Fisher's three sub-claims: (1) every 
real thing can have an indiscernible counterpart which is an artwork, (2) every 
artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart which is a different artwork and lastly. 
(3) every artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart which is an ordinary thing. 
Recapping, Kuriloff's Laundry Bag installation and an indiscernible everyday laundry 
bag, the Manhattan Telephone Directory for J 980 and an indiscernible experimental 
novel Metropolis Eighty and Loran's diagram of Cezanne's Portrait (~r Afadame 
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Cezanne and Lichtenstein' s indiscernible painting supported sub-claim (1). The two 
indiscernible extracts mentioned in Borges' short story Pierre Menard and the SC\'en 
paintings from the imaginary gallery of nine indiscernible red canvasses supported 
sub-claim (2). Finally, the two remaining squares (non-artworks) from the imaginary 
gallery of nine indiscernible red canvasses and Rembrandt's Polish Rider and an 
accidentally produced although indiscernible counterpart support sub-claim (3). I 
have just examined how Fisher's three sub-claims are supported by the six examples 
of indiscernible counterparts. I intend to proceed by examining how the three 
sub-claims support the six principles of Dan to's theory of art. 
The fIrst principle is that art is the result of hunlan endeavour bv an 
artist. The second and third sub-claims self-evidently support this principle: it is the 
fIrst sub-claim - that every real thing can have an indiscernible counkrpart which is 
an artwork - that requires some clarifIcation. Surely ready-mades are not made b: 
artists. This point has, however, been addressed in chapter one (section V) where it 
was explained that these everyday objects are, to use Danto's term, "transfigured' 
into artworks by the agency of an artist. In the discussion of Kurilotr's Laundry Bag 
installation earlier in this section I also made it clear that Danto did not claim that 
everyday, un-transfIgured objects were works of art. The artists responsible for the 
ready-mades take up everyday objects into the artworld; in doing so the objects 
become transfigured, to stay with Danto' s loose term, and they cease to be what 
they were before. 
The second principle is that artworks acquire a history and a provenance. 
This principle. following my discussion in chapter one (section V). is again 
dependent on the idea of the transfIguration of the commonplace. and little more 
needs saying other than the comments made above on the tirst principle. In being 
taken up into the art\\ orld the everyda: objects acquire a history and a provenance. 
lhe problem here is one that surfaced in the discussion in the previous chapter: the 
point was made there that any o~ject·· \\l~ recall the piec~ of teak from II. \ 1.S. Iron 
Duke - could similarly acquire a history and a provenance; this principle does not 
help me to distinguish art from non-art. 
The third principle is that artworks embody mearung (they are 
expressive), which meaning is a result of the artist's intention. I shall also include 
here the fourth principle - that such meaning requires a subject, which projects a 
point of view by means of rhetorical ellipsis - bearing in mind that a fuller 
exploration of this latter principle awaits the next chapter. These two principles are 
supported by Fisher's sub-claim one: that every real thing can have an indiscernible 
counterpart that is an artwork. I have explained how this can be so in the examples 
ofKurilofI's Laundry Bag installation and the experimental novel Metropolis Eighty; 
these artworks embody meanings which their indiscernible counterparts, the 
everyday objects, lack. While discussing principle four - that meaning requires a 
subject, about which the artist projects a point of view by means of rhetorical ellipsis 
- I am also in a position to discuss the full implications of sub-claim (la) that every 
representation can have an indiscernible counterpart which is both a representation 
and an artwork. 
The important example here is Danto's comparison of Loran's diagram of 
Cezanne's painting Portrait of Madame Cezanne with Lichtenstein's indiscernible 
canvas - they are indiscernible at least in reproductions (see illustration 7). I made 
the distinction before that Loran's diagram is clearly a representation and not a work 
of art whereas Lichtenstein's painting is both a representation and a work of art. 
Where does the difference lie? The Loran diagram tries to explain how Cezanne 
composed and constructed his painting; the Lichtenstein version is something quite 
different: it is elliptical in that it invites the viewer to consider how we attempt to 
address Cezanne's genius in art-historical terms by means of diagrams. Noel Carroll 
picks this point up when he explains: "the subjects of Loran's diagram and 
Lichtenstein's painting differ; Loran's painting [sic] is about a certain work by 
Cezanne, whereas Lichtenstein's painting is about Cezanne's vision. The method of 
address of the Loran diagram is straightforward; the address of the Lichtenstein"s 
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Portrait of Madame Cezanne is rhetorica1. whic~ for Danto. means that it has to he 
filled-in by the spectator in the manner of a rhetorical question" (1993. p.S5). Carroll 
has conflated rhetoric and ellipsis here; in the following chapter I will highlight the 
difference. In brief, Danto believes the Lichtenstein painting is both elliptical and 
rhetorical: something is omitted which has to be filled in hy the yiewer. and the 
omission itself is a device of persuasion. The distinction between these two 
indiscemibles is an important one for Danto, and, as I will point out. he returns to it 
several times later in the book. At this stage, it is the only concept proposed hy 
Danto offering to identifY a substantive difference between art and non-art: it ofiers 
to provide a potential solution to Danto's quest for a definition of art without 
employing a circular argument. Danto is well aware of the importance of this 
distinction and devotes a substantial part of the final chapter of The TransfiKural ion 
of the ('ommonplace to rhetorical ellipsis in art. In the penultimate chapter he begins 
to articulate the distinction: '"any representation not an artwork can be matched h: 
one that is one, the difference lying in the fact that the artwork uses the way the 
nonartwork presents its content to make a point about how that content is 
presented" (198 L p.146). I shall return to discuss this issue of the wayan artwork 
presents its content in the following chapter in greater detail. 
The fifth principle was that artworks require interpretation. and this is 
supported by sub-claims one and three: that every real thing can have an 
indiscernible counterpart which is an artwork and that eyer) artwork ean have an 
indiscernible counterpart which is an ordinary thing. As I ha\c already explained with 
the exanlple of Kuriloff's Laundry Bag installation, it is the laundry bag's 
transfiguration into an artwork by the artist that imposes a meaning onto a merc 
evcryday n~iect: an interpretation is then required to understand the en~r:'day object 
as art. An interpretation is also required to distinguish the artwork from the 
accidentalh produced indiscernihle: as in the case of Remhrandt's Polish Rider and 
the paint splat. As I han~' already pointed out. the difliculty is that many other objects 
\\ hich are not artworks also require interpretation. The ,\/o11h£l/l(ln 1del'hulll' 
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Directory for J 980 requIres interpretatio~ or to return to the subject of 
representations, road signs require interpretation in a similar wa\ to Julian Opie' ~ 
artworks which resemble road signs (see illustration 11). 
The fmal principle is that artworks are produced and interpreted within a 
historical context and this is supported by sub-claim two: that every artwork can 
have an indiscernible counterpart which is a different artwork. The discussion of the 
seven indiscernible artwork canvasses in Danto' s gallery has demonstrated how each 
one was produced in a different historical context and how each interpretation 
requires knowledge of the circumstances appertaining at that particular time. \\'1th 
each of the seven canvasses some knowledge of the artist's intention is required, ,md 
this is inextricably bound up with the artistic milieu within which the artist was 
working. Again the criticism may be raised that this principle says nothing 
particularly to distinguish artworks from non-artworks. For example it does not help 
to distinguish artworks from everyday things: after alL the road signs in the example 
mentioned above, which were being compared with Julian Opie's artworks. have 
their own small place within the history of graphic design and its relation to highway 
engineering in this country. 
In this section I have examined how some of Danto's examples of 
indiscernible counterparts from The Transfiguration of the Commonplace are used 
to support his concept of the artworld. The twenty-three main examples of 
indiscernihles dominate the book, certainly all but the final chapter. In each case we 
are asked to agree that the examples used are indeed perceptually indiscernible. rhe 
work of Dantu's theory is to explain why these indiscernible objects. at least one out 
of each pair which is an artwork. are difkrent. The whole basis of Danto's theory of 
art as Carroll says "must explain how the relevant distinction is possihle" (1993. 
p.RO). In the next section I shall look at J()seph Margoli<s criticism of the method 
Danto has pinned his laith on: in the conclusion I shall consider whether his faith in 
this ml'lhod·· the comparison uf indiscl'fnihle counterparts - is justified. 
III. Joseph Margolis's Criticism of Danto's Method of Comparing 
Indiscernibles 
I begin by re-emphasising the centrality of the method of comparing indiscernible 
counterparts to Danto's work not only in aesthetics but, as I have already 
mentioned, in his overall philosophical project; he explains: "it is here, at the 
boundaries between radically different but otherwise indistinguishable worlds, that 
philosophy itself must begin ... It cannot be a philosophical possibility that a genuine 
division between philosophers can consist of the presence in one world and the 
absence from another of some concrete thing" (1997b, p.13). Much criticism of 
Danto focuses on his philosophy of the history of art ignoring the indiscernibility 
question which is the basis of his philosophy of art. As I have explained in the 
previous chapter, Danto's philosophy of the history of art is reliant on his philosophy 
of art; it is crucial, therefore, to examine his use of indiscernible counterparts before 
an informed view of his philosophy of the history of art is possible: a consideration 
much overlooked in discussions of Danto's writings on art. 
Margolis and Danto have much in common: they are exact 
contemporaries (both were born in 1924) both are or were professors of philosophy 
at American universities and both have an interest in and write extensively about art. 
They also disagree fundamentally about art: there is a long-standing argument 
between them over the question of how we perceive works of art. This disagreement 
culminated in a series of three articles published in The British Journal of Aesthetics 
between 1998 and 2000; 1 0 it is these articles that I shall be referring to, for the most 
lO-rhe first by Margolis, 'Farewell to Danto and Goodman' Vol. 38. No.4, October 1998, 
pp.353-74, the second by Danto '.ndiscemibility and Perception: a Reply To Joseph Margolis'. Vol. 
39, No.3, July t 999, pp.32 t -9. and the third by Margolis • A Closer Look at Danto's Account of 
Art and Perception' Vol. 40, No.3, July 2000, pp.326-39 (referred to in the bibliography as 
Margoli~ t 998, Danto. 1999c and Margoli~ 2000a. The first is also reprinted with revisions as 
93 
part, in my discussion. Margolis has three major criticisms of Danto' s use of the 
comparison of indiscernibles. Firstly, that Danto in examining indiscernibles uses the 
logically incoherent concept of the is of artistic identification. Secondly. that Danto 
has to identify an artwork perceptually in order to get his experiments going (in 
which he argues that artworks are perceptually indiscernible) and thirdh. that the 
work of art must be discernible as such before the indiscernibilitr issue can arise. 
'"" 
They are not separated as such by Margolis but I have done so to help structure and 
clarify the discussion. I shall address the three criticisms in turn. 
It will be recalled that in chapter one J have already outlined 
Margolis's criticism of Danto 's idea of the special is of artistic identification. It is the 
starting point of Margolis's first criticism of indiscernible counterparts. At the end of 
the discussion in chapter one, it will be recalled, I mentioned that Margolis's 
criticism moved on from Danto's is of artistic identification to consider his use of 
indiscernible counterparts. I promised to return to consider his criticism of this latter 
issue and I intend to redeem that promise now. 
Margolis's argument against Danto's is of artistic identification is 
crucial to his criticism of Danto's indiscernibility thought experiments; it n:lies. as I 
have explained in chapter one, on a close reading of key passages in "The Artworld' 
article; they are given in full in section IV of chapter one, together with Margolis's 
criticism, and I do not repeat them here. Margolis argued, it will be recalled, that 
Danto's concept of the is of artistic identification was logically incoherent: that 
Danto had lost the reality of artworks. He belie\"es that Danto is saying. on the one 
hand. artworks are reaL and, on the other hand, Danto's definition of the is of 
artist ic identification results in artv.;orks being unreal. They are unreal in the sense 
that. if they arl~ identified by Danto' s special is, they are unable to possess the 
intentional properties \\ hich hoth Danto and i\1argolis agree are essential to art. 
Chaptl'r 2 ofS"h't" and Other ft'Xl,. Margolis. 2001a). 
The first criticism Margolis has of Danto's indiscernibles is that he 
continues to use the incoherent concept of the is of artistic identification. 
In summary, Margolis believes that Danto's argument proposes that in identifying 
artworks, we must use the is of artistic identification (because it is a necessary 
condition), and, in doing so - Danto states this quite clearly - we must refer to some 
physical property of the real thing which exists but is not an artwork. As I have 
explained in chapter one, Margolis believes that on Danto's argument in speaking of 
artworks, as we are speaking of a physical part or property of a real thing, we must 
therefore be speaking about something which is discernible perceptually in the real 
thing. So we cannot be referring to the perceptual properties of artworks because the 
only perceptually discernible properties are in the real thing which on Danto 's 
argument are not artworks. Danto believes the artwork is the real thing interpreted in 
terms of the is of artistic identification. Margolis believes that Danto needs to invoke 
the is of artistic identification to constitute an artwork before any interpretation can 
take place. To identify an artwork Danto needs the special is which Margolis 
believes is an incoherent concept. 
Margolis goes on to apply the results of this criticism of Danto's is of 
artistic identification to the indiscernibility issue, and I pick up his argument again at 
this point. Margolis says of the latter: "it is not that the perceptual properties of 
artworks and 'real' things are (may be) indiscermbly the same; it is rather that we are 
never [on Danto's argument] perceptually confronted with more than the properties 
of real things. Of course. But if that is so, then all of Danto's fiunous puzzle cases 
evaporate. His indiscernibility charge never rightly arises!" (1998, p.368). This is 
because Margolis's criticism of Danto's argument - about the is of artistic 
identification - explains how "he [Danto J has somehow lost the existence and reality 
of artworks!" (1998, p.367). Margolis discusses Danto's example of the gallery of 
indiscernible red squares and concludes that "if the eye cannot · determine' the actual 
or real 'difference' between an artwork and "a mere real thing', then we cannot ever 
discern the real presence of an artwork; and if there are no artworks discerned as 
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suc~ or if there are no artworks period, then indiscernibility neyer arises as a r\..'a] 
puzzle ... Artworks cannot be real enough to be denoted and indi\ iduated if they are 
not real enough to have discernible properties qua art. That is Danto's pan," (1998. 
p.369). 
I now move on to consider the second area of Margolis's criticism; the 
question of how we perceive works of art: Margolis believes that Danto is 
profoundly rrllstaken in his view of this issue. To explain Margolis's view I will use, 
and elaborate on, an example which Margolis refers to briefly in his final reply to 
Danto: it is from Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scient[/ic Revolutions: the case of 
the swinging stone. I I I shall re-fo nnu late it in terms of a thought experiment. Two 
people, one an Aristotelian, the other a follower of Galileo. are shown a swinging 
stone and asked to comment on what they see. Both say they see a swinging stone. 
but I point out that they have merely given me a description and ask them what it is 
they see~ I receive very different comments. The Aristotelian says she secs a hcayy 
object attempting by its own nature to move from a higher position to a lower one. 
cventually coming to rest. The process being seen as one of controlled or 
constrained falling: the control being provided hy the chain: as Kuhn puts it. it is a 
case of .... falling with difficulty" (1996. p.119). Galileo's follo\\cr hO\\C\Cf sees a 
pendulum: a remarkable device which attempts to achieve an isochronous movement 
indefinitely: the period being determined solely by the length of the pendulum 
irrespcct iyc of the amplitude. The point I wish to highlight is that initially hoth 
ohserycrs arrive at the same description: a swinging stone: Kuhn says: "note that 
gcnius l Galileo's I does not here manifest itself in more accurate or objective 
nbsl'nation ofthl' s\\ inging hody. Dcscripti\c1y, thc Aristotelian perccpt ion is just as 
accllrak" ( 1996, p. 1 19). 
II Margolis rl'll'!"s to it at the end of \1argolis. 2000a. p139. Ihe original I.., If1 Kuhn. 1996. 
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I now move to another thought experiment which brings in art. I 
consider two people, a builder and a museum curator; both are asked to \ iew ~mJ 
comment on a monochrome rectangle of grey metallic-looking materiaL and both say 
it is a rectangle of grey metallic-looking material. As with the previous case, I 
persevere and ask not for a description but what the object is. The builder suggests 
either a cover for some item of site plant, or a sample board, or a piece of building 
cladding. The museum curator suggests either part of a cover for a domestic 
appliance, or a wall tile, or (she obviously works at the Tate Modem) possibly a 
work of art. Both say that without further information or investigation they cannot 
be sure what the object is. The object is in fact part of a work of art. a component of 
one of Carl Andre's gallery installations. I could also envisage indiscernibles of the 
object on display at the same time; they could all be parts of Andre's installation. or 
six different objects each corresponding to one of the observcrs' guesses. or all 
completely different objects not thought of by either viewer. 
Margolis believes there are two broad levels of perception occurring in 
these thought experiments: firstly. a descriptive one (for example the response that 
the object is a swinging stone). and secondly, one which has an epistemic 
component: it involves a guess (in an abductive sense) concerning what we kno\\ 
about the nature and function of the object. It is the latter which brings into play the 
background knowledge of the viewer and contextual issues. It must be noted that the 
two levels are not completely separate: there is some overlap; some background 
knowledge is involved in the first level. Margolis belicvcs that Danto has used thc 
descriptive level of perception and misappropriated the results at the other, epistemic 
level. This epistcmic level Margolis calls the primary scnse of 'percei\c', where 
perception is penetrated .md influenced hy cultural and cOlltextual knowledgc. This 
latter being how \\l' usually 'rercein~' works of art amongst other things \\ hich \\ l' 
sec in a cultural context: a very ohvious example of how this \\ould work in m~ 
thought experiment would be if the grey n:ctangle \\ere seen arranged in an art 
gallery with other similar pieces and la~lIed '(iallny hls/al/alion hy Carl-\ndrL'·. 
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Both observers would be under no misapprehension at all about the nature of the 
object they were looking at. Margolis believes Danto has, incorrectly, used the 
resuhs of his indiscerrubility thought experiments, which operate at the descriptive 
leve~ to formulate a theory about the ontological status of works of art: objects 
which we normally perceive at the other level (the primary or epistemic level). 
Margolis puts it this way: 
Now, the verbal slippage (the sleight of hand) that I see is this: the 
sense of 'indiscernible' that holds in speaking of indiscernible red 
squares is made to play the same role (without defence) in speaking of 
indiscernibly different paintings or the indiscernible difference 
between a painting and a mere object daubed with paint, all the while 
we neglect to ask ourselves whether the difference between a mere red 
thing (a red square) and a painting in the form of a red square (Red 
Dust, say) could be, or ever needs to be, outfitted with a distinctive 
sense of 'perceive' (that incorporates the other) in virtue of which the 
difference (between the objects, not the colours) is perceptible and 
could be rightly said to be 'descried' by perceiving a pertinent 
difference. (2000a, pp.337-8) 
Margolis believes that this is where Danto makes a fundamental error 
with his thought experiments. He believes that Danto' s phrasing of the question, in 
terms of what is the difference between the red square which is a work of art and the 
red square which is not, hides the assumption that we have already perceptually 
identified the former red square as a work of art and thus 'freighted', as Margolis 
terms it, our perception. Our response is already coloured by our prior acceptance of 
the red square, which is an artwork, as art. Margolis believes we should be 
questioning when the acceptance of the first red square as a work of art occurred. 
He believes the acceptance is prior to D8Oto's question concerning indiscernibility, 
and there is therefore already some perceptual difference involved which involves the 
fuller or "primary' level of perception: the second level which I identified in my own 
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thought experiment. What kind of difference would enable us to decide that the first 
square was a work of art? In Margolis's wider view ofperceptio~ it would be that 
the perception involves the artwork's emergence from a cultural background: 
perhaps the fact that it is in a gallery, it has a label, a frame, a catalogue description 
or is accompanied by a statement from the artist. Margolis believes that Danto is 
perceptually identifying an artwork in order to compare it with its "perceptually 
indiscerruble' counterpart. In other words, the criticism is that Danto contradicts 
himself by relying on the very thing he denies to make his point: he has to identify an 
artwork perceptually in order to get his experiment going (in which he argues that 
artworks are perceptually indiscernible). 
Margolis's third and final argument against Danto's use of 
indiscernible counterparts he regards as his most telling. He calls it his "reductio" 
argument (1998, p.370), although his previous criticisms have all been formulated on 
the refutation of Danto's assumptions by deriving contradictions or false 
assumptions from them. He explains his final criticism: "the 'sensory' indiscernibility 
of the difference between an artwork and some 'mere real thing' is (must be) internal 
to the common conceptual space in which artworks and mere real things are 
themselves differentiated. In that sense, artworks must be 'discernible'. They must be 
discernible if, contingently they are on occasion sensorily indiscernible from other 
works or mere real things!" (1998. pp.370-l). In other words, he believes that works 
of art must be discernible as such before the indiscernibility issue can arise. When I 
look at a work of art, say Warhol's Brillo Box, I bring knowledge of pop art and the 
artist to my interpretation. But Margolis's point is that Danto in using his 
indiscernibility thought experiments has provided us with nothing which identifies 
the specific (ontological) nature of art. A sales representative, for example. with no 
knowledge of pop art or Warhol would bring knowledge of Brillo pads as scouring 
tools and their place in the development and marketing of such materials when they 
looked at Brillo Box the sculpture; they would be using the same process as Danto 
describes. Margolis believes that Danto is trying to separate a pure form of 
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perception for his thought experiments, and for Margolis there is no such . pure ' 
perception: "there is no mere 'sensory' perception that we can report, except what 
we agree to abstract from the cuhurally freighted perceptual reportings that we 
normally learn to make" (1998, p.371). Danto's comparison of indiscermbles is just 
such an abstraction in what Margolis believes is an unsuccessful attempt to isolate 
'pure' sensory perception. 
In his reply to these criticisms (1999c) Danto returns to the gallery of 
indiscernible red canvasses; he stresses that the thought experiment was designed to 
show that these examples are perceptually indistinguishable yet completely different 
works of art: "I sought, in brief, to separate perception from interpretation, whereas 
Margolis has a theory in which perception is infused with interpretation, so that we 
never merely see a plane figure covered with colours" (l999c, p.324). Danto puts 
forward another thought experiment to make his point: he asks us to imagine that 
one of the red canvasses in this gallery is stolen and the curator replaces it with 
another, although the labelling is not changed. The visitors will be looking at say Red 
Dust but believe they are seeing The Israelites Crossing the Red Sea; the perceptual 
'freight' they bring to the examination of Red Dust will be that appropriate to the 
other picture which, as I have already explained, is a totally different painting. 
Danto's view of perception, as this illustration shows, is that it is essentially what 
remains when the interpretational elements are removed; he believes that 
interpretation, at least at this basic leve~ cannot penetrate perception. He sums up 
his position: "the problem as I see it has to do with what fallback position one has if, 
with no objective change in what one perceives, one discovers that one was wrong 
not in terms of what one sees with one's eyes but in terms of what one needs to see 
it as art" (1999c~ p.327). This situation of misinterpretation or changing 
interpretations is widespread in art: it is not limited to the monochrome paintings in 
D8Oto's hypothetical gallery~ D8Oto explains how his own interpretation of 
WaUeau's L 'embarquement a Cythere changed after discovering that the a in the 
title can mean from as well as to. Another famous example is Goethe's 
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misinterpretation of Gerhard Terborch's L'Instruction Paternelle (see illustration 
13) in Elective Afjinities.12 Goethe, in the nove~ explains the subject of the painting 
as a knightly father admonishing his daughter; we now know that the young lady is a 
prostitute agreeing terms with a potential client! 
Margolis believes that in discussing these questions of interpretation we 
have already decided that we are discussing works of art. However. once this 
decision has been made he is happy to accept that varying, perhaps changing, or 
indeed mistaken interpretations may occur. In his reply to Danto' s response to his 
original paper Margolis accepts that the comparison of indiscernibles does in certain 
restricted circumstances apply to art: he says that "certain forms of contemporary 
art, it is true, are peculiarly susceptible to indiscerrubles. I put it to you that 
conceptual art often does rely - and relies entirely - on artists' intentions, as appears 
with ready-mades and appropriational art; but such art very often has no further 
interest for us beyond our grasping the point of the pertinent intention or trick or 
joke" (2000a, p.330). This is a common objection to Danto's approach: that it 
relates to a special, and very limited, class of art which is susceptible to the approach 
of comparing indiscernibles. 13 However, my brief discussion of Sherrie Levine's 
work indicated that appropriational art does raise deep, complex and fundamental 
issues about its subject matter and the nature of art. I shall return to this issue in the 
conclusion to this chapter when I discuss the difference between attenuated 
indiscernibility - of which this objection is an example - and Danto's broader claim. 
Before I move on I will outline my own view of Margolis's 
criticisms. In chapter one I have already endorsed Margolis's criticism of the is of 
artistic identification: that it is logically incoherent. Margolis's first criticism is that 
D8Oto uses this special is in his explanation of indiscernible counterparts. and I 
12The passage referred to is from Elective Affinities pp.191-2, see Goethe, 1971. 
IJA typical example of this approach is Nan Stalnaker's in her article on 'Fakes and Forgeries' in 
Gaut and ~ 2001, pp.402-3. 
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clearly accept this point. The second criticism is that Danto has to identify an 
artwork perceptually as art to get his thought experiments going (in which he argues 
that artworks are perceptually indiscernible), and I agree with Margolis that Danto 
has to perceive a distinction somewhere between two indiscernible works of art or a 
work of art and an everyday object. In his last criticism Margolis argues there can be 
no absolute indiscernibility; if there were, Danto's thought experiments could not be 
envisaged. The discernible difference, wherever or whenever it occurs, must be 
sensory and take place in a cuhurally conditioned environment. I also agree with 
Margolis on this point: Danto's attempt to isolate 'pure' perception is untenable 
wherever we are addressing culturally and historically situated objects such as 
artworks. However in the conclusion to this chapter I explain why I believe this does 
not compromise Danto's theory of art: I explain how his theory of art does not rely 
on either the is of artistic identification or the indiscernibility thought experiments. 
As I shall point out, this is a point Margolis makes himself. However. before I do 
this, I move on to consider the relation between Danto's artworld and Dickie's 
institutional theory of art. 
IV. The Artworld and the Institutional Theory of Art 
In chapter one I mentioned briefly how George Dickie's institutional theory of art 
was similar to Danto' s artworld concept. This was evident in two areas: firstly, in the 
area of interpretation; both theories were seen to be dependent on the process of 
interpreting works of art. Secondly, both theories disavow any reliance on purely 
aesthetic qualities in art. In this section I intend to look at the differences between 
the two theories and examine how one aspect of Danto's technique of comparing 
indiscernible counterparts - Fisher's sub-claim (2) every artwork can have an 
indiscernible counterpart which is a different artwork - provides an argument against 
Dickie's institutional theory at least as Danlo understands it. I have highlighted the 
last phrase; there is a significant difference between Danto's understanding of the 
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institutional theory (and incidentally many others') and Dickie's own. 14 To begin 
with, I need to make this distinction clear. I do not, however, intend to provide a 
detailed explanation of Dickie's theory and its development. My main concern lies 
with its relation to Danto 's technique of comparing indiscernibles, and as both 
theories are in general agreement about the results of the thought experiments. I 
concentrate on how the theories differ. 
George Dickie's first version of the institutional theory appeared in 
1969 in which he explained that "a work of art in the descriptive sense is 1) an 
artefact 2) upon which society or some sub-group of a society has conferred the 
status of candidate for appreciation" (1969, p.252). It was this wording, particularly 
the phrase society or some sub-group of a society, that engendered a wide-spread 
and still prevalent misunderstanding of Dickie's theory. The phrase was, it still is, 
taken to refer to a wide-ranging group of curators, critics, collectors and 
commentators who could themselves confer the status of artwork on an object, 
acting individually or somehow in concert. Dickie did not mean this at all: he saw the 
society as being composed of artists; it is artists alone who make art and confer 
artwork status on objects; he clarifies this point saying: "even at this early date the 
theory focuses on the actions of artists when they create art" (2000, p.93). He has 
also explained that he carefully chose the word society to cover cases of muhiple 
authorship such as a group of people making a film which otherwise might have been 
excluded from his definition. Dickie has revised the definition several times since this 
first version; his later versions remove any reference to the word society from the 
definition but the misunderstanding about the earlier version has proved very 
14 See for example Richard Wollheim's criticism of the theory in Painting as Art (Wollheim. 1987, 
p.IS) or Garry Hagberg in Art as Language (Hagberg, I99S, p.IS0-61). A recent example appears 
in Cynthia Freeland's BuJ is it . .frt? (Freelan~ 2001, p.SS.) 
103 
persistent. He complains that the misunderstanding has even been enshrined in The 
Camhridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 15 
As late as 1992 Danto is still choosing to misinterpret Dickie's theory 
saying: "his notion of the artworld was pretty much the body of experts who confer 
that status [of being an artwork] on something by fiat. In a way. Dickie's theof\ 
implies a kind of empowering elite" (1992, p.38) and slightly later: '1he em" of his 
theory is that something is art when declared to be art by the artworld" (1992, p.38). 
Clearly Dickie himself sees artists creating art or conferring artistic status on objects~ 
the misinterpretation of his theory by Danto and others sees the conferral being givcn 
by members of the artworld. How does 'artworld' differ from 'artists' in this debate? 
Why is the difference important? There are two reasons; firstly, if anyone in the 
artworld can confer artistic status this could remove the element of the artist's 
intention from the process of creating art. On both Dickie's and Danto's account of 
art the intention of the artist is a necessary feature of art. The ability of anyone in the 
artworld to randomly confer artistic status goes completely against this. A curator 
could decide that a snow shovel, say, any snow shoveL is a work of art~ we have lost 
the intention of the artist and therefore by Dickie's and Danto's account we have lost 
art per se. Secondly, looking at the issue in another way, if anyone in the artworld, 
curator or critic, can 'create' a work of art, are we not conferring the status of artist 
on those very people: we have simply enlarged the pool of artists. They must surely 
have some reason for conferring artistic status on whatever they choose: so the 
reason becomes their artist's intention, they become artists. and \\c return to 
Dickie's view of conferral of artistic status by artists. It is the misinterpreted theOI: 
that Danto and Richard Wollheim criticise so unfairly. :\gain from Beyond the Brillo 
nox in 1992 Danlo says: 
I~Did .. i~. 2000. p.9S. h~ r~ti..'r~ to l"t' Cm,hri(~~t' [)ictionary I!(I'II/!o,\ophy. Camhridg~ L'niH'r ... ity 
Pr~ss. 1994. pp.'78-t). 
lO-t 
Who is the art world? is the standard questio~ along with: How does 
one get to be a member of it? "Do the representatives, if they exist. 
pass in review all candidates for the status of art, and do they the~ 
while conferring this status on some, deny it to others?" Richard 
Wollheim slyly asks. Who keeps records of these decisions: are they 
announced in art magazines? Do art writers wait outside the judging 
chambers, desperate to phone their publication with the scoops? How 
literally can Dickie mean what he says?16 
Reading this it is easy to understand Dickie's obvious exasperation with this 
misinterpretation of his theory. However, 1 leave the misunderstanding for the 
present but return to it shortly to examine how it results in unwarranted criticism of 
the institutional theory. 1 move on now to look at the technique of comparing 
indiscernible counterparts in relation to Dickie's institutional theory. 
I consider two issues, firstly, how Dickie views the technique and 
secondly, I return to look at how the technique has been used to criticise the 
misinterpreted institutional theory: the unwarranted criticism I mentioned above. The 
first issue is easily dealt with: Dickie fully accepts the usefulness of the technique of 
comparing indiscernible counterparts; he acknowledges Danto' s origination of the 
technique and its relevance to artworks; he states quite clearly that he has adopted 
the technique himself (2000, p.96-7). He fully accepts that the result of comparing 
these indiscernible pairs - where one is an artwork and the other not - is that the 
difference between them lies in the context of the artworks: which he, along with 
Danto, believes to be lodged in their non-manifest qualities. It is these qualities 
which must give artworks their status; Dickie says: "I accept Danto's argument, but 
I give a different account of what the context is, namely the institutional account 
embodied in the definitions I have given" (2000, p.97). His reference to definitions in 
l'oanto. 1992. p.38. the Richard Wollheim quotation is from Wollheim. 1987. p.IS. 
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this quotation - note the plural- is to the various changes and impro\ emcnts he has 
incorporated into his definition since 1969. 1 7 
The second issue is that of how the technique of comparing indiscernible 
counterparts has been used to criticise the misinterpreted institutional theory. It is 
the second of Fisher's sub-claims - every artwork can have an indiscernible 
counterpart which is a different artwork - which is invoked here. Fisher makes the 
point that the institutional theory fails to explain why certain objects achieve artwork 
status: it simply explains how they achieve that status. With this view he clearly joins 
the 'misinterpretation' camp. Fisher explains: "but to explain (8) [his 0\\11 sub-claim 
two: every artwork can have an indiscernible counterpart which is a different 
artwork], as the problem requires, is necessarily to address the basis for content in 
artworks, because it requires an explanation of the difference in the qualities and 
interpretation of two indiscernible artworks. Hence, (B) provides a direct chalkng~ 
to the adequacy of the institutional theory" (1995, p.475). In other words Fisher is 
arguing that the institutional theory cannot explain the difference between t \Vo 
indiscernibles both of which are artworks. In his view two indiscernible objects 
"labelled' as art by the institutional elite would be incapable of being distinguished 
onc~ they had been accepted as art. He believes that the institutional theory can tell 
us how they became artworks but cannot explain why they are artworks: it cannot 
explain how they can possibly be completely different works of art. The explanation 
which. as I have already explained, Dickie emphasises is that the distinction lies in 
the artists' different intentions. Fisher has the same view of the institutional theor: as 
Danto and Wollheim and, with them, has missed this essential element: that art is 
created hy artists and the context of the creation of art inyohcs artistic intention. So 
Dickie's \'ie\\, rather than the misinterpreted version. is very close to Danto' S O\\TI 
art world theory. Take away the misundcrstandin~ ahout the interpretation of the 
. ~ 
I7 l1is prefcrrl'tJ n-rsion is in lilt' .Irt Circle. A Theon' (It Art. 1984. p. 80-2 . . trt and J"u/u('. ~OO 1 
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word society in Dickie' s original fonnulation of his theor: and Danto' s artworld 
theory and Dickie' s institutional theory are ver:' similar. Dickie puts more empha:-;is 
on the institutional and social aspects of the creation of art, but. along \\ ith Danto. 
he believes that it is the non-manifest qualities, particularly the contextual issues 
surrounding the creation of artworks, that are crucial in defining them as art. Both 
theories, Danto's artworld and Dickie's institutional theory - certainly in the latter's 
correctly interpreted fonn - have a great deal in common. Fisher refers to Danto' s 
theory as contextualis~ and it is a very apt label for both theories: the tenn makes 
quite clear the overriding emphasis both theories place on the importance of context. 
Before I move on from Dickie's institutional theory I shall raise one final 
issue: the spectre of circularity of argument which I discussed in chapter one. There I 
identified circularity as a major criticism of Danto's artworld theory: as I havc 
already explained, Dickie's theory, being similar in its contextualism to Danto' s 
theory. is surely open to the same criticism. How does Dickie respond'? His answer 
gives rise to an initial element of surprise: he openly accepts the circularity as an 
inevitable and intrinsic part of his theory. I will explain his reasons for this view~ it is 
perhaps the most unusual and original feature of his theory. Dickic identifies fivc 
linked elements in his theory: artist, work of art, public. artworld and artworld 
system. He accepts that his definition of art involves circularity: each element is 
dependent on another as part of its definition. 
Dickie. however. distinguishes the circularity in his theor:' from the 
circularity involved in. say, BcIrs concept of significant fonn which he uscs as an 
cxample (2000. pp. 101-2). Signiticant fonn is a technical tenn and wc need to havc 
the term cxplained to us~ BeIrs cxplanation of significant form. as that which causcs 
aesthetic emotion. is no real detinition: it relics on a circular relationship OctWCl'O 
sic.nitlcant t<.)fm and acsthetic emotion which tells us vcr~ little. Dickie bclic\l's that 
... 
the Ilve elements in his dctinition of art are of a different order: we accept and 
understand them Irom an early age: they arc part of our cultural idcntity. Dickie 
explains: 
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Art teachers and parents teach children how to be artists and how to 
display their work. Children are taught how to draw and color and 
how to put their drawings on the refrigerator door for others to see. 
What children are being taught are basic cultural roles of which every 
competent member of our society has at least a rudimentary 
understanding. These cuhural roles are, I believe, invented very early 
on in primitive societies and persist through time into all structural 
societies. (2000, p.l 01) 
Dickie calls this set of five elements - artist, work of art, pUblic. 
artworld and artworld system - an 'inflected concept'; they are acquired and used 
as an inter-related and interdependent set. Dickie is using 'inflected' in its technical 
sense of bending or turning inward. He sees the five elements providing support and 
relying on each other; no single element can be fully understood or appreciated in 
isolation: the set has to be seen as a whole. It is this idea of an inflected concept 
which, for Dickie, legitimates the circularity in his definition of art: in other words 
the circularity is an integral part of the definition. It also distinguishes it from the 
technical definitions such as Bell's significant form. Dickie sees art as a cultural 
construct along with other social concepts: "there is nothing mysterious about such 
sets of concepts. I suspect that many of our cultural phenomena involve inflected 
notions, notions that are interdefined and are learned as a set" (2000, p.102). Dickie 
develops an important distinction between what he calls natural-kind and 
cuhural-kind activities. He gives as an example one of the most basic animal 
activities required for survival: the need for nourishment. The natural-kind activities 
would be gathering food and hunting; the cultural-kind would be ritualised activities 
involving the preparation or eating of food in a certain way. Dickie applies this 
distinction to theories of art; he sees expressionist theories as being natural-kind 
whereas his institutional theory is cultural-kind: "on this [the institutional] theory. art 
is a cultural invention. Art may involve natural-kind activities such as the 
appreciation of basic aesthetic qualities, but the institutional theory does not see such 
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appreciation as essential to art" (2000, p.l 07). This is another area where Danto and 
Dickie are in broad agreement. Before I leave the discussion of Dickie's institutional 
theory of art I shall summarise the difference between it and Danto' s artworld 
theory: bot~ it has been explained, are contextual theories. Dickie's theory accepts 
the circularity in his own definition of art as inevitable: in fact as an essential part of 
his definition of art as an inflected concept. Danto attempts to break the circularity 
with his concept of the is of artistic identification and his use of the technique of 
comparing indiscernible counterparts. His aim is to provide a non-circular definition 
of art grounded on a priori principles. I leave the institutional theory of art now but I 
will return to the idea of art as a cultural construct, and particularly to Joseph 
Margolis's extreme form of culturalism, in the next section, the conclusion to this 
chapter. Here I intend to review the various threads of my discussion on 
indiscernibility. 
V. Conclusion 
Before I review my discussion of indiscernible counterparts I need to address one 
more issue: this is the distinction that John Andrew Fisher draws between broad 
indiscernibility and narrow indiscernibility: what he calls "the attenuated problem of 
indiscernible counterparts" (1995, p.48t). He suggests that if supposing the 
indiscernibility thought experiments apply in a universal way raises concerns, perhaps 
an attenuated form would be acceptable. The attenuated form would replace the 
three original sub-claims with the following: (1 ') some real things can have 
indiscernible counterparts which are artworks, (2') some artworks can have 
indiscernible counterparts which are different artworks and lastly, (3") some 
artworks can have indiscernible counterparts which are ordinary things. The word 
every in the original formulation has been replaced by some. It is a straightforward 
and uncontroversiaI exercise to find some instances of artworks that can be 
accommodated in each of these three sub-claims: for instance from the cases 
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included in Danto's list of twenty-three examples of indiscernibles. The ease of 
finding evidence to support this c~ however, tends to divert attention from a 
serious difficulty it engenders. 
In the revised sub-claim (1') - some real things can have indiscerruble 
counterparts which are artworks - I am accepting that broad indiscennbility is false. 
Because in taking away the some I am left with the remainder (of real things) which 
do not have indiscernible counterparts. There are similar results with revised 
sub-claims (2') and (3'). Note that once I have exchanged 'some' for 'every'. revised 
sub-claims (1') and (3') are logically equivalent. If I accept the revised sub-claims 
(2') and (3') I am in effect denying the original sub-claims (2) and (3); there are 
going to be artworks that do not have an indiscernible counterpart which is a 
different artwork and artworks that do not have an indiscernible counterpart which is 
a non-artwork. In denying broad indiscernibility it seems I have to accept that some 
artworks are unique; that they are artworks by virtue of some non-relational 
property. But Danto's treatment of ready-mades shows that two objects, one an 
artwork, one not, can be indiscernible. Narrow indiscernibility cannot account for the 
difference in the contextual history and provenance of these objects which is where 
Danto believes the difference between them lies. 
Narrow Indiscernibility creates a special class of artworks that do not 
have indiscernible counterparts and the difficulty lies in identifying which features of 
this special class determines that it cannot have such counterparts. Fisher says: "the 
attenuated problem has the strange property of undercutting itself by generating 
through suggestion a mirror-image problem of why there are some things without 
indiscernible counterparts" (1995, p.483). How would this group of artworks 
without indiscernible counterparts be identified? Any identification would imply 
some non-contextual or non-relational property; it implies that artworks form some 
natural-kind group. It is the existence of such a natural-kind distinction to identify art 
that Danto has consistently denied. Narrow indiscernibility has created a sub-class 
which forms a natural-kind group. and I am given no indication of how to idcntit~ 
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the members of this group. Narrow indiscernibility re-introduces the very problem 
that Danto has been so careful to avoid: the existence of some form of art that would 
be immune to the technique of indiscerruble counterparts: artefacts that could be 
identified as art by their discerruble properties. Danto's whole argument on 
indiscernibles rests on the basic premise that any material object can have an 
indiscernible counterpart, and if I accept this premise, narrow indiscernibility fails. 
Whatever form of art proposed by the narrow indiscerrubility argument would, on 
Danto's argument, have an actual indiscernible counterpart or the possibility of 
acquiring one. I now return to broad indiscernibility and review the arguments we 
have encountered in this chapter. 
The array of indiscernible counterparts used by Danto ranges from the 
existent to the plausible to the extremely unlikely; the important matter of principle 
for Danto is that they are all possible; I have just pointed out that Danto's whole 
case rests on the basic premise that any material object can have an indiscernible 
counterpart. Once this basic premise is accepted any artwork can have an 
indiscernible counterpart. Danto's case is strengthened by the fact that in some cases 
we are not considering thought experiments but existent works of art: Danto' s use of 
ready-mades is an example; I also pointed out appropriationaI art; in both these 
genres indiscernibility is a crucial element of the art. So we are not dealing 
exclusively with thought experiments; examples of indiscerrubles, of the type Danto 
has chosen, exist in the artworld today. At the other end of the range we have 
Danto's examples which are highly improbable: such as the accidentally produced 
indiscernible counterpart to Rembrandt's Polish Rider. However unlikely this 
accidental counterpart is, there is no difference in principle between it and other 
more probable or extant examples. I should mention here that there are highly 
complex works of art that do have indiscernible counterparts: two consecutive 
castings of Rodin's The Kiss are indiscernible. Forgeries provide another example 
where the history of production of the artwork and the forgery are radically different 
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yet the two may well be indiscernible even to experts, as I explained in the case of 
van Meegeren' s 'Vermeers'. 
However, the premise that any artwork can have an indiscerruble 
counterpart brings with it the problem that it tells us nothing about an object's status 
as art: after all, anything can have an indiscenuble counterpart. Throughout the 
explanation of Danto's technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts, I have 
pointed out on several occasions that there is nothing in the technique which helps us 
to distinguish artworks from non-artworks. For example, I pointed out that the 
canvas grounded by Giorgione was not a work of art, but, had it existed, it would 
have had a complex, rich and interesting history of its own. I examined the technique 
of indiscernible counterparts and looked at how the examples supported Oanto' s six 
principles embodied in his artworld concept. In all but one of the principles there was 
nothing that related specifically to art. For example, some of the objects in the 
indiscernibility examples which were not artworks match five of the principles 
closely; they could be products of human endeavour, have a history and provenance, 
embody meaning and require interpretation within a historical context: the Loran 
diagram of Cezanne's painting is a good example. 
The only principle which did, at this stage in the discussion, seem to 
relate specifically to art was the additional principle I added: the idea of art as 
rhetorical ellipsis. Oanto's view is that art is self-reflexive, that artworks are making 
a point about their own content; his claim is that artworks achieve this in the way in 
which they present their content to an audience. The difference between Loran's 
diagram and Lichtenstein's painting of the diagram is used by Oanto to illustrate this 
distinction. However. I believe that the use of indiscernible counterparts is not 
needed to support this additional principle - the idea that art embodies rhetorical 
ellipsis. For example. in a later discussion of Guercino's SainI Lulce Displaying a 
Painting of the Virgin (see illustration 12) Oanto makes this same point without 
using indiscernible counterparts (Oanto, 1991 b, pp.212-5). He examines in detail 
how the painting operates at a number of historical and cultural levels: it is a 
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religious painting with an obvious religious subject; it is a painting about style in 
painting - we note how the style of Saint Luke's painting in Guercino' s painting is a 
historical style (historical that is in Guercino' s time); it is a painting about viewing 
paintings - Saint Luke's gesture invites us to comment on his painting. We see it 
from our own historical perspective; we see the style of Guercino and are able to 
trace the influences on his work: how he incorporates both Carraccesque and 
Caravaggesque elements; we note how his style changes over his career. I return 
shortly to the question, mentioned above, of whether the technique of comparing 
indiscernible counterparts is really necessary to support Oanto' s contextual theory of 
art. The next chapter looks in detail at Oanto's view of art as being self-reflexive and 
rhetorical in nature. 
I examined criticisms levelled by Joseph Margolis against Oanto's 
technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts. In summary. Danto relies on the 
flawed concept of the is of artistic identification to identify art. I restated Margolis's 
argument from chapter one that Oanto's concept of the is of artistic identification is 
logically incoherent. If the concept is flawed the experiments fail; in fact they can 
never do what Oanto suggests they do: which is to tell us anything at all about the 
nature of art. I believe Margolis's criticism of Oanto's use of indisceroibility is 
correct; however, I do believe that Oanto's insights into art, particularly his six 
principles, do not rely on the is of artistic identification or the issue of 
indiscernibility. This is a point which Margolis makes briefly himself: 44if you allow 
the argument [his own view of artworks as culturally emergent real entities], then 
there is no need for a special 'is of artistic identification'. It is quite enough to admit 
artworks as a special kind of entity" (1998, p.3 72). I shall return to the issue shortly 
and explain my own position; I shall also briefly outline Margolis's own theory of art 
which justifies this view. 
I also agreed with Margolis that Oanto has to identify an artwork 
perceptually in order to get his indiscernibility thought experiments going~ 
experiments in which he argues that artworks are perceptually indiscernible. 
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Margolis's final criticism, which 1 endorse, is that Danto makes a fundamental error 
about how we perceive works of art. Margolis identified two broad levels of 
perception (although Margolis does not refer to them as such): firstly, a descriptive 
level and secondly, an epistemic level where perception is penetrated by cultural and 
historical knowledge. It is the epistemic leve~ which Margolis refers to as a 
'primary' level of perception, which we use in viewing works of art. Margolis 
believes Danto's mistake is to use the first descriptive level in his indiscerrubility 
thought experiments and use the results to make ontological assertions about how 
we perceive works of art. He believes Danto is misapplying the results of one level 
to the other level: it is an unsuccessful attempt to isolate 'pure' perception. 
The way we accept artworks as art must involve being told about them 
or reading about them or seeing them in a gallery: all of which involve cuhural and 
contextual elements being present in the process. The 'art' objects in questio~ in 
Danto's indiscernibility thought experiments, must already be discernible as works of 
art. Margolis says: "I find it impossible to avoid the conclusion that perceptual 
indiscemibilities of Danto's sort are completely irrelevant (or only very marginally 
relevant) to the actual concept of what a painting is, though they are hardly 
irrelevant to distinguishing one painting from another or a painting from something 
that happens not to be a painting at all, or a kind of painting that deliberately 
generates certain indiscernibilities parasitic on an already operative distinction" 
(2000a, pp.328-9). With the last phrase parasitic on an already operative distinction 
Margolis believes he has identified one feature which limits the applicability of 
indiscernibility to a certain type of painting; the phrase identifies minimalist paintings 
and ready-mades; genres that are, in their very subject and style, already inextricably 
linked to the question of indiscernibility: indiscernibility is part of their meaning. 
It goes further than this for Margolis: the problem strikes at the very 
core of Oanto's philosophy of art: Margolis believes that we are ineluctably involved 
in interpretation in the very act of constituting objects for interpretation: in other 
words we are involved in a hermeneutic circle of discourse. He believes O8Oto does 
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not address this issue adequately: he says "it is quite clear that his [Danto' s] general 
philosophical orientation is uneasily - and unsatisfactorily - divided between his 
appreciation of the complexities of cultural phenomena. particularly historicit: and 
intentionality, and his residual commitment to a relatively inflexible physicalism and 
extensionalism" (2001 a, p.25). Margolis provides an alternative view and how to 
follow it up; he says: "I hesitate to offer Danto my own solution - that is. a doctrine 
favouring physically embodied but culturally emergent (real) entities. But it is a 
solution that links artworks and selves, that (contra Danto) accepts in the frankest 
way the thesis of cultural realism." 18 
Before I move on, I very briefly outline Margolis's own solution 
mentioned above: his own theory of art. He espouses realism and relativism. He sees 
works of art as culturally-emergent, irreducible, real entities which he views in a 
similar way to Peter Strawson's conception of individuals. He believes that \\c 
understand artworks relative to our interpretative practices which are marked hy 
what he calls 'consensual tolerances'; he explains: ''what 1 say here is that objectivity 
must be a constructed artefact of our consensual practice - \vhether construed 
bivalently or relativistically. Furthermore what holds for predication holds for 
reference and denotation and for all linguistic powers that bear on servicing 
truth-claims" (1999a, p.63). Margolis goes on to highlight the problem of using any 
theory of artistic judgement or criticism based exclusil·t!ly on bivalency. The ubiquity 
of this approach. the exclusive reliance on bivalent logic, he sees as having relegated 
what he calls 'intentional utterances' ( he gives examples - artworks. histories. 
deeds. speech acts) to a level of widely accepted irrelevance. I should stress here that 
Margolis is not trying to banish the use of bivalent logic in any field whatsoe\Cf. 
mther hc is arguing that in ccrtain areas of human endeavour. art being a prime 
e:\ample. its singular lise is sl'vl'rely limiting. Ilis approach is summed up well in the 
18Margolis. 1995. p.37":.:\ ti.)otnotc refns to Margolis. 1l)Q5a.Ii.)r the folh.m-up. 
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title of his paper: 'The Eclipse and Recovery of Analytic Aesthetics' .19 His 
. recovery' gives art an important place: '1he arts. I am convinced. may be shov,n to 
provide a better clue than the usual accounts of the natural sciences about how. for 
instance, to recover 'objectivity' at the end of the century" (1999a, p.3) and latcr: .. I 
have tried to make a beginning here, and in doing so have tried to show how the best 
puzzles of epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the other disciplines favored in 
the analytic world could be productively recovered via the seemingly marginal 
questions raised in the philosophy of art and history and culture" (200la p.xiii). 
His is an attempt to develop an ontology of art which sees works of art 
as culturally emerging entities, and he arrives at a critical theory of art based on what 
he calls 'robust relativism'. The relativism appears as a consequence of his rejection 
of bivalency. He develops the idea that "predicative objectivity is not criterial but 
collective, consensually tolerant, grounded in the discursive practices of an enabling 
society. and subject to historical drift" (2000b, p.l2S). Margolis foregrounds the 
philosophical dispute between essentialism and ant i-foundationalism and relates it to 
modernism versus postmodernism, but he rejects both. Rather he sees the crucial 
dehate is between what he calls 'modal invariance', modernism, postmodernism et aI, 
which he rejects. and the claims of his philosophy of continual flux. His approach is 
historically based. he uses the term "historicity' to explain the emergent process 
which typifies what he calls encultured objects like artworks. Hermeneutics is an 
important clement in his theory. Richard Shusterman summarises this aspect 
succinctly: ""this ... "hcrmeneuticizing' naturalism. recognising that interpretation not 
only fUnctions to explain or elucidate the entities or texts that we encounter. but that 
it is already actively involved in constituting those entities as entities fiJr 
interpretation. ,,20 
190rigillall~ puolishl.-d In Ril'hard Shusterman, l.-d., .Ifla/\'IIt" It:.\thelll·s, Alackwdl. 19S9, 
pp 161-89. Rl"printed as Chapter 1 of r..1ar!!ol is, ~OO 1 a. 
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I moved on to examine George Dickie's institutional theory of art as 
it relates to the indiscernibility issue. I found an anomalous situation: the institutional 
theory has been widely misunderstood and the technique of comparing indiscermble 
counterparts has been used as an argument against the theory in its commonly 
misunderstood form. Dickie accepts the results of Danto' s thought experiments and 
has stressed that art is created by artists within a historical and societal context: this 
is the key feature of his institutional theory. The theory, I found, was very close to 
Danto's: both stress the importance of context in the creation and appreciation of 
art. The emphasis they place on aspects of the context does differ: Dickie places 
more emphasis on society and Danto on individuals, but I stress that it is a matter of 
emphasis rather than of principle. One aspect of Dickie's approach addresses an 
issue which I have discussed at several points in the discussion; the claim that the 
arguments used by Danto are circular: that the artworld is defined by some reference 
to art or culture (which itself involves an artistic element). Dickie fully accepts the 
circularity but claims that it is not vicious: the five elements of his artworld form an 
'inflected concept' which he argues legitimates the circularity. 
Finally, in the conclusion I address the issue of whether Danto's chosen 
technique - the comparison of indiscernible counterparts - achieves the aim he set 
out to obtain: to explain how Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture is a work of art when an 
everyday Brillo box is not. I have explained earlier how Margolis's criticism of the 
technique exposes a problem. The problem, as I have explained, is that Danto must 
have, at some stage, discerned one of the two objects as a work of art. Therefore 
Margolis believes, and I endorse his criticism, that the indiscernibility thought 
experiments cannot tell us anything about the status of the object qua art. We have 
already decided, or been told, that one or both the objects are works of art: the 
ontological distinction has already been made. The indiscernibility thought 
experiment is unnecessary; what is important is that Warhol's Brillo Box should have 
a history and a provenance as a work of art~ and Margolis believes that this must 
have been discernible (he uses the term 'sensorily' discernible) in some way. 
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otherwise the indiscemibility issue could never have arisen. If we did not know. 
somehow, that Brillo Box was a work of art, Danto's thought experiments could not 
have started. This is a crucial point and one with which I am in agreement with 
Margolis: a contextual theory of art does not require, and certainly cannot be 
justified by, the technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts. 
To clarify this point I propose a thought experiment which does not rely 
on indiscernible counterparts. The experiment supports the views of both Danto and 
Margolis that works of art have a history and acquire a provenance; to use 
Margolis's phrase works of art are culturally-emergent entities.21 A recent exhibition 
at the Henry Moore Institute displayed a selection of objects entitled UMOs, 
Unidentified Museum Objects; the purpose and function of these fascinating objects, 
all from the British Museum, was, and remains, unknown; in some cases we have no 
indication of how they were made.22 My thought experiment proposes an object in 
such an exhibition: say a piece of smooth stone of an unusual shape. I know nothing 
more about the object; it could be a natural object weathered in a peculiar way, an 
artwork, a ritual object or a mere utensil. Some time later I read that correspondence 
from a deceased curator has been discovered which provides uncontroverted 
evidence that this object is a hitherto unknown work by Brancusi. Nothing has 
changed in my perception of the object; I could be gazing at the object in the 
museum as I am told about the discovery; but my interpretation of it has changed: 
the object ceases to be a UMO; it takes its place in art history as a part of our 
understanding of the development of modem sculpture. The object now has a history 
and a provenance and in future will be displayed~ with the correct attribution and 
labelling. in the fine art section of the museum. The object which I previously 
21 John Dewey uses a similar thought experiment in Art as Experience. see Dewey. 1980. pp.48-9. 
11'UnidenJijied Museum Objects' The Henry Moore Institute. ~ 12/1212001- 281212oo2~ items 
from The British Museum. a virtual tour of the exhibition is available at 
<www.thebritishmuseum.ac.ukJcompass> 
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regarde<L say, as a piece of weathered stone, I now know to be a work of art without 
any change in its manifest properties. 
It could be argued that my thought experiment uses indiscermble 
counterparts separated by time rather than space. My response is that indiscermble 
counterparts, by definition, must be separated by space not time: an indiscernible 
counterpart is another object or thing that is identical with some object. It is trivially 
true that the objects we encounter are usually unchanged from one moment to the 
next; the suggestion that indiscernible counterparts are separated by time would 
result in nearly every object being an indiscernible counterpart. We accept this basic 
level of indiscernibility as we look at objects, but Danto exclusively relies on 
indiscernible counterparts in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace; my 
argument so far is that the counterparts are not required to support the contextual 
theory of art which Danto advocates. 
However, if one accepts that indiscernibility over time (ahhough 
Danto does not use it) rather than the use of indiscernible counterparts is an issue, I 
propose another thought experiment. I am walking on a beach with an artist who 
picks up a weathered stone, and at the moment I see it she explains it is her latest 
'found object' artwork. The object from that moment has an artistic provenance and 
context. It has ceased to be a mere lump of stone; it is the latest found object 
artwork 'created' by my artist companion who, of course, has a long and successful 
career exhibiting such objects in galleries. Indiscernibility either in space or time has 
no part in explaining why this object has been transformed (transubstantiated as I 
prefer to say) into an artwork. Note that I are not denying that, although this object 
does not have one, it could have an indiscernible counterpart. But, it may be 
objected. in this thought experiment the object (the weathered stone) is itself 
indiscernible over time. I now consider an artist who produces artworks by dropping 
inks into a tank of water as a performance piece. The piece is constantly changing; 
there is no record of the performance (the artist stipulates this) and the work cannot 
be recreated. In this case there is no indiscernibility in space or over time. In this 
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situatio~ as with the accidental copy of Rembrandf s Polish Rider. it is possible that 
there could be an indiscernible counterpart of this work. but. giyen the absence of 
any record, the indiscernible counterpart could never be identified as such. 
Danto, as I have already explained, relies on examples of indiscernible 
counterparts; they are the basis of his whole philosophical system and are used 
throughout The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Danto's claim is that it is 
through the use of indiscernible counterparts that we are able to distinguish art from 
non-art. My thought experiments show that any object or performance may be. or 
may become, a work of art without having an indiscernible counterpart: \\"hat makes 
it art is the context of its creation (choice in the case of a found object) and its 
provenance. There is no need to resort to indiscernible counterparts or 
indiscernibility in time to support Danto's claim that works of art are such hy \irtue 
of their history and provenance; this applies to Brillo Box or any other of Danto's 
examples. Danto's thought experiments do provide a fascinating insight into the 
wide range of contemporary art: its diversity. the unusual techniques and approaches 
involved and the thinking that underlies its creations: however. I believe the 
technique itself is philosophically redundant. Although the technique is redundant. I 
believe it is a redundant premise which has been added to a valid inkrence (Danto·s 
historical and contextual view of art) and this does not make the original inference 
invalid. Danto's contextual and historical view of art is a genuine insight; it does not 
require the technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts to demonstrate its 
validity. The answer to Danto's 4uestion - what is the difference between \\'arhol\; 
Bril/o Box sculpture and an everyday Brillo box? - is that Bril/o Box is part of the 
artworld as Danto defines it: the everyday Brillo box is not. \\Tarhol's Bril/o Box 
embodies the six principles of art \\hich I have identitied as constituents of Danto' s 
theof\:. Brillo hoxes do not do so in the same wa~" 
This raiSt,s the issue of how Danto separates art from non-art: an 
impPl1ant isslle I shall n:turn to in the tinal chapter: the conclusion. Ilk' Elet that 
UriI/o Bux and Brilln tx)'l'S arc indisl'l'rnihlc counterparts is not neCl'ssary to l'nahk 
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me to account for the difference between them - that one is an art\\ork th~ other 
not. It can alert me to the problem - it did just this for Danto in 1964 - and enable 
me to develop a theory: in Danto's case incorporating the six principles which I ha\ c 
discussed. I believe that once Danto has used indiscernible counterparts to alert 
himself to the contextual nature of art, they can serve no further purpose in definin~ 
art. As the traveller in the Buddhist parable finds, once you have crossed a river 
there is no point in continuing to carry the raft across a desert. 23 Indiscernibility is an 
interesting feature of some contemporary art. and, as I have explained. it is used as 
an essential ingredient of some of this art: in appropriational art indiscernibility is a 
part of the meaning of the works. Perhaps we are intrigued hy indiscernibility 
because, in this particular form, it has only been a feature of art since the advcnt of 
pop and the existence of works like Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture. 
I emphasise in this particular fonn because finally I would like to point 
out that the existence of indiscernible counterparts in art is not something new: as a 
feature of art it has a long and varied history. Throughout the history of painting 
there are many examples of artists producing several versions of succ~sslul 
canvasses; these have been accepted by patrons, collectors and curators as \\ orks of 
art. The casting of several versions of sculptures in bronze was and is commonplace; 
the production of prints is by its very nature the production of sets of indiscernible 
counterparts. So indiscemibility has a long history in art. Th~ indiscernibility 
identified in these examples is of a fonn that Danto does not address: it raises man) 
interesting issues, the nature of types and tokens, the status of multiple. 
machine-made copies. whether the original version of a painting has special 
signiticance and the status of artworks produced in studios by artists' assistants. This 
varied nature and history of indiscernible counterparts is outside the scope of the 
dissertation but I mention it to counter the impression. perhaps given by Danto. that 
indisccrnibility is a unique feature of contempor~ art. 
23Sl'l.' the supcr:--aiption to the Introduction. p.l. 
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Returning to Danto's theory. we are still left with th~ difticulty of 
circularity of argument: the problem that the history which artworks ha\ e necessarily 
acquired is defmed in relation to, or is reliant o~ some concept of art or culture. And 
this concept of art is needed somewhere along the line to explain why a work 
qualifies for its status as art. I accept that my UMO and other thought experiments 
do not resolve the problem of circularity. At the end of the last chapter I considered 
the circularity inherent in Danto's concept of the artworld and his attempt to break 
the circularity using the is of artistic identification. In Danto's original example. 
Picter Bruegel's Landscape with the Fall of Icarus. I pointed out that the sp~cial is 
was no more than the is of representational identification. Later Dantl) used the 
special is as an is of historical location. In this use it proved capable 0 f wider 
application and capable of explaining and accommodating the wide range of l1e\\ 
artforms we encounter today. The problem I identified with the reyised application 
of the special is was that it was too inclusive: every object has a historical local ion. 
So the key issue is how do you particularise art? Dickie, I have explained. attempts 
to particularise art within this broad historical context by his idea of art as an 
inflected concept. Margolis addresses the same issue with his concept of cultural 
realism: his idea of artworks as culturally-emergent real entities. Danto attempts to 
particularise art. to narrow the definition of art within the wider historical context. 
by proposing that art is essentially rhetorical in nature. This is the subject of the last 
chapkr of The TransjlKUralion (~llhe ('ommonplacL' "Metaphor. I· xpression and 
Style'. ~md it is this sll~ject which I address in the next chapter. M\ own ne\\ IS 
l'xplained in the condusion to the dissertation. chapter four. 
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Chapter Three 
Art as Rhetorical Ellipsis: Metaphor, Expression and Style 
Ifwe seek the light of external facts, the only cases 
of thOUght which we can find are of thOUght in signs 
C. S. Peirce (1991, p.49) 
I. Introduction 
In the last chapter I identified how Danto introduced an important new subject area 
into his discussion of art; it is contained in chapter seven, the final chapter, of The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. This new subject area is his examination of 
metaphor, expression and style; it is the final element in his fully developed 
philosophy of art, and it rests on Danto's belief that art is essentially rhetorical and 
elliptical in nature. The discussion follows on from Danto's examination of artistic 
representation and indiscernibility which I examined in the last chapter. The new 
subject area is introduced at length in the latter part ofhis chapter six, 'Works of Art 
and Mere Representations', together with an explanation of why this new topic is 
required: that it identifies a feature which enables his theory to distinguish works of 
art from non-artworks. The aim of this chapter is to formulate Oanto' s theory of art 
as rhetorical ellipsis and to explain how this leads to the concept of intensionality 
(with an s) in art. Danto's contextual and historical theory of art, as I have explained, 
is intentional (with a /) in that it requires an artist, with an intention, expressing 
meaning through the artwork which requires interpretation within a historical setting. 
Intentionality whic~ for Oanto, is synonymous with "aboutness·. underlies his 
artworld theory. Oanto's overarching theory of art, however. is both intentional and 
intensional. As well as explaining intensionality in this chapter. I make two major 
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criticisms of the concept as it applies to art. First, I assert that the concept is 
over-inclusive: it includes other things beside art and therefore cannot be used to 
distinguish art from non-art. Second, it rests on a circular argument. It relies on 
Danto's concept of the artworld, which I have already argued includes an element of 
circularity, to identify rhetorical ellipsis in art as opposed to rhetorical ellipsis outside 
art. However, in addition to developing these criticisms, this chapter aims to show 
the fruitfulness of Danto's notion of rhetorical ellipsis. This notion is indeed 
important for understanding 'artistic presence', even if it falls short of specifying 
necessary and sufficient conditions for art. 
Danto also raises an initial potential objection to his view of rhetorical 
expression in art: that it may simply be a somewhat richer or different form of 
content. Danto addresses the potential objection at length, and, in section III of this 
chapter, I follow him in the arguments he uses to rebut the objection. Danto's 
introduction and treatment of the potential objection sets the scene for his detailed 
examination of metaphor, expression and style: the three key features arising from 
his view of art as embodying rhetorical ellipsis. These issues, as I have already 
mentioned, are the subject matter of the final chapter of The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, and I devote section IV of the chapter to Danto's discussion of these 
three concepts. In the conclusion to the chapter I address two questions. Firstly, are 
there any works of art that do not embody metaphor, expression and style? 
Secondly. are there any non-artworks that do embody these three features? A 
positive answer to either question would severely damage Danto's philosophy of art. 
I also look at Danto's more recent views on defining art in his 2003 book The Abuse 
of Beauty. I now begin the discussion and look at how and why Danto introduces 
the concept of rhetorical ellipsis into his philosophy of art. 
124 
II. Art as Rhetorical Ellipsis Introduced 
Danto uses two indiscemibility thought experiments to introduce his idea that art is 
rhetorical and elliptical in nature. His primary aim is to attempt to distinguish works 
of art from non-artworks. If he is able to achieve this, if he is able to detennine the 
features which establish this difference, he will have identified some necessarv and 
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perhaps sufficient or jointly sufficient conditions of art. The first thought experiment 
is used as an eliminatory tool; it is designed to identify those concepts which cannot 
be used to distinguish artworks from non-artworks. Danto uses the experiment to 
highlight and eliminate three such concepts, and he explains why they are deficient 
for his purpose. This leads him on to identify the need for some other approach: 
some new concept to distinguish art. The second thought experiment provides this 
other approach and Danto's answer to the problem of how to identify art: it is used 
to show how rhetorical ellipsis can be used to point out the difference he is seeking 
between artworks and non-artworks. The first thought experiment is one I have 
already discussed; it examines the difference between Loran's diagram of Cezanne' s 
Portrait of Madame Cezanne and the Lichtenstein painting based on the diagram: 
the second is text based, and it was inspired by Truman Capote's novel In Cold 
Blood. I shall examine these two thought experiments in turn. 
In section II of the last chapter, one of the examples of indiscernible 
counterparts which I examined was Danto's comparison of Erie Loran's diagram of 
Cezanne's painting Portrait of Madame Cezanne and Roy Lichtenstein's painting 
based on that diagram (see illustration 7). The point was made that, although they 
are of widely different scales and materials, they are indiscernible when illustrated in 
books. Danto uses this example to identify some deficiencies with three concepts 
which, he suggests, may be promising candidates for use in distinguishing artworks 
from non-artworks. He asks a question: what makes one of the pair a work of art 
while the other remains a diagram? Why is Lichtenstein's canvas a work of art when 
it is indiscernible, at least in illustrations. from Loran's diagram'! Both are 
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representations and both have artistic subject matter. but. as I have explained in th~ 
last chapter, they embody quite different meanings: the Loran diagram is about the 
compositional features of Cezanne's painting; Lichtenstein's canvas is much more 
complex and can be read as being concerned with a number of different themes. I 
mention three, although this is not an exhaustive exegesis. Firstly, the painting can be 
read as being concerned with the way art historians use diagrams to try to ~:\plain 
works of art: in this case to explain Cezanne's genius. In other words. it invites us to 
reflect on the use of diagrams as a tool of art-historical analysis. Diagranls are 
usually used to explain mathematically exact principles in the sciences: how 
appropriate is it that diagrams should be used to explain works of art? Secondly. th~ 
painting can be read as being about the way Cezanne moved towards treating his 
subjects as geometricised figures and why he took this direction in his art. We seL' 
this aspect In art-historical terms: In relation to the d~\elopment of 
post-Impressionism and how it can be read as part of the mo\'l~ towards Cubism and 
abstraction in painting in the early twentieth century. Thirdly. Lichtenstein's painting 
can be read as being about Cezanne's treatment of his subject: the artist's \\itt:. It 
helps explain how Cezanne's vision as an artist can be seen to have taken precedence 
over his intense and troubled relationship with his wife. As Danto tells LIS. the 
Lichtenstein painting is about this relationship: 
But then how singularly apt to apply this geometrizing VlSlon to 
Cezanne's w~le, treated as though she was a Luclidean problem! For 
we know the se:\ual side of this man. in whom prude and sat: r \\arred, 
and we know the passion and violence of his relationship with this 
woman. with whom he lived out of \\ edlock and b: \\ hom he had a 
son. :\nd if the source and fi.1Cus of all this kding should be reduced 
to a kind of li.)[mula. ho\\ much this must tcllus of the tinal triumph or 
the artistic impulse in his souL even if it L'ntailcd a certain 
dehumanizing transfiguration of the sul~jcd. (Danto. 1 <)X 1. p. I·n) 
It should be noted that each of these three readings opens up a host of issues that 
could be explained, researched and debated at length. Each reading has generated 
volumes devoted to its respective topic. 
From his consideration of these indiscernible counterparts Danto puts 
forward three conclusions: three possible concepts which could explain how to 
distinguish an artwork from a non-artwork. He then goes on to identi~' why the 
three concepts fail to enable us to make the distinction we are seeking. Firstly. Danto 
reminds us that so far his analysis has shown that Loran' s diagram and Lichknstein' s 
painting have different content. One may have more complex. multi-layered and 
allusive content than the other, but. as I explained in chapter t \\ O. \\ e can ha\'e 
works of art which look the same yet are both quite different. It will be recalled that 
this is the case identified in Fisher's sub-claim (2) - every artwork can ha\e an 
indiscernible counterpart which is a different artwork - for example the indiscernible 
extracts mentioned in Borges' story Pierre Menard. So the question remains. \\ hat is 
it about the content, what is special about the content of Lichtenstein' s painting, 
which makes it a work of art? Before I proceed, I need to make a distinction 
between content and subject matter: the latter term is general in that several quite 
diflerent o~jects, not necessarily works of art. could be about one subject. For 
example. a thematic collection of (different) postage stamps could all contain images 
of animals. Content is a specific term relating to a particular object. although 
indiscernible objects like current first class postage stamps can ha\t.~ the sarnL' 
conknt. WL' need to note that both the Loran diagram and Lichtenstein's painting 
share the same subject matter: they are both about art. Therefore simply being about 
an artist ic subject cannot help us to make the distinction \\ ~ an~ looking f(Jr: wh~ one 
is a work of art and the other a mere diagram. In other \\ ords. being ahout art llr 
treating an artistic su~ject is not a distinguishing feature of art: the loran diagram is 
about an artistic sul~iect but is not a work of art. 
SL'cnndly. Di.Ullll makl'~ the pt'int that although one of the t\\o. the 
l.ichtcnstl'in paint in~. is H'idc~l' w,Ct'I'/cd as a \\ ork of art. this ~IL'certaJll'L' is n\Jt 
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adequate, in philosophical tenns, to point out the difference. The fact that the 
Lichtenstein canvas has a place in the history of art cannot be used to tell us 
philosophically why it is art: history can tell us what is regarded or accepted as art, 
but it does not tell us why it should be accepted as art. The problem is one I 
identified with the institutional theory of art which I discussed in the last chapter: 
that the institutional theory is circular in that it defines art by using the term art or 
some similar expression, such as culture, which already includes an artistic element 
or a reference back to art. 
Thirdly, we cannot rely on any special type of formal quality to 
distinguish the artwork. This would run counter to the results of Danto' s previous 
deliberations on the nature of art; as the debate we encountered in the last chapter 
has shown, two objects can share the same formal properties yet one be a work of 
art and the other not. The Lichtenstein painting and the Loran diagram do share, at 
least in illustrations, the same formal properties. Summing up, we have two 
indiscernible objects, one a work of art the other not, where the content is different; 
we find that neither subject matter, nor art history nor any formal quality is able to 
establish the difference we are looking for: the difference between a work of art and 
a non-artwork. The reasons have been illustrated by Danto . s first thought 
experiment: although the Loran diagram and the Lichtenstein canvas have different 
content, they are both about artistic subjects, both share identical formal properties, 
and, although the painting is accepted as art. the institutional acceptance of the 
Lichtenstein as art rests on an argument which is circular. It should also be noted 
here that, as I have previously mentioned, both the Loran diagram and the 
Lichtenstein painting are representations. Danto now moves on to his second 
thought experiment which addresses the issue of content. 
D8Oto suggests another thought experiment in an attempt to resolve the 
problem of how to distinguish artworks from non-artworks: he attempts to devise a 
thought experinlCnt where we have two indiscernible works, one a work of art. the 
other not, but both having the same con/en/. He explains: "suppose we can find a 
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pair of things which not only resemble one another outwardly to whatever required 
degree, and have moreover the identical content, but where one of them is a work of 
art and the other not" (Danto, 1981, p.I44). The example he chooses takes its 
inspiration from Truman Capote's novel In Cold Blood. This compulsive book is 
written in the form of a detailed report on an actual murder case; it makes use of the 
author's interviews with witnesses and others involved. It was publicised. when first 
published in 1966, as the first non-fiction novel. 1 As a literary work it probes the 
distinction between fact and fiction, and it points to the difficulty of making this 
distinction in any work of reportage. Danto uses a similar scenario in his new 
thought experiment: he suggests an author M who produces a similar work to 
Capote's: M is an avant-garde novelist exploring the boundaries of fiction. The 
novelist M chooses to use the form of a newspaper report, and his work is. in a 
similar way to Capote's, an investigation of a real-life murder case. Danto asks us to 
compare this work with the newspaper report of the same homicide incident; the 
newspaper report happens to be identical, word for word, with M's novel, and it is 
written by a reporter whose name coincidentally also happens to be M. The first M, 
with his interest in verite, has his work, including photographs, printed on newsprint 
in tabloid format, and it is indiscernible from the second M's newspaper article. 
Danto makes the point that although they are indiscerruble and share the same 
content, the first is a work of art whilst the second remains a newspaper report. 
The artwork, the first M's avant-garde nove~ uses the form of a 
newspaper story to comment on how we rely on the format and presentation of 
newspaper articles to tell us about events in the world; in contrast the newspaper 
story is nothing more than a piece of reportage. Danto points out where he believes 
the difference between these two works lies: '1he nonfiction story [the first M's 
IThe case was the apparently unmotivated murder of the Clutter family, father. mother and two 
childn.-n. on a remote Kansas farm in 1959; the perpetrators. two small-time ~Tooks. were hanged 
for the offences in 1965. See Capote. 1 Q66. 
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artwork] uses the form of a newspaper story to make a point. The newspaper story 
[the second M's mere report], by contrast, uses that form because that is the way 
newspaper stories are; the writer is not making any special point by using that form" 
(Danto, 1981, p.146). Danto goes on to suggest a parallel between this example and 
the way pop artists use everyday images to comment on contemporary art and 
culture. The presentation of the content is used as a stylistic device by the artist to 
comment on what otherwise would be a commonplace of popular cuhure. Hence the 
extensive use of soup cans, comics and photographs of film stars in pop art. From 
this Danto formulates a principle: "any representation not an artwork can be 
matched by one that is one, the difference lying in the fact that the artwork 
uses the way the nonartwork presents its content to make a point about how 
that content is presented" (Danto, 1981, p.l46, bold face added). 
In other words there are different levels of meaning embodied in the 
artwork: it is inviting us to interpret the way the content is used and presented as a 
way of expressing something about how we relate to the subject and the medium 
used for its presentation. The existence of these other levels of meaning enables 
Danto to bring in his two new concepts: that art is rhetorical in nature and that this 
rhetorical element involves ellipsis. I will now explain these two concepts which I 
address in turn. However, I must emphasise that Danto sees them together as part of 
his definition of art. I need to restate the list of principles underlying his theory of art 
which I identified in the previous chapter: (I) art is the result of human endeavour by 
an artist, (2) artworks acquire a history and a provenance. (3) artworks embody 
meaning (they are expressive), which meaning is a result of the artist's intention, (4) 
that meaning requires a subject about which the artist projects a point of view by 
means of rhetorical ellipsis, (5) artworks require interpretation and finally, (6) they 
are produced and interpreted within a historical context. Principle number (4) links 
rhetoric to ellipsis; principles number (3) and (5) bring in expression and 
interpretation. Although I discuss rhetoric and ellipsis separately at this stage for the 
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purpose of expositio~ they should be read together, and with the other principles, as 
an inter-related whole. 
Danto introduces his first new concept, that of the rhetorical nature of 
art, into his theory at this point. He believes that rhetoric is involved in art because 
art is expressive: it must be interpreted by the viewer, and this introduces the 
awareness of a level of meaning which goes beyond the mere subject matter of the 
representation. The artist, in expressing, addresses an audience with the aim of 
eliciting a certain response; this elicitation brings with it an element of persuasion 
which is essentially a rhetorical device. Looking at a work of art is a two-way 
process: the artist addressing the viewer, and the viewer interpreting the artwork, 
usually but not always in the artist's absence. Going back to Danto' s previous 
discussion of art in chapter one, this incorporation of meaning in art is what he calls 
'aboutness': the fact that works of art must be about something. Addressing an 
audience about something is an intentional act: there is a link between artist, work 
and audience. The aim is to generate a response which is elicited to a large extent by 
the work of art (I have shown earlier how the audience also adds to the process of 
interpretation and how the balance between the two can change). Danto sums up this 
rhetorical element of art: "it may just be one of the main offices of art less to 
represent the world than to represent it in such a way as to cause us to view it with a 
certain attitude and with a special vision" (1981, p.167). I accept at this stage that 
many other human products, like newspapers, embody this rhetorical element: they 
put forward a point of view and aim to persuade. However, recalling the previous 
point, rhetoric should not be considered in isolation; it is part of a set of principles 
underlying Danto's theory of art. 
I now move on to explain the second concept of ellipsis: ellipsis IS 
involved when the viewer is required to fill in or complete an interpretation. As I 
have already mentioned, interpretation is essentially a two-way process: the viewer 
must provide an element which is missing in the presentation of the work itself The 
other levels of meaning which Danto has already identified in artworks - see the 
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discussion of Lichtenstein's painting above - are not explicitly or fully stated: they 
are not explained in the artwork. The interpretation requires the viewer to 
participate and in doing so to add something as part of the process. Here I need to 
make a distinction between the element of ellipsis, the omission in the artwork itself 
and the completion or filling in by the viewer as part of the interpretative process. 
The distinction is between (1) ellipsis as a feature of the artwork and (2) the 
subsequent process of filling in or completion by the viewer. Interpreting a work of 
art is not a matter of reading a message from the artwork: it requires the viewer to 
think about why the artist chose to do the work in the way she did. This is the 
difference I have already identified between M the journalist's newspaper report and 
M the avant-garde author's experimental novel. Interpretation is not a matter of the 
one-way reception of information from an artwork. It is this two-part process 
involving ellipsis in the artwork and completion by the viewer which Danto suggests 
is an essential feature of artistic interpretation. In passing I mention that Danto sees 
this elliptical element of art being closely identified with the concept of metaphor and 
this will be discussed in detail later in section IV. Before I move on I should add that 
not all rhetoric requires the same degree of ellipsis; rhetoric as a device of persuasion 
can engender other more immediate responses: shock, endorsement, fear and anger 
amongst many. 
From this explanation it can also be seen why Danto believes the two 
elements of rhetoric and ellipsis are inter-related; the rhetorical nature of the process 
of interpretation inevitably involves the viewer responding to the work of art. by 
filling-in, by completion or by adopting a position in relation to the work; the 
response is to the elliptical element contained in the artwork. If the viewer 
contributes something to the process, ellipsis must be involved; there must be 
something in the original presentation which is missing or demands completion. I 
refer back to the different subject areas of interpretation I previously identified in 
Lichtenstein's painting of the Loran diagram: these are examples of the other levels 
of meaning I mention above. Danto makes the point himself when he reters back to 
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these two works again; he believes that the difference between the two is that 
"Lichtenstein uses the diagram rhetorically. Loran does not use the idiom of 
diagrams; he simply uses diagrams (which happen, since they are diagrams, to be in 
that idiom). Whatever Lichtenstein is doing, he is not diagramming" (1981. p.147). 
In other words, Loran simply uses the diagram as a diagram; Loran' s is a 
contribution to the psychology of art; it is not a work of art itself which the 
Lichtenstein painting is. 
From his consideration of this thought experiment Danto suggests that it 
is the elements of rhetorical usage and ellipsis which must characterise art: these are 
the crucial areas where the artwork and the non-artwork differ and can be 
distinguished. He goes on to propose a thesis: ''that works of art, in categorical 
contrast with mere representations, use the means of representation in a way 
that is not exhaustively specified when one has exhaustively specified what is 
being represented" (1981, p.147-8, bold face added). In summary. there are two 
elements involved in interpreting works of art. Firstly, an element of rhetoric: we are 
moved to question how we should respond to the work. Secondly, an element of 
ellipsis: something is omitted which we are required to fill in. We formulate our own 
response; we develop our own interpretation: our own input as viewers is part of the 
process of responding to a work of art. Further, this response is to the way the 
content is presented, and because we, as interpreters, are adding to the process, the 
outcome cannot be predicted. It should be noted here that Danto, by his own 
admission, has introduced the concept of rhetorical ellipsis into his theory of art in a 
casual way. The full explanation and development of the two concepts comes later; 
the concepts are embodied in the thesis which Danto goes on to examine in greater 
detail in the last chapter of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. 
Two obvious problems spring to mind with the thesis. Firstly. that there 
may well be non-artworks which exhibit elements of rhetorical ellipsis. In which case 
how do we distinguish rhetorical ellipsis in art from the same concept in non-art. 
without involving a circular argument? There is also the corollary - are there an~ 
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artworks which do not embody these features? I shall leave this criticism for th~ 
present but I return to it in the conclusion to this chapter. after I have di~cu~~cd 
Danto's full explanation of his thesis. Secondly, an objection which is raised hy 
Danto himself which I now explain. His thesis, it will be recalled, is concerned v. ith 
how expression and content in an artwork are linked. The objection he raises is that 
the features of art which he has identified, rhetorical usage and ellipsis. may ju~t turn 
out to be a part of the content, albeit at a different level; he explains: "but how do I 
know that what I have called expression is not after all part of the content of the 
work, so that in the end Lichtenstein's work has a somewhat richer and somewhat 
different content than the Loran diagram, and the nonfiction story contains some 
information about the cultural place of the newspaper idiom in addition to whatc\er 
criminal facts it also records" (1981. p.148). I examine this objection in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Before I do this however I shall make two points about Danto' s thesis. 
Firstly, I refer to his repetition of the word 'exhaustively'. This repetition tells us 
that in works of art when the content has been fully identified. the mC"ffiS of 
representation is used in a way that is not and cannot ever be fully specified. In other 
words we cannot explain, paraphrase or fully describe a work of art. This reinforces 
Danto . s idea of ellipsis: there is something which requires completion by the 
interpreter. The lack 0 f total definition in the means 0 f representation invites the 
interpreter to question or complete the treatment of the subject. The interpretation of 
the presentation is not fully determined: it allows for the possibilit~ of further 
interpretation. Therc are two different issues here. Firstly. the open-ended nature of 
\\ nrks of art due to the dliptical dement which the~ embody. Sccondl~. the 
open-ended naturl' of interpretation itsdf due to the changing circuIllstance>.; at the 
mlllllent or interpretation. TheSl' t\\O issues taken tllgl,ther give a situation in \\hich 
till' artist ( .. In assume what the response will be but can ne\er he sure her art\\ork 
\\ ill engender that partinilar resptHlSl'. Such further interpretations could ne\er 
them.selves he ti.dly ant icipated hy \ irtuc of thl' unknown tutun: condii ion" tlf their 
attnoution: this is a simple result of Danto 's contextualism which I considered in the 
last chapter. Danto has added the elliptical element to the contextualism I discussed 
in chapter one. It will be seen later in this chapter how the idea of art not being 
capable of full explanation or paraphrase re-emerges in Danto's concept of 
intensionality (note with an s not a t) in art. 
Secondly, it should be noted that although Danto's principle mentions 
indiscernibility, the actual thesis does not - see the two quotations above, both in 
bold face. I mention this here and refer back to the result of my consideration of the 
indiscernibility issue in the previous chapter. The point I make now is that Danto's 
thesis does not depend on the use of his technique of comparing indiscernibles. As I 
pointed out in my previous discussion in the last chapter, ahhough the technique 
helps to identify and illustrate Danto's theory of art, it is not a requirement of the 
theory. I believe Danto's new thesis also stands without the need for indiscernible 
examples. I shall explain why, and I give two reasons. Firstly, in the thought 
experiment using M's experimental novel and the other M's newspaper report, the 
examples are certainly indiscernible. But indiscernibility is not necessary to make 
Danto's point. His point is made and his argument secured by Capote's In Cold 
Blood which does not have an indiscernible counterpart. Capote's 'novel' is factual: 
a work of reportage yet also a work of art because it is a comment on the boundaries 
between fact and fiction in the process of reporting. In Cold Blood embodies the 
element of rhetorical ellipsis which Danto has identified as a distinguishing feature of 
art; the indiscernibility thought experiment using the two Ms' work adds nothing of 
significance philosophically to the argument: it merely acts as an illustration. I 
accept that works of art can have indiscernible counterparts and that some do. I also 
accept that Danto's indiscernibility thought experiments alert us to the importance of 
the non-manifest features of art. However, I have already shown in chapter two that 
any object can have an indiscernible counterpart and that having an indiscernible 
counterpart cannot help us to particularise art. The second reason is that Danto' s usc 
of the Loran diagrdlll and the Lichtenstein canvas as an example of indiscernibility is 
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questionable: unlike most of his other examples these two objects are not 
indiscernible; one is a diagram in a book the other is a sizeable painting. Danto 
avoids this issue by referring to illustrations, but this introduces another issue which 
seriously complicates the debate: the question of how illustrations of works of art 
relate to originals. 
Before I move on I pause to restate Danto's thesis "tbat works of 
art, in categorical contrast witb mere representations, use tbe means of 
representation in a way tbat is not exbaustively specified wben one has 
exhaustively specified what is being represented" (1981. p.147-8, bold face 
added). This is the thesis which I will be discussing in detail in section IV of the 
present chapter. Before that, however, I follow Danto in his identification and 
discussion of the previously-mentioned objection to his thesis: that rhetorical ellipsis 
in art may turn out to be no more than some form of content. 
III. An Objection Considered 
I t will be recalled that Danto 's original aim was to distinguish between two 
indiscernible representations, both ostensibly having the same content, one of which 
was an artwork, the other not so. He previously put forward the view that the 
difference between the two lies in the way the work of art uses the means of 
representation to express a point of view about its content. Danto's objection, 
which, as I will expl~ he sets out to counter, is that what he has identified as 
expression may be no more than a part of the content. For example, the avant-garde 
author M's story may contain information about how newspapers relate to the 
society in which they are produced and read; this is in addition to the information 
about the murder enquiry the story reports on. Danto suggests that there may be two 
levels of content involved in examples like the one above: the first level. simply what 
they are about. in our avant-garde author's case, the murder enquiry. and the Sl.-cond 
level, that they are about the way the first level is presented: in our example. ahout 
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how newspapers report such cases. The second level would raise wider cultural 
issues; for example in the case of crime reports, why they are reported in such detail 
and why the reports are read so avidly. Danto explains: "suppose that in addition to 
being about whatever they are about, they are about the way they are about that -
having, as it were, first- and second-order contents. They are complex., semantically 
speaking, incorporating into themselves a subtle piece of self-reference" (1981. 
pp.148-9). He sums up his objection by asking whether all representations which 
contain any element of self-referentiality are works of art. 
The objection is based on the nature of the link between content and 
expression in representations. Danto addresses the objection by attempting to show 
that content cannot be responsible for the rhetorical and elliptical elements of 
expression in art which he proposes as necessary conditions. He does this by 
examining two theories of art: the Transparent Theory and the Opaque Theory. and 
he goes on to explain why both theories are defective. Each theory focuses on an 
element of content, and Danto explains why that particular element cannot contain 
the rhetorical and elliptical elements of art: the necessary conditions of art which he 
has advanced. The first, the Transparent Theory, Danto uses to show how imitation 
cannot account for rhetorical ellipsis; the second, the Opaque Theory. he uses to 
show how the materials used in the artwork cannot serve the purpose either. With 
this accomplished, Danto believes he has established that the content of artworks 
cannot be responsible for the element of rhetorical ellipsis which his theory demands. 
I now look at why Danto believes this objection is so important; why he raises it and 
why he needs to counter it. Danto has just examined an example of indiscemibles 
(the two Ms' stories) where one is a work of art and the other is not; yet the two 
share the same content. If this is so, Danto argues. content cannot explain the 
difference between art and non-art. He has already argued that artworks express 
something about content. I f the expression is a form of content (which the objection 
states) then Danto's theory fails. He would be fcilling because he would he St."Cking 
the difference between art and non-art in a place his theory rejects: in content. The 
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Transparency Theory argues that in art the medium is transparent: art is about its 
content. So it cannot accommodate Danto's theory of expressing something ahoUi 
content: it is just content. If the transparency theory is true Danto' s theory fails; if 
the theory is false the objection to his original theory is countered: his theory stands. 
Similarly with the Opaque Theory: this argues that art is just its material so, agaia it 
cannot express anything about content. If the Opaque Theory is true Danto' s theory 
fails; if it is false the objection is defeated. 
I will look at the two theories in turn and explain why I believe 
Danto's treatment of them fails to confirm his view that content cannot be 
responsible in some way for the rhetorical aspect of artworks. Danto devotes a 
considerable amount of space to refuting his objection for the reason I have outlined 
above and I follow him shortly in his discussion. However, before I do so I need to 
question if the objection itself is valid, and I do so now. As I have explained, Danto's 
objection rests on his indiscernible example of the two Ms' stories; one is an artwork 
and the other is not, but they both share, according to Danto, the same content. The 
belief that they share the same content is crucial to the objection: if the two stories 
share the same content, content cannot be responsible for the difference between 
them, and content cannot be used to distinguish art from non-art. However, Danto 
has ignored his own earlier discussion about the contextual nature of art. It will be 
recalled from chapter one that Danto believes that what distinguishes ready-mades 
from everyday objects, 'mere real things', is a theory of art, an 'artworld'. It is the 
context of their production, display and appreciation which distinguishes the 
ready-mades as art. As Danto pointed out, it is the non-manifest properties which we 
need to distinguish art. But, surely, these non-manifest properties are part of the 
content, and, ifso, Danto's objection is flawed. In other words. the content includes 
the intentional and historical aspects of art which I accept are non-manifest. 
Returning to the two Ms' stories, I believe the content is different because the 
intention of the authors and the context of their creation were different. In putting 
forward the objection Danto takes content to refer to the discernible propcrt ics and 
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he ignores context. In the 'Artworld' article Danto put forward an argument that 
context was an essential feature of art; in raising the objection he has iunored thc 
contextual nature of art. 
I allow Danto his narrow view of content for the present and continue 
with his discussion of the objection. As I will show in the discussion. I ha\c a major 
concern about Danto's treatment of the objection: again, it relates to the issue of 
content. Danto's Transparency lbeory is a variation of his Imitation Thcory of Art 
which I have already discussed in chapter one. It will be recalled that he invoked the 
I mitation Theory to introduce his artworld concept. Recapping the earlier discussion. 
Danto examined Plato's arguments in Book X of The Republic. Plato sees art - or 
mimetic art to be precise - as an attempt to imitate nature and to deceive the viewer 
into believing that what she is looking at is the object depicted. Plato compares 
works of art with mirror images: art produces images which are representations of 
objects in the same way that a mirror produces images of objects. Danto is ignoring 
Plato's other views of art; for example its role in the education of the Guardians in 
Book II I of The Republic or its ecstatic or inspirational function in Phaedrus. And. 
although he mentions it, he is putting to one side the Aristotelian vicw of imitation: 
that the aim of figurative art may not be to deceive but to allow the viewer to take 
pleasure in imitations, even if they are of distasteful subjects, or to enable us to learn 
about the objects depicted.2 This raises an important issue that Danto ignores: the 
view that most figurative art does not aim soldy at illusion and that there are other 
purposes behind imitation. As well as the Aristotelian view of imitation. figurative art 
may be predominantly narrative. commemorative. didactic. religious. or decorative. I 
shall return to this point shortly. 
Danto is restricting his discussion at this point to art as illusion. This is 
the basis of his Transparency Theory: if art achieves its aim of deceiving the viewer. 
the medium of the artwork hccomcs transparent: we will he una\\are of the medium 
2l>anto (1981. p.14) quotL'" Pot'fin J .J48h. /O-J J. I (N6. p.6-7. 
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used by the artist. Danto explains the theory using a famous illustration: the Da 
Vincian example of the wall of glass. Leonardo envisages a sheet of glass between 
the artist and the subject as a way of reproducing perspective: the surface of the 
glass is marked to produce an image of the object behind the wall of glass.3 If the 
marking (painting) is done perfectly, the result, as Danto explains, will be that "the 
medium must, as it were, be invisible, and this requirement is perfectly symbo lized by 
the pane of glass which is presumed transparent, something we cannot see but only 
through ... If the pane of glass were not a means, it would be a metaphor for mimetic 
representation, and accordingly I take the logical invisibility of the medium to be the 
chief feature of imitation theory" (1981, p.ISI). Danto is using another example of 
indiscernibles: he is comparing what is on the glass, the painted image, with what we 
see through the glass. His point (not Da Vinci's, he was concerned purely with 
perspective) is that if these quite different images are indiscernible, the painted image 
shares the properties of the image seen though the glass which is only content. If the 
medium is transparent, Danto believes that the logical consequence of the theory is 
that the only thing we can be looking at is the content: that is all there is to see. We 
cannot be sure whether we are looking through the pane of glass or at the marks on 
the surface of the glass. Both the view through the glass and the marks on its surface 
share the same content and therefore Danto believes that content cannot be 
responsible for the rhetorical component of art because rhetorical ellipsis, according 
to Danto's theory, says something about the content. Put another way, according to 
the Transparent Theory there is no way of distinguishing the real thing from the 
artwork because they are indiscernible; art then is reduced to just its content. The 
result is that art cannot account for the rhetorical element which Danto believes it 
must embody. Rhetorical ellipsis goes beyond the content: it comments on it. It will 
be recalled that this is embodied in Danto's thesis: '1hat works of art, in categorical 
contrast with mere representations, use the means of representation in a way that is 
lLeonardo Da Vinci. 1954, vol.lI. p343 
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not exhaustively specified when one has exhaustively specified what is being 
represented" (1981, p.147-8). He says: '''it is a clear consequence of this theory that 
whatever response an audience has to an artwork must ipso facto be a response to 
the content of the artwork. Less pragmatically, whatever properties the artwork has 
are simply the properties of whatever the artwork shows - media being ideally 
empty" (1981, p.153). This, however, leads to a question: why cannot the content of 
an artwork itself point to something about itself? Why cannot rhetorical ellipsis be 
embodied in the content? For example, the content of Giorgione' s Tempesl itself 
draws us into speculation about why the figures are there and what they are doing. I 
shall return to this objection at the end of this section. 
This leads to Danto's other objection to the Transparency Theory of art 
which refers to the issue of aesthetic predicates. He begins by considering the 
predicate "is beautiful'. He believes that a consequence of the Transparency Theory 
is that when we sayan artwork is beautiful we are saying no more than it is of a 
beautiful subject. If there is no distinction between an artwork and its subject, 
assuming the medium to be transparent, it follows that any attribution of an aesthetic 
predicate to the artwork is also making exactly the same attribution to the subject of 
the artwork. The Transparency Theory does not give any information about how the 
predicate . is beautiful' is to be applied; it does not tell us what is beautiful. But it 
docs enable the predicate 'is a beautiful work of art' to be used: simply find a 
beautiful object and create a work of art successfully imitating the object to the 
extent that the medium is transparent. Ilis objection to the Transparency Theory here 
is that if we try to attach an aesthetic predicate to the subject of the artwork \\ e find 
WI.' have done no more than attach the predicate to the content of the art\\ork. In 
other words. whenever a work of art acquires the predicate 'is \:' it is becausl' the 
su~ied has that predicate. 
D.mto moves on to highlight the inadequacy of the TransparL'ncy 
I'hL'ory by e\:,mlining other 4lesthet ic predicates t hat apply to art hcsides . is 
hL'3ut itul'. The inadequacy is highlighted hy considering the wide rangL' of aesthct ie 
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predicates which we do apply to works of art. He chooses the botanical drawings of 
Andre Racz4 as an example (illustration 14), and he provides a list of aesthetic 
predicates which were applied to the drawings in art journal reviews of an exhibition 
of Racz's work: " 'powerful,' 'swift,' 'fluid,' 'have depth,' 'have solidity: 'sharp: 
'eloquent,' 'delicate' " (1981, p.155). His argument is that most of these terms, in 
fact all but the last, would not be applied to the actual flowers which are the subjects 
of the drawings. Danto believes that this makes clear the inadequacy of the 
Transparency Theory of art. If that theory were accepted all the predicates applying 
to the artwork would also apply to the subject. I believe that Danto, as I shall explain 
shortly, has failed to distinguish subject matter from content. It would clearly be 
inappropriate to describe flowers as being powerful but we can quite easily 
understand that drawings of flowers could be described in this way. Danto belien~s 
that the language we use to talk about art points to something which is beyond the 
capability of the Transparency Theory to accommodate. He makes the point that the 
language we use to describe art also tends to be used to interpret and to evaluate art~ 
as Danto puts it: "the language of aesthetic description and the language of aesthetic 
appreciation are of a piece" (198 L p.156). He goes back to the flower drawings 0 f 
Andre Racz and proposes a thought experiment. Suppose we read the art journal 
reviews of Racz's work without being aware of the subject matter of the drawings; 
I )anto points out that nothing about the descriptions of the drawings, the artworks, 
would necessarily tell us anything about what the subject matter was. Nothing would 
tdl us that the drawings are of flowers. He says: "but perhaps the most useful 
observation to make is that the terms used so interestingly (and as it happens, so 
intelligently) of Racz's work do not ~ntail that the drawings are in fact of anything at 
all. In a way. told that there was a set of pow~rful. fluid, energetic drawings being 
shown at the Ruth "'hite Gallery, I could hardly tell what the: w~re ot: or if they 
4:\ndrL' Racz (lll)6-IQQ4). Romanian artist \\tll1 settlt.-d in l\;e\\ York. Fellow teacher at Columbia 
llniVL'rsit\' and friend nf [)anto who dt-dicated his ,\l\-sriClsm and \/oraliry to RaCl ("L'C DantoIQ7h). 
were of anything" (1981, p.159). In summary. Danto argues that the Transparency 
Theory locates the core of art in its content. But if: according to Danto' s thesis. 
rhetorical ellipsis is a feature of art, and if rhetorical ellipsis is about the way content 
is presented then art must be more than content which the Transparency Theon' 
avows. 
I return to the Transparency Theory at the end of the section to give 
our my own view; I now move on to consider the other theory Danto discusses: the 
Opaque Theory. He explains that this theory is the opposite of the Transparent 
Theory. Criticising the Transparency Theory, Danto attempted to show how content 
or subject matter could not be responsible for the rhetorical nature of art: he no\\ 
uses the Opaque Theory to try to show that material cannot be responsible for this 
element of art. The Opaque Theory proposes that artworks are only the materials of 
which they are composed: the canvas and paint. the paper and pigments or the 
vibrations in the air. Danto refers to the type of painting, and the once fashionable 
reductionist view of art that went with it, which attempts to reduce art to being 
nothing more its own material: what the art critic Joseph Mashek has called hardcore 
painting (1981, p.159). As examples I suggest the work of Sam Francis in painting 
or the sculptural work of Carl Andre; in both these artists' work the material initially 
seems to be all that the work is about. Danto makes the point that, if we subscribe to 
the Opaque Theory, in describing such hardcore paintings we can only legitimately 
use language which is appropriate for describing the materials used. Once we use the 
terms we normally apply to art. like the ones used to describe Racz's flo\\cr 
drawings, the theory has failed. We might describe the material of Francis's paintings 
as runny or viscous but we could not say that it was powerful. If wc did \\ c would 
be talking about how the paint was applied and for what purpose it was used: we 
would be bringing the rhetorical clement into the discussion. Put in another way. 
hardcore paint ings aspire to a condition of being solely about the materials they use. 
But once the) arc discussed in temlS other than those applying to materials. then the 
other attrihutes or art. such as the ones Danto has identified in Rac/'s drawings, 
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retum Danto believes that this shows that material cannot be responsible for the 
rhetorical element of art he has identified. The materiality gives way to othl?r 
concerns and the Opaque Theory is inadequate. Danto says of these paintings: '1he 
moment an artistic predicate is applied - such as 'has depth' - we have left the 
material correlate behind and are dealing with the work of art, which can no more be 
identified with matter than with content" (198] . p.159). 
Let me now return to Danto' s overall argument. Recapping. he 
proposed a thesis "that works of art, in categorical contrast with mere 
representations, use the means of representation in a way that is not 
exhaustively specified when one has exhaustively specified what is being 
represented" (198], p.147-8, bold face added). He goes on to explain why this 
thesis leads to his view that the elements of rhetoric and ellipsis are necessary 
conditions of art. Before discussing this in detail, Danto identified a potential 
objection: that what he has identified as rhetorical ellipsis in art may be no more than 
a form of content. It is this initial objection which I have been considering in this 
section. To address the objection Danto discussed the Transparency Theory and the 
Opaque Theory. He has attempted to demonstrate that if these theories are accepted 
then the rhetorical and elliptical elements of art can be part of the content and thl? 
objection stands~ his aim has been to criticise and reject the two theories and thus 
defeat the objection. I agree with Danto that the Transparency and the Opaque 
Theoril?s fail. but my argument is that this does not prove that rhetorical ellipsis 
cannot be part of the content of artworks. Danto has assumed that by showing the 
two theories are false the objection is defeated. In the remainder of this section I 
explain why I believe he is mistaken in this assumption. 
In addressing his objection Danto treats art disjunctively: he treats art 
as i r it blls either under the Transparency Theory of art (which, as \\l? ha\l? Sl'l?n. is a 
de\'e1opment of his Imitation I'henry) on the one hand. or. on the othl?r hand. under 
the Opaque Theory: the \'ic\\ that art is nothing more than thc materials from which 
it is made. Ihe prohlem with this approach is that n:ry little art falls tully umkr the 
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aegis of either theory. For instance, very little figurative art is purely imitative: it may 
wel1 contain an element of imitation but its primary aim is not to deceive the \;e\\cr 
into thinking that she is looking at the subject of the artwork. There are exceptions: 
trompe I 'oeil or trampantojo art is primarily designed to deceive the viewer in this 
way; but it is a rare exception. The majority of figurative art uses imitation. but it is 
the way that the imitation is carried out and presented to the viewer which is 
important. I have already mentioned Cezanne's painting, Portrait of Afadame 
Cezanne, and explained some of the reasons why Cezanne painted his \\ife in this 
geometrical and clearly non-mimetic way. Surely. in this case. the way he painted his 
wife is an essential part of the content of the work of art and involves a rhetorical 
element in its interpretation. 
I suggest that this is the case with most figurative art; I )anto . s 
argument addresses the extreme position (trompe l'oeil art for instance) but fails to 
address the majority of figurative art where imitation is not the primary aim. There is 
a similar objection to the Opaque Theory - there is some artwork which is primarily 
about the material it uses - but with the majority of art the material is used to 
express something beyond its materiality. Carl Andre's firebrick installations - I 
mentioned Andre's work as an exemplar of the Opaque Theory - are not simply 
about firebricks: they are works of art that invite us to address how we rdate to 
traditional and non-traditional art materials in a gallery setting; they raise the very 
rhetorical issues Danto has identified as being essential to art. 
I return to my initial criticism of Danto's objection - that is the original 
objection which he tries to refute - made in the beginning of this section: I sugg~sted 
that. in raising the objection. Danto ignores his o\\n theory of the contextual nature 
of art. It is thes~ contextual issues which arc able to provide the rhetorical element of 
arC s content. Carl Andre' s firebricks are a rhetorical statement. thl" subject matter is 
hricks: the content is the spccitlc display of the bricks as a rhetorical statl'm~nt in a 
cal1crv. Danto. I hclicv~. in his discussion of the obj~dion ha'\ failed to distinguish 
... . 
hel \\ cen suhjcct matter anJ content. 
Danto has polarised art in an attempt to address his objection: in his 
argument to defeat the two theories he considers art to be either purely mimetic or 
purely concerned with material. Most art, I believe, lies between these extremes and 
the rhetorical element of art can be seen to be part of the content. In Cezanne's 
Portrait of Madame Cezanne, for example, I identified a form of content which does 
exhibit the rhetorical element which Danto puts forward as a necessary condition 0 f 
art. In other words, Danto has assumed that showing the Transparency and Opaque 
Theories to be defective is sufficient to address his objection; this assumption I 
believe is flawed. There are other elements besides subject matter or materials 
involved in works of art: for example, as I have shown with Cezanne, how the 
subject is represented and how the material is used. 
In summary, I believe that although Danto has shown the 
Transparency Theory and the Opaque Theory to be defective, this does not 
overcome his objection - that some form of content may be responsible for the 
rhetorical and elliptical elements of art. I suggest his view of content - "by content I 
have in mind whatever would elicit equivalent stimuli with the object represented" 
( 1981, p. 164) - is limited; he has omitted the intentional properties which he argues 
elsewhere are necessary features of art. I now move on to look at how Danto 
develops his view of art as rhetorical ellipsis in the final chapter of The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace 'Metaphor, Expression and Style.' 
IV. Metaphor, Expression and Style 
Danto sets out his exposition of these topics in four parts. Firstly. he continues his 
examination of rhetoric and ellipsis in art, to which he adds the concepts of 
enthymeme and metaphor. Secondly, he looks in more detail at metaphor and 
explains why he believes its intensional structure is an important feature of art. 
I'hirdly, he outlines his view of expression in art and compares his l)\Vn vicw with 
that of Ndson (Joodman. Fourthly and finally, he e\..plains his view of the role (If 
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style in art; he concentrates on distinguishing between style and manner using Plato' s 
Ion as an example. I follow Danto's sequence and deal with these four parts in turn: 
I devote a sub-section to each subject. 
IVa. Rhetorical Ellipsis Continued: Enthymeme and Metaphor Introduced 
The first part of Danto's final chapter in The Transfiguration of the Commonplac(! 
continues his examination of rhetoric and ellipsis in art; he also introduces and 
discusses the concepts of enthymeme and metaphor. He begins with rhetoric: initially 
he makes the point that the purpose of rhetoric is to bring about a change in the 
recipient (the auditor or viewer): to alter their view about the subject in question. 
Whatever is being relayed about the subject is, in addition, being carried out in a way 
designed to alter the perception of the subject by the auditor or viewer. He returns to 
the Loran diagram (see illustration 7); its aim is to relate certain information about 
the structure of Cezanne's painting to the viewer. That is its function, and I judge it 
by how well it achieves this aim as a diagram. As I have already sho~ the 
Lichtenstein painting of Loran's diagram does more than this: it uses the diagram 
format rhetorically to make a number of points about a much \\ider range of issues. 
Now, Danto is aware that rhetoric may well be unavoidably involved in all types of 
communication. Loran's choice of the diagram as a means of communication is 
rhetorical in that it uses a . scientific ' format where it is not usually encountered; it is 
used with the rhetorical purpose of giving a certain air of objectivity to his argument 
as well as being a very clear and succinct way of relating information about the 
structure of Cezanne's painting. Danto at this stage notes thc pcni.lsiveness of 
rhetoric in all communication and mon~s on. and I return to this point shortly and 
again in t hc conclusion. 
The next step in Danto' s argunlent is to demonstrate that rhetoric is 
in\'ol\cd in visual as well as \\Titlen communication: he does this using a numocr or 
cxamples. I will mention one of these: an image of Napoleon as a Roman emperor. :\ 
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standard definition of a metaphor is that it is a figure of speech in which a linguistic 
expression is applied to an object to which it is not literally applicable in order to 
suggest some similarity. For example, 'he is a lion in battle'. In the image which 
Danto suggests, of Napoleon as a Roman emperor. I recognise Napoleon: I also 
recognise the Roman outfit, and I appreciate that Napoleon did not usually wear 
these clothes. I can see how the visual metaphor parallels the literary one: I haye an 
object, Napoleon, shown dressed in a way not usually seen or expected (the 
equivalent of the non-literal application) to suggest some similarity (that Napoleon 
has the attributes of a Roman Emperor). Danto explains why an artist would choose 
to depict Napoleon as a Roman emperor, and, although he does not mention any 
specific work, he could have had Canova's colossal marble statue of Napoleon in 
mind.5 The sculptor did not represent Napoleon in fancy-dress: the aim was to imply 
that Napoleon shared the qualities of imperial grandeur and omnipotence we usually 
attribute to a Roman emperor. Danto contrasts that situation with one where 
Napoleon simply acts as a model for a sculpture of a Roman emperor - albeit a very 
unlikely occurrence. In this second situation the model stands for whoever they are 
modelling, and this is why Napoleon would have made an extremely bad model: he 
would have been instantly recognisable as himself Danto makes the point that in the 
tirst example, Napoleon as Roman emperor - what he terms an instance of 
"metaphoric transfonnation" (198 L p.173) - the identity of the subject remains 
constant and recognisable: Napoleon is seen as Napoleon throughout. Danto 
believes that the distinction between these three. visually indiscernible examples -
Napoleon dressed up, Napoleon as Roman emperor and Napoleon as model will 
help us to differentiate art from non-art. The distinction will also help to e1ucidak 
~'he colossal marble statue .\'a{)(JIt'on Bonaparte in the Post' (~r (/ Ruman Empt:rnr by .\ntonio 
Canova. produced hctwL'cn 180~ and 1810. is no\\ in The Wellington \ 1useum. :\p~ky House. 
I.ondon. 
148 
why a difference in content alone, the issue he addressed in his previous chapter. 
cannot be used to identifY art from non-art: the content is the same in all three case~. 
Danto moves on to examine rhetoric in more detail. He approaches the 
subject in Aristotelian terms: as a psychological device intended to result in the 
generation of an attitude or emotion in the recipient. He says "it is not implausible to 
see Aristotle in the Rhetoric working out the structures of a pathetic syllogism which 
are supposed to terminate in a certain sort of emotion" (1981, p.169). In dealing 
with emotions we are considering states of mind, not merely moves in logic. 
Aristotle believes that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic and that both are made 
use of in all human deliberation; in The Art of Rhetoric (henceforth Rhetoric) he 
says: "it is, then, established that rhetoric is not concerned with any single delimited 
kind of subject but is like dialectic" (J 355b, 1991, p.69). I mentioned above that 
Danto noted that there is an element of rhetoric in all human communication and this 
stems from the Aristotelian notion of the universal need for both dialectic and 
rhetoric. It also reflects the somewhat fuzzy distinction between the two which is 
evident in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Danto believes the rhetorician is demonstrating two 
things: firstly, why we ought to feel an emotion, and secondly. taking the audience 
back to experience the original emotion. Aristotle's discussion of rhetoric identifies 
its three components: firstly, ethos. dealing with the character of the speaker. 
secondly, pathos, engaging the feelings and finally logos. a sound argument. The 
third element. logos or argument had two main categories: firstly. example. the 
rhetorical equivalent of induction, and secondly, enthymeme. the rhetorical 
equivalent of syllogism. It is the enthymeme which Aristotle identifies as the most 
appropriate logical form tor rhetorical use~ it is Danto's next task to examine why 
this should be so. The answer. as I shall explain. is central to Danto's theory of art. 
His discussion of the enth~meme begins with a definition: an 
cnthvrneme is an argument with an unstated premise or conclusion. :\S sl)mcthing is 
missing. the cnthytncme is a rhetorical device which is essentially elliptical in nature. 
In Rhetoric Aristotk explains: "hoth enth~memc and example must umcern things 
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that for the most part can be otherwise ... and arise from few facts. often fewer than 
with the frrst syllogism; for if any of them were well known. there would be no need 
to mention them. The hearer supplies them for himself' (l35 7a, 1991. p.77). In 
other words, an argument is capable of being followed but what is missing must be 
supplied by the auditor, and this is the crucial point for Danto. The auditor is 
contributing to the process and must add something to enable the argument to be 
followed. The rhetorical power of the enthymeme is psychological and this is 
manifest in two important ways. Firstly, the auditor becomes involn~d. and being 
involved, being drawn into an argument, generates heightened interest. Secondly. as 
a participant in the argument, the auditor is in a way persuaded hy herself and 
therefore more easily convinced than she would be by another person' s argument. 
Danto explains that the process "involves a complex interrelation between the framer 
and the reader of the enthymeme. The latter must himself fill the gap deliberately left 
open by the former: he must supply what is missing and draw his own conclusions ... 
In a small way, the audience for the enthymeme acts as all readers ideally should. 
participating in the process rather than just being encoded with information as a 
tabula rasa" (1981. p.170). 
Danto claims that a similar element of ellipsis is present in metaphor. and 
he believes that they can be seen as enthymematic in structure. He outlines 
Aristotle's view that a metaphor relates one term to another hy way of a hidden 
middle term. Without accepting that Aristotle has found the correct logical structure 
of metaphors. Danto believes that in understanding metaphors the hearer. vie\', er or 
reader is involved in filling in or finding this middle term: that metaphors are 
essentially elliptical in nature. He believes that metaphors share the same crucial 
feature as enthymemes: that they demand invoh'cment with and completion hy their 
audience. llowc\"cr. there is a ditlcrencc (it is not a sharp diffcrence: therl' is 
o\erlap): enthyrnemes require specific knowledge to complete the gap: metaphor 
usually allows tl)f wider intl'rprctation. I either han~ the knowledge to complete the 
cnthymcme or not: with metaphor. although srx-citic knowledge ma: he necessary. 
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there is more opportunity to think about the elements and discover the links between 
them. Danto returns to his example of Napoleon to make another point. The \;ewer. 
to make sense of the metaphor, must know who Napoleon was and how he usually 
dressed in 18th-century France; the same applies to Roman emperors. If the audience 
does not have this knowledge the metaphorical import is missed entirely. The 
metaphor answers the original question which, it will be recalled, was why did the 
artist choose to depict Napoleon in this way? This, Danto points ouL is a different 
question to simply asking why Napoleon is wearing these odd clothes, the answer to 
which may well be non-metaphoric. The difference is one that Danto has identified 
before: the metaphor is dealing with a representation, and, as I have explained. this 
is another key feature of Danto's theory of art. A final distinction is made; in the 
latter case, Napoleon just wearing a Roman outfit, there is the possibility that the 
clothes could have some metaphoric significance for Napoleon himself. I therefore 
must be aware that a picture of this latter possibility - a picture of a metaphor - is 
not necessarily, in fact will usually not be, a metaphoric picture. As Danto points 
out, '''it is crucial to distinguish the fonn of a representation from the content of the 
representation" (1981, p.172). 
I now return to a previous example: the difference between the Loran 
diagram of Cezanne's Portrait of Madame Cezanne and the Lichtenstein painting of 
I ,oran' s diagram. How does the Lichtenstein painting operate as a metaphor? I refer 
back to our standard definition of a metaphor - it is a figure of speech in which a 
linguistic expression is applied to an object to which it is not literally applicable in 
order to suggest some similarity. The Lichtenstein work is a \ery large studio 
painting. 68"x 56", on canvas. The diagrammatic subject matter is not usually seen in 
a large studio painting: it seems out of place in this huge canvas: so here we have the 
non-literal application from our definition. But there is another non-literal dCIl1L'nt at 
work: the title of the painting is Portrait (~l.\fadame CC::lInne yet its subject matter 
is Loran's diagram of that painting (see illustration 7). So what similarity is thcfl~. as 
my ddinition suggests must exist. between a largl" studio painting of a diagmm of a 
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painting from a book and that original painting? The similarity lies between ErIe 
Loran's diagrammatic attempt to explain the structure of Cezanne's painting and 
Cezanne's own schematised vision of the world generated through his approach to 
painting which embodies a process similar to that used in a diagram: geometrification 
and simplification. In a letter to Emile Bernard, Cezanne says: '"treat nature by the 
cylinder, the sphere, the cone, everything in its proper perspective so that each side 
of an object or plane is directed towards a central point".6 This is the main metaphor 
in Lichtenstein's painting; there are others, and I will mention three without 
discussing them: firstly, the relationship between Cezanne and the subject of his 
painting, his wife; secondly, Cezanne and his acceptance by the artworld: and thirdly, 
how art historians attempt to explain painting and the suitability of the methods they 
adopt. 
Danto applies the results of his discussion on rhetoric, enthymeme and 
metaphor to this earlier example. It will be recalled, Danto pointed out that in the 
case of Napoleon as a Roman emperor - the case of metaphoric transformation - the 
subject, Napoleon, was recognisable throughout the process. In fact. he had to be 
recognisable throughout for the metaphor to work. Danto believes a similar 
metaphoric transformation is at play in the case of Lichtenstein's painting of the 
Loran diagram. The original painting, Cezanne's Portrait of Madame Cezanne, is 
recognisable throughout. Lichtenstein's canvas is saying something about Cezanne's 
paint ing: it is a comment on how Cezanne has geometicised his images to produce a 
schematised figure and how this relates to the diagrammatic format used hy Loran. 
As with the Napoleon example, the viewer must know both the diagram and 
Cezanne's paintings to appreciate the metaphor which is central to Lichtenstein's 
painting. Danto concludes by pulling togcther the results of his consideration of hoth 
examples and proposes that it is tran.~figurati\'() representation which is involved 
hcrc. I t is not rcprl'sentation as such: it is this transtigurat ivc representation \\ hich. 
b-rhl' Idter is from Aix-en-I>ro\~nce dated 15th April 1904, see CC/anne. 200·-L p.I~:-: 
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he believes, distinguishes representation in art. Danto explains the transfigurative 
process in the Lichtenstein painting: "it is a transfiguration of the portrait 
rCezanne's] , in which the portrait - like Napoleon - retains its identity through a 
substitution which is meant to illuminate it under novel attributes: to see that portrait 
as a diagram is to see that artist as seeing the world as a schernatized structure" 
(1981, p.172). The transfiguration happens consciously in the two examples which 
he has discussed, but he believes that it takes place unconsciously or naively in other 
artworks. He concludes that 'io understand the artwork is to grasp the metaphor 
that is, I think, always there" (1981, p.172). 
In the following passage, which Danto admits is very speculative. he looks 
at the impact of this metaphoric transfiguration on the viewer, and he chooses 
specifically to address the impact of masterpieces on the individual. He distinguishes 
masterpieces from two other classes of art. Firstly, that which is merely beautiful and 
secondly, and interestingly, from the minimalist art which he has tended to use for his 
examples. The implication being that the minimalist art, although it is art. is not of 
the first rank. He believes that in the case of masterpieces. the greatest metaphors in 
art are those in which the viewer identifies herself with the subject. and he gives 
Anna Karenina or Elizabeth Bennett [sic] as examples from literature where the 
reader is drawn into the world of the character: to some extent living the life of the 
character in a make-believe world. The power of the metaphor here, he believes. is 
that '"the artwork becomes a metaphor for life and life is transfigured" (1981, p.l 72). 
He is. of course, referring to the reader's life~ to see one's own life through the 
metaphor of Anna's life is to be changed by the experience. Danto suggests that this, 
not unfamiliar. experience in art of enabling llS to enter into another world is a result 
of this metaphoric transfiguration~ the reader is the subject and is transfigured hy the 
experIence. 
But do the situations Danto describes reall) emhody metaphoric 
transt(xmation'? It is tdlill~ that the l'xanlplcs he givcs arc from literature: from 
novl'ls to he precise. In novels we do. In man\' cases. tend to associate oursehe" 
with the protagonists; we are drawn into sharing their experiences and expectations. 
but, f suggest, this is a case of empathy and escapism. The transformation is 
empathetic rather than metaphoric. Danto believes this feeling is a mark of great art. 
but we can have this feeling very strongly with trivial art, for example with Mills and 
Boon novels (so I am told) and with adventure stories. Danto sees this situation as 
"the enactment of a metaphoric transformation with oneself as subject" (1981. 
p.173). I can accept the empathetic aspect and that this type of literature can and 
does transform lives, but I question whether metaphor is involved in this aspect of 
the art. Danto is conflating the empathetic response to a novel with metaphor which 
of course they may well contain. The story of Anna Karenina. which he uses as an 
example, is part of a metaphor, which runs through the novel, of the problems facing 
Russian society at a particular time. However. our identification with Anna is not 
metaphoric transformation, although I accept it could transform our life. Danto ends 
this speculative passage suggesting that "we must descend from the heights on which 
it is difficult not to sound portentous" (1981, p. 1 73) and concludes his examination 
of the rhetorical nature of art by discussing four features. 
The first feature is that, if we accept Danto' s view that the structure 0 f 
artworks shares certain features with metaphor, it will be impossible to paraphrase 
an artwork or explain it fully in other terms. The reason is clear: if artworks require 
participation - to identifY the metaphor and resolve the enthymematic gap - there is 
an input required by the individual viewer which can never be fully determined by 
another person. This input is provided from outside the artwork and theretore cannot 
be entirely predicted or described. In other words, the interpretation of an artwork 
depends on the person involved in the interpretation and what they bring to the 
interpretation~ we can never know in advance what they will contribute to the 
experience. There is a second reason why a description of a metaphor is dcticient: to 
describe a metaphor: the attempt to paraphrase it is inevitably to lose some of its 
power; the impact of the original metaphor must be jell. This second reason. Danto 
relieves. explains why criticism can never replace art. It may be possihle to crit ically 
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unravel in minute detail many aspects of a metaphor, but this will neYer replace 
feeling the original. However, Danto does accept the importance of criticism: it is to 
ensure that the background information necessary to understand the metaphor 
retains its cultural currency. Put another way, one function of criticism is to ensure 
the metaphoric allusions required to interpret a work of art are capable of being 
understood by the community. It is not so much the danger of the metaphor 
becoming a cliche, rather that a metaphor may die: the information necessary to 
interpret it may cease to be generally available. Danto says that metaphors "go dead 
in a way that sometimes requires scholarly resurrection. And it is the value of such 
disciplines as the history of art and literature to make such works approachable 
again" (1981, p.174). 
The second feature which Danto raises follows on from his view of the 
uniqueness of individual works of art. It is raised to forestall a possible argument: an 
argument proposing that we consider art having some unique feature in a similar way 
to a primitive quality. He suggests that, given the uniqueness of works of art, a view 
could be taken that they are irreducible in the way that certain empiricist theories 
view primitive qualities such as colours. Danto's account is confusing here~ the 
traditional empiricist view, say in Locke, would regard colour as a secondary quality: 
the primary qualities would be solidity. shape, extension. motion, rest and number. 
Ilowever. he suggests that if, as his own account of the empiricist view proposes, 
works of art are themse/res such basic objects in the world, the unique nature of art 
would be explained. Danto rejects this theory. He argues that works of art are 
distinguished by internal relations which involve a cognitive process of 
interpretation: we encounter and interact with \vorks of art in a two-way process. 
The process we havc seen demonstrated in the case of metaphor. It is this which 
distinguishes them from the primitiYc qualitics of the empiricists. Danto belicves 
thcre is a cognitivc clement involvcd in the interpretation of artworks which is absent 
in the case of basic qualities likc 'rcd'. lie suggests that those who adyisc us to Innk 
to 'the work itsclf', and hcre we hcliC\c he is referring to acsthetic formalists, arc in 
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danger of accepting a form of this reductive view. He suggests that they tend to treat 
art as a primitive quality - treating art as 'significant form' would be an example _ 
and disregard the complexity of the cognitive response which his theory has 
advanced. 
The third feature which Danto raISeS IS that his theory of art is 
contextualist. To interpret a work of art requires, as I have explained, a degree of 
historical knowledge to enable the metaphor to be understood or the enthymematic 
gap to be completed. So an ahistorical theory of art cannot be defended. This leads 
to another characteristic of art: that it is intentional. Art's rhetorical and 
enthymematic nature involves the intention of the artist being an essential featurc. 
Danto believes that the rhetorical process is intentional: that rhetoric requires an 
advocate and a respondent and that the advocacy has a purpose; he belic\'L~s this is an 
"analytic truth" (198 L p.175). If we accept that rhetoric is a feature of art then it 
follows that art must be intentional. We have the artist and the interpreter 
corresponding to the advocate and respondent. and it follows that there is an 
intention behind the artist's creation. The intention may be misunderstood, it may. in 
later circumstances, be incapable of being fully or correctly interpreted. but a 
relationship between the artist and the viewer underlies any attempt at interpretation. 
Danto also makes the point that the intention need not be conscious: the rhetorical 
and metaphorical structure of art could still be in operation in circumstances where 
the artist was unaware of their import. 
I move on to the fourth and final feature which Danto discusscs: he 
believes the structure of rhetoric and metaphor in art is linked with other 
representational features. rather than with content. He refers back to his discussion 
earlier in the book: his original objection. it will be recalled, was that what he tak~s 
as distinguishing art from non-art may be just another form of content. lie hclieves 
his establishment of rhetoric and metaphor as essential features of art has prov~d that 
content cannot be resronsihle for the dist indion he is seck ing. His examples havc 
shown that content cannot by itself provide a way of interpreting a metaphor: l)thcr 
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elements of representation are needed. Underlying the process of interpreting 
metaphors, and hence art, are two key features. Firstly, the intentional nature of art: 
art is characterised by the intention of the artist, and it is this which brings rhetoric 
into art. Secondly, the contextual nature of art: interpretation takes place within a 
historical context. These two features go a long way towards explaining why works 
having the same content, the three versions of Napoleon in Roman clothes for 
example, could be different works of art. Summing up the discussion so far, Danto 
has identified and explained the importance of metaphor in art: it is a trope in which 
rhetoric, intention and context work together. He moves on to look at some of the 
logical features of metaphor. I now begin the second subject in my exposition of the 
final chapter in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. 
IVb. Metaphor 
The discussion begins with three topics; I examine them in turn. The first discusses 
metaphor and cliches, the second, deviant metaphors and the third, metaphors as 
intensional structures. To avoid any confusion, I perhaps need to point out that 
Danto believes that art is both intentional and intensional.7 The question of 
intentionality was considered in the discussion in the previous section: it is concerned 
with the intention of the artist. Intensionality, Danto believes, as I shall explain 
shortly, is a feature of the logical structure of metaphors. The latter point is crucial in 
this present argument: from his consideration of the intensional structure of 
metaphor Danto outlines a theory linking intensionality to how representations depict 
their subject matter: what he calls style. The first two topics, cliches and deviant 
metaphors are used. as I shall explain, to introduce the final topic of intensionality. 
'Interestingly Margolis also believes that interpretive discourse is both intentional and intensional. 
He introduces the term 'Intentional' (distinguished by its capital) which incorporates both and is a 
feature of his culturally emergent entities such as artworks. See Margolis. 1995b. pp.I3-4. 
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He concludes his examination of metaphor by looking in detail at intensionality: he 
then examines four contexts which explain how his theory operates. 
I begin with a general comment: Danto explains that metaphors can be 
both visual and linguistic, and, therefore, a theory of metaphor must take account of 
both areas. Music is not mentioned at this stage but it is introduced later in his 
discussion of expression - which itself involves metaphor. He points out that there 
are theories of metaphor which relate purely to the grammatical features of sentences 
but that these are unlikely to be able to accommodate visual metaphors: we simply 
do not have a grammar of images. These theories, although use~ cannot be used to 
explain visual as well as linguistic metaphors. There must be some other essential 
feature of metaphor which characterises both the linguistic and the visual forms. He 
makes it clear that he does not aim to address this difference in detail in the present 
book but that he has covered the issue elsewhere.8 He mentions the issue in passing 
to guard against a narrow view of metaphor which deals with one area only. 
The first of the three topics examines the relationship between metaphor 
and cliches. Danto accepts that everyday language is full of cliches and that cliches 
are stale metaphors. But, the original metaphor behind a cliche entered language at 
some time as a vibrant new figure of speech, and it was its novelty and power which 
led to its success and to its over-use. To appreciate cliche, he believes, requires a 
cultural competence rather than just linguistic ability; it is this competence which 
distinguishes the over-used metaphor or cliche from the literal meaning of the words 
it employs. Danto uses the examples of "the water was boiling" and "his blood was 
boiling" (1981, p.177). The first could be literally true; the second cannot be: the 
subject would be dead long before the boiling point of blood. The first can be 
8In his books prior to The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. this subject is addressed in What 
Philosophy Is. Danto.1968c. pp.23-S. There is also a section on metaphor in Niet:sche as 
PhilO$opher. Danto. I96Sb. pp.38-47. His most recent discussion is in his essay 'Metaphor and 
Cognition'. see Danto. 1992. pp. n-87. 
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paraphrased perfectly well as 'the water is now at 212 degrees Fahrenheit"" the 
second cannot. For Danto it is this last feature of metaphors, the fact that we cannot 
paraphrase or substitute for them or within the~ which is crucial; he says: "it is the 
mark of metaphors in general to resist such substitutions and precisifications, the 
explanation of which must, I think, give us the key to this concept" (1981. p.177). 
This leads into Danto's explanation of metaphors as intensional structures in the next 
point but one. He finishes his discussion of cliches by making the comment that there 
are of course visual cliches as well as linguistic ones; he gives the example of the 
comic book depiction ofa knock to the head, 'seeing stars', as an illustration. 
The second topic concerns metaphor and deviance. Danto acknowledges 
the strength of the theory that metaphors are deviant utterances: the theory is an 
attempt to distinguish literal utterances from metaphors in a structural way. He 
believes the theory is correct in approaching the problem by examining sentences 
rather than words: this brings in the element of the context in which metaphors are 
created. But he believes the theory suffers from a major drawback: it provides no 
foolproof method of determining when deviance is occurring or how it is to be 
identified. In other words, in many situations this form of structural analysis seems 
incapable of picking up the author's intention. He explains \\ith an example: we arc 
asked to consider two hypothetical paintings of Napoleon dressed as Madame 
Rccamier. The first is metaphorical: it is perhaps intended to show that Recamier's 
salon was more powerful and enduring than Napoleon's Empire. The second, 
however unlikely, is a picture of Napoleon dressed in woman"s clothes because he 
was a transvestite: this painting of course would be quite literal. Both paintings are 
identical. Danto highlights the ditlerence: "one is a metaphor. the other not. One. if 
metaphor bc deviant. is a de\iant portrait: the other a portrait. nondeyiant in itsclf. of 
deviancy (pcrversion) ... The metaphorical truth of the one is consistent with the 
nonmetaphorical truth of the other" (1981. p.178). In this exampk we have two 
indiscernible paintings. one IS metaphorical and deviant. thL' other IS 
non-metaphorical. although its sll~iect IS deviancy. Danto argues that. as the 
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paintings are indiscernible, we cannot tell whether we are faced with metaphorical 
deviancy or literal deviancy. Therefore a deviant utterance cannot always be used to 
distinguish metaphor because there is always the possibility we are looking at a 
litera4 non-metaphoric deviant utterance. Danto suggests that his next topic, 
examining metaphors as intensional structures, will provide a means of identi~ing 
metaphors by highlighting their logical structure, and he emphasises that this would 
apply to all metaphors, visual as well as linguistic. 
I now move on to the third and final topic and examine metaphor as an 
intensional structure. A standard definition of an intensional entity is that it violates 
the principle of extensionality: the principle that equivalence implies identity. It: say. 
a context is intensional, its extension may change if an expression contained in the 
context is replaced by a coextensive expression. With many sentences this is not the 
case; their truth or falsity depends on the truth conditions of the things being 
discussed: the sentences are extensional. Intensional contexts are different: their 
truth value depends on how the things are discussed. I shall explain this by looking at 
some examples which illustrate this difference shortly. By this definition, I shall 
explain that intensional entities will include such things as concepts. conditions, 
attributes, and relations. I will return shortly to consider the issue of how the way a 
thing is discussed relates to intensionality in works of art. The question of 
replacement is a crucial feature of the definition of intensionality: intensional entities 
cannot allow replacement of terms with coextensive terms. Danto believes that a 
feature of metaphors is that their expressions cannot be substituted: they are 
therefore intensional in structure. He uses an example from Shakespeare: "But. soft! 
what light through yonder window breaks? / It is the east. and Juliet is the sun." 
(Romeo and '/uliet. Il.ii.2-3). Clearly a substitution here of. say. a scientitic 
description of the sun would destroy the metaphor. Such a description would be 
quite correct when applied to the sun but meaningless when applied to Juliet. Dantu 
also hdieves that this example shows that amhiguity is not a key teat un: in metaphor: 
an amhiguolls kml would gin~ two or more readings. Romen' s metaphor is quite 
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clear and unambiguous: where intensionality is involved there can be no substitution; 
in which case ambiguity is precluded. Danto does accept that an argument could be 
put forward, in some cases, for an element of ambiguity in metaphor: his previous 
example of 'his blood boiled' for instance; it is unclear whether this is a metaphor or 
a sentence using an ambiguous predicate. However, without further discussion 
Danto moves on to the next stage in his argument: ''I shall proceed by assuming that 
metaphorical contexts are in fact intensional ... and that the first philosophical step to 
be taken in understanding metaphorical construction is to find out why" (1981. 
p.179). 
Danto's next step is to examine a number of contexts to clarify the 
nature of intensionality and its opposite extensionality. He begins with a discussion 
of belief contexts: statements where someone is said to believe something. As an 
example, I could consider someone who believes that Sydney is the capital of 
Australia.9 This is not an unwarranted belief: Sydney is the largest city in the country 
and has many of the features you would expect to find in a capital. I know that 
Canberra is in fact the capital of Australia. But, in my example, the person concerned 
will most certainly not believe that Sydney is Canberra So, I cannot substitute 
Canberra for the capital of Australia in this sentence which ascribes a belief: belief 
statements are non-extensional or intensional in nature. As I have already mentioned, 
statements involving attributions of the mind, usually termed propositional attitudes, 
are intensional: for example those statements involving feelings of desire, doubt, 
certainty, fear or hope. Danto however warns against believing that this mental 
reference is the mark of intensionality. He gives other cases of intensional statements 
where the mental attribution is not so marked: modal contexts and quotational 
contexts are two examples. 
Danto • s aim is to find a general theory of intensionality: some special 
feature of intensional contexts which is true in every instance and which only applies 
'oanto uses 8 similar example in 'Metaphor and Cognition'. see Danto. 1992. p.80. 
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to such contexts. Until such a general theory is available Danto warns against any 
theory which deals with one particular type of intensional context: such a theory 
must, he believes, be viewed as ad hoc. He considers one such ad hoc theory of this 
type which was developed to accommodate modal and other similar contexts: it 
makes use of possible worlds. The theory, he believes, does indeed explain modal 
contexts very well, but he doubts whether it is able to accommodate attributive 
contexts. Modal contexts are those in which a claim is made about a possibility or 
necessity; attributive contexts are those where someone is said to believe something: 
for instance my example of someone who was said to believe that Sydney is the 
capital of Australia: 1 attribute a belief to them. He concludes, although he gives no 
reasons, that "I find it hard to see how a possible-world structure will convincingly 
resolve contexts of direct discourse, cases in which it is true that m said 'a is F' and 
false that he said 'b is F,' for all that a is identical with b" (1981, p.18l). Danto is 
stating here, without any elaboration, the standard view from the study of intensional 
logic: that possible-world structures are inapplicable to attributive contexts. He now 
puts forward his own theory which looks at the process of how we understand 
metaphor; he believes this theory can be generalised to cover all the contexts he has 
discussed. The theory he proposes is this: 
The explanation of the logical peculiarity of intensional contexts is that 
the words these sentences make use of do not refer to what they 
ordinarily refer to in routine nonintensional discourse. They refer. 
rather, to the form in which the things ordinarily referred to by those 
words are represented: they include among their truth conditions some 
reference to a representation. (1981, p.181) 
It is the reference to a representation which is the key point here; an example will 
help to explain Danto's position. When 1 say that x believes that Wagner is a great 
composer, it is not the same as saying that x believes that the person who wrote the 
opera Parsifal is a great composer. The difference lies in the fact that I - it is the I 
which is crucial - am attributing beliefs to x. I are not talking about Wagner or 
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Parsifal in these statements; I am explaining, albeit in a partial way, how x 
represents her interpretation of Wagner to others. The statement '\\'agner is a great 
composer" is extensional; I can substitute a coextensive tenn for \\' agner. such as 
"the composer of Parsifal', and the truth of the statement is unchanged. The 
statement 'x believes Wagner is a great composer' is intensional: I cannot substitute 
'the composer of Pan'~ral' because I have no knowledge of whether x knows that 
the composer of Parsifal was indeed Wagner; the fonn of the words is important. 
My assertions are about components of a representation - of how x sees the world -
and they are, therefore, in this context not about the meaning of the words contained 
in the statement in isolation, or in some other context. I have already explained that a 
statement of x's belief could be literally false: x, because of her particular 
circumstances, could believe that Parsifal was composed by Verdi. My assertions 
are about components of a representation - of how x sees the world - and they are. 
therefore, in this context not about the meaning of the words contained in the 
statement taken in isolation or in a different situation. Danto concludes that: "since 
intensional contexts are about something quite different from what expressions using 
the words they use would be about, it is small wonder that substitution and 
quantification seem blocked. They are so only because they have no business being 
used with reference to the same things they would be used with reference to in 
nonintensional contexts" (198 L pp.181-2). 
To see how his theory can be used to explain metaphor. as a preparatory 
step. Danto looks at four examples of different contexts where intensionality is 
evident: quotations, modalities. psychological ascriptions and texts. He begins with 
quotations. believing that they offer the most clear example of a situation in which 
words cannot be substituted with synOI1)1TIS. The quotation must replicate e,actly 
what was said: this is trivially true. but. as I shall explain. the semantics or quotation 
can become much more complicated. I follow Danto here and begin my discussion 
with quotations. and I choose this context out of the tlmr examples mentioneJ to 
discuss in some detail. ~ tv choice is based on Danto' s vicw that '1he parallels 
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between them [quotational contexts] and other intensional contexts are much closer 
than one might have believed. In brief: I mean quotational contexts to stand as my 
model for the others I want to discuss" (Danto, 1981. p.184). 
Danto chooses a subject which he admits may be o\·erly complicated: he 
chooses to discuss allusive quotations, and from a number of examples I will 
concentrate on one which he chooses from a novel by Anthony Trollope. Danto uses 
an allusive quotation which he says is used by Mr. Daubeny in Phineas Finn: where 
Mr Daubeny cites Virgil in Latin. lO In fact in the passage it is Mr. Gresham who 
makes full use of the quotation, although Mr. Daubeny replies to him with a 
truncated version - I will refer to Mr. Gresham from now on. To understand the 
example, some of the background to this chapter of the novel is required. \Ve are in 
Parliament (Trollope was writing around 1874) and the Queen's speech of the 
Liberal government has just been read. The subject of the disestablishment of the 
Church is in the air and the speech mentions that the subject will have to be 
considered. Mr Gresham, the leader of the Conservatives. uses this as an opportunity 
to argue for disestablishment: his, until then. private and passionate belief. As a 
Conservative, he is an unlikely advocate for such a momentous change~ he has the 
difficult problem of convincing his dissenting fellow conservatives to follow him. not 
to mention his opponents. the Liberals. This is where Mr Gresham uses the quotation 
from Virgil: '"turning to the Dissenters who usually supported him, and pointing over 
the table to his opponents, he uttered that well-worn quotation, Quod minime 
reris,- then he paused, and began again; Quod minime reris,- GraW pandetur ah 
urhe" (strange as it may seem, will start from a Greek city). I I 
IODanto, 1981, pp. 1 8~-4. He quotL"S the wrong book: it is in fact Phineas Redu.r. "cC: Trollope. 
1973. chapter 8. 'The Address'. 
Ilrrollopc. 1<)71. p.83. The l.atin quotation is from Virgil. 199\. Book VI V\\. Larlier t:ditions 
misquote Virgil: "Quo nimium ran" ( I 95~) instead of "QlIod minmlt' ra,," (ll)"'''n' 
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The complexity of the allusion is apparent: the speaker is flattering the 
audience in their ability to understand the relevance of the partial quotation to the 
subject being discussed. The quotation relies on the completion of the ellipsis by \ If 
Gresham's audience; it relies on their ability to know the location of the quotation in 
the story of The Aeneid. The audience must know that it is spoken by the Sybil and 
that the quotation's full meaning relies on the knowledge of the previous line as well 
as the line quoted: "your road to safety, strange as it may seem, will start from a 
Greek city" (Book V/.97-8 1991, p.135). It also relies on a knowledge of the plot of 
The Aeneid to see the relevance of the quotation to the position Mr Gresham finds 
himself in: in its relation to the question of disestablishment it suggests that the way 
forward for disestablishment in Parliament has a paralIc I with the Sybil's lines. The 
task will begin in what is usually regarded as the enemy camp: in this case with Mr 
Gresham, the opposition leader. Danto believes that "such [allusi\'e I quotations have 
always a metaphoric pragmatics in excess of any metaphor the quotation itself may 
have if it is already a metaphor~ and commonly the quotation is made to establish a 
recognised parallel between the situation it is applied to currently and the situation 
intended by the source of the expression quoted" (1981. p.182). 
The flattery in Mr Gresham's use of the quotation is rhetorical: it is an 
allusive device used to form a bond between the speaker and his usual opponents. 
the Liberals and, as well. his. perhaps bemused and startled, fellow Conservatives. 
The rhetorical device relies on a shared educational background and literary 
knowledge between quoter and audience which implies a joint sense of community, 
ambition and purpose. Such allusive quotations in literature operate at a number of 
metaphoric levels, or. in the words of Danto's theory, they provide a number of 
tiered representations. They are complex assertions about components of a 
representation: in this example about how Trollope represents the \\orld of Vich)rian 
politics to us, the readers. in his novel. Firstly. there may ~ a metaphor in the 
quotation itself: in this case a mixture of metaphor and. at least t()f '\L'neas. reality. 
ror Aeneas the road is a metaphor for the coming journey. but parts of his jOllrne: 
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may well be made by road. Secondly, there is the recognition of the literan 
metaphor within the dialogue: the recognition of the parallels in the quotation h: the 
characters in the novel. Thirdly, the metaphorical dialogue between writer and 
reader: the reader is expected to understand the tacticaL rhetorical use of the 
metaphor as a component of the novel's development. We can see how these levels 
operate separately. For instance, the last element has a strong contextual or historical 
component. Writing in 1874, Trollope could rely on his educated readership having a 
knowledge of Latin and Virgil. The situation is different today; no popular novelist. 
as Trollope was, could rely on this knowledge today: this third level of metaphor has 
changed into a matter of scholarship rather than common knowledge. It has taken on 
a historical component: we are now reading a Victorian novel. Danto sums up the 
situation: 
Whatever the case, Mr Daubeny, [Mr Gresham] in quoting Virgil, is 
making a very complex cla~ some of the truth conditions of which 
are satisfied by Virgil's words themselves, some of which are satisfied 
by whatever will have satisfied what Virgil's words will have been 
about. and some of which must be satisfied by that. whatever it is, 
which the sentence into which Q [the quotation] is taken arc about -
and then there are truth conditions having to do with the relationship 
between the last two sets of truth conditions. The complexity is due to 
the various levels upon which Mr Daubeny's [Mr Gresham's] 
utterance must be taken. His words refer to some words, to what 
those words were meant to refer to. to what he means for them to 
reter to, and so on. So his allusive quotation. as must any. plays a vcry 
complex role in the discourse it facilitates. (1981. pp.183-.+) 
Following the discussion of this specific allusive quotation. Danto returns 
to the more general issues of quotations and intensionality. lie makes the point that 
it is the characteristics of specific words which makes thl' quotation intensional: 
outside the quotational context the samc \\ords could he suhstitutcd hy l)thers with 
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no fundamental change to the meaning. But, Danto also believes that the allusive 
quotation, Mr Gresham's words in his example, are not totally intensional: there is a 
primary level of meaning, which we have identified above, which is the non-
intensional meaning of the words quoted. The words of the quotation, as I have 
shown, exist in a tiered hierarchy of representation which is a feature of the allusive 
quotation: it is this complexity which Danto has unpacked in his discussion. 
Danto goes on to discuss the three other contexts: modalities, 
psychological ascriptions and texts. In each he points out the intensional nature of 
the contexts, and that, as with quotations, there is always a reference to a 
representation. This he sees as the crucial point: "the explanation of their 
intensionality follows if what accounts for intensionality is finally reference to 
representation" (1981, p.187). He then goes on to summarise his view of metaphor 
and art. He makes the point that metaphors are not about the meaning of the words 
in their non-metaphoric usage - in many cases they are literally untrue - they are 
about the way the words are presented and are dependent on the historical context in 
which they are used. The interpretation of the contextual nature of metaphor is 
dependent on the understanding of the audience and will change over time: what 
Danto calls ''the cultural framework of the times" (1981, p.189). This explains why 
metaphors can die or can become cliches through over-use. I now come to the key 
feature of metaphors: Danto believes that they embody some of the structural 
features of art which he has identified earlier in his discussion about intensionality: 
''they do not merely represent subjects, but properties of the mode of representation 
itself must be a constituent in understanding them" (1981, p.189). The discussion of 
metaphor has striking similarities with Danto's discussion of the contextual nature of 
art; he illustrates this by referring to an example he has used before. Looking back to 
the discussion on the Loran diagram of Cezanne's Portrait of Madame Cezanne and 
the Lichtenstein painting of the diagram we can appreciate the parallels. 
Lichtenstein's canvas is concerned with issues absent in the Loran diagram in the 
same way that Shakespeare's metaphor about Juliet is about much more than the 
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small star at the centre of our solar system. In the previous discussion I have 
identified how Lichtenstein's painting also operates at a number of levels in a similar 
way to Trollope's metaphoric use of Virgil's quotation; the parallels are striking. 
Danto concludes his discussion of metaphor: 'it is after all, a 
commonplace that every metaphor is a little poem By dint of the features we have 
identified, metaphors are minor works of art" (1981, p.189). So, the key issue that 
Danto identifies from his discussion is that metaphors share some of the features of 
works of art, particularly rhetorical ellipsis and intensional structure. This must mean 
either that all metaphors are art or that rhetorical ellipsis and intensionality are not 
confined to art. The implications of the second, relatively weak. claim - that 
rhetorical ellipsis and intensionality are not confined to art - I will leave for the 
present and return to it in the conclusion. The first claim - that all metaphors are art 
- requires further comment here: from Danto' s quotation above I assume he is 
inclined to this view. The claim initially seems to provide a promising approach to a 
definition of art: if art and metaphor share the common features of intensionality and 
rhetorical ellipsis, perhaps we have identified a necessary condition of art. There is, 
however, a major problem with this claim: the problem of how we delimit metaphor. 
Theories of metaphor can be divided into two types. Firstly, those 
which propose that there is a literal aspect to language and that metaphor is a 
secondary attribute: a specific use of language. Secondly, those which believe that 
the basis of all language is metaphorical and that any literal reading is precluded. 
Paul Ricoeur sums up this second approach: "that discourse on metaphor is itself 
infected by the universal metaphoricity of philosophical discourse. In this regard, one 
can speak ofa paradox of the auto-implication of metaphor" (2003, p.338). In other 
words we can have no non-circular account of metaphor because the language of 
that account would be metaphoric. I side with the latter view: I believe that 
metaphor is a widespread and inescapable f~ture of most, if not all. language: that 
metaphor permeates language far beyond the obvious textbook examples; for 
instance. the one I used previously 'he was a lion in battle'. Without entering into a 
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lengthy discussion on the ubiquity of metaphor in language. I give some examples to 
support my view: in the previous sentence the words 'widespread' and . beyond' can 
be considered spatial metaphors, the word 'permeates' is biological and 'inescapable' 
is social. Ricoeur points to the spatial metaphor in the word 'metaphor" itself. 
Danto's idea of the transfiguration of the commonplace can be viewed as a metaphor 
operating on two levels: firstly, the metaphoric basis of the word 'transfiguration' 
itself and secondly, the metaphoric transfer involved in the artistic process of pop art 
elevating the status of items from popular culture. I leave the issue without further 
discussion 12 aware that I have rather sketchily put forward my view that metaphor is 
a widespread and underlying feature of language. Given this position. it is e\ ident 
that a proposed definition of art based on the common features of art and metaphor. 
would now include all language as well as art and is far too inclusive to serve any 
useful purpose. If we cannot delimit metaphor. a definition of art relying on 
metaphor suffers the same problem of delimitation. I now move on to examine the 
second part of Danto's final chapter of The Transfiguration of the ('ommonplace: 
the role of expression in art. 
IV c. Expression 
Danto's initial view of expression in art is heavily indebted to Nelson Goodman' s 
treatment of the subject in Languages of Art (1976, Part II.8, pp.85-95) although. as 
I shall explain, he does point out some difficulties with Goodman's approach. Danto 
initially suggests that expression in art may provide a link, lying midway. as he 
12Some philosophers have gone further and proposed that metaphor lies behind all philosophy. 
Nietzsche in his 1873 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sensc' (see Nietzsche. 2000) and 
Dcrrida in his 1978. 'The Retrait of Metaphor' and his 1982 'White M~thology: Metaphor in th~ 
I"~:\t of Philosophy'. rhe title of thc lattl.'r alludes to the importan(c Dcrrida places on dead 
metaphor which he ~:lil'\cS brings into play the hasic oppositions which charJcterisc metaph~"ic, 
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believes, between rhetoric and style. I will return to this point when I discuss stylt? 
His starting point is a discussion of Goodman's view of expression as metaphoric 
exemplification. As Danto has treated metaphor at some length, he begins his 
discussion with the concept of exemplification which he regards as one of the most 
straightforward cases of representatio~ but, as I shall expla~ it turns out to be quite 
complex. Goodman explains exemplification in Languages of Art by referring to the 
small pieces of cloth used by tailors as samples: they exemplify, in one way. by 
possessing certain properties of the material: for instance texture. colour and quality; 
other properties are exemplified in another way: by reference. For example. I would 
be shocked if my garment was made up of Scm squares of the material: the swatch 
exemplifies the final garment within a certain commonly understood frame of 
reference. The swatches are samples which act as symbols of the finished garment 
within a well-defined and commonly-understood context. Goodman says: ''to ha\t? 
without symbolizing is merely to possess, while to symbolize without having is to 
refer in some way other than by exemplifying. The swatch exemplifies only those 
properties that it both has and refers to." (1976, p.S3). I shall now consider this 
distinction in relation to expression. Expression, Goodman believes, is a form of 
metaphoric exemplification, and this is a common, but not exclusive feature of art. 
Works of art express the properties they metaphorically exemplif}'. The crucial 
aspect here is that of metaphoric transfer: Goodman believes that metaphor takes the 
su~ject which is being referred to in the metaphor into a differt?nt realm. New 
distinctions and qualities arise that could never emerge from purely literal predicaks. 
In this way, for example, Donatello's David, a statue of a young man, expresses 
sensuality and homoeroticism which has little to do with its biblical subject matter. 
Danto uses an example from Goodman to highlight the problem of 
expression: he asks how music is able to express sadness. How do sounds mana~e to 
convey a keling of sadness'? I:ollowing Goodman, he rejects theories of a causal 
nature: those suggest ing that the sadness is an expression of the compo~er' ~ sadness 
or that it engenders sadness in those \\ ho hear it. I Ie pl-)ints out that the composer 
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may not have been sad whilst writing her sad music and that any piece of music may 
make us feel sad because it reminds us of a sad event having nothing to do \\ ith the 
music in question. Goodman's solution is to invoke metaphor and to use it to explain 
expression. In his introduction to Languages of Art, Goodman points out that the 
'languages' of his title should strictly be called 'symbol systems' (1976. pp.xi-xii.): 
the symbols develop in a context, ancL of course, they must be understood in a 
context. This understanding requires a syntax: a set of rules required for 
understanding and analysis to be possible. I have mentioned that Goodman belieyes 
that metaphor requires the transfer of predicates: the transfer of coextensive tenns or 
'labels' as Goodman refers to them. These labels belong to a family. a schema or 
extended re~ which operates within the syntactical and cultural context. The 
metaphoric tenn does not apply literally but it must apply within a syntactical 
context: thus sad music is sad within a particular cultural framework which can 
change and develop over time. Goodman sums up his approach to expression: "what 
is expressed is metaphorically exemplified. What expresses sadness is metaphorically 
sad. And what is metaphorically sad is actually but not literally sad. i.e .. comes under 
a transferred application of some label coextensive with 'sad' .. (1976, p.85). It can 
now be seen how close Goodman's and Danto's theories of metaphor are: both 
propose an element of transfer; as will be recalled from the discussion of Danto's 
idea of 'metaphoric transformation' earlier in this section, and both are context 
dependent. 
Danto and Goodman discuss the problem of artistic predicates. They 
both accept that some predicates can be literally true of works of art: a sculpture. 
being made of marble, may be literally very heayy. but this same sculpture rna: \\dl 
express lightness. Goodman uses this idea to make his famous distinction tx'twccn 
denotation and exemplification. The saIne sculpture. if it happcns to he a portrait. 
\\ ill denote its subject. As I hayc explained earlier with the cxample of Cant.)\a·" 
statue of Napoleon. the sculpture denotes its sUQicct hut also exemplities other 
qualities. grandeur. ostentation and self-importance. {Toodman stresses that art l'an 
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contain both denotation and exemplification; the two are not mutually exclusive. 
Danto goes on to explain his own views on artistic predicates whic~ as I shall 
explain shortly, are similar to Goodman's. He refers back to his previous explanation 
of artistic predicates; his aim is to make it clear that in our discussions about art we 
must go beyond any set of artistic or emotional predicates: relying on a set of 
'artistic' predicates tells us nothing about the essential nature of art. In the previous 
chapter of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, it will be recalled, Danto 
examined artistic predicates in relation to the flower drawings of Andre Racz: he 
explained that emotional predicates could also be used as expressive predicates. In 
that discussion he explained that many of the predicates applying to Racz's drawings 
would not apply to their subject matter: the flowers themselves. Now he adds a note 
of caution: any expressive predicate we could possibly think of could apply, in some 
circumstance, to a particular work of art. Danto is warning against an attempt to 
match expressive predicates with artistic predicates; the links between the two are 
complex. He raises three arguments against an oversimplified view of the 
"assimilation of the expressive to the artistic vocabulary" (1981, p.193). 
Firstly, a drawing may express power and yet not be a powerful drawing 
in any usual artistic sense: it may be a drawing of a powerful animal. Or, it may 
express something badly or incompetently. Artistic predicates, such as those 
identified in the discussion of Racz's work seem ill-suited to these situations: they 
lack the ability to describe these circumstances. Secondly, the language used to 
describe art tends to be evaluative and Danto suggests that this is not the case with 
all expressive predicates. This leads Danto to draw the distinction between the use of 
literal artistic predicates and the metaphoric use of ordinary predicates. He says: 
U someone who praises Beauvais [Cathedral] for its verticality, or uses 'verticality' to 
praise it, is of course not praising it for standing erect. But using verticality as an 
artworld predicate ... leaves open the question of whether Beauvais expresses 
verticality. which may be one with asking whether its artworld verticality carries a 
metaphoric connotation" (1981. p.193). It is at this point that Danto believes that 
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style becomes an issue: we are discussing what a work of art expresses together with 
the means it uses to do so; I will return to this point shortly. 
His third argument against the assimilation of the expressive to the 
artistic vocabulary draws on the previous two. It is that artistic predicates are often 
used as part of the metaphor in art. We saw this in the example of Beauvais: the 
verticality is part of a religious metaphor for striving to rise above the everyday 
world and achieve a union with God; he says: ''the inference from 'metaphorically 
exemplified' to 'not literally exemplified' is no more a warranted one than its parallel 
from 'metaphorically true' to 'literally false' " (1981, p.192). Danto returns to his 
well-used example: the difference between the Loran diagram of cezanne's Portrait 
of Madame Cezanne and Lichtenstein's painting of the diagram. Both use the 
predicate of 'being diagrammatic'; the way in which it is used is, however, 
completely different. The Loran diagram is just that: a diagram; the Lichtenstein 
painting uses the predicate as a metaphor for how we look at paintings. Danto says: 
" 'diagrammatic' is an artistic predicate as applied to Lichtenstein, but a literal one as 
applied to Loran, but the diagrammicity of the former enters into any account of the 
metaphor in which its expression consists" (1981, p.193). It is at this point that the 
difference between Danto's and Goodman's views on expression becomes apparent: 
in the discussion Danto has taken us through Goodman's idea of expression as 
metaphoric exemplification and explored the common ground as weU as the 
differences. Goodman's theory, as the title of his book indicates, concerns 
Languages of Art and it is, as the sub-title states An Approach 10 a Theory of 
Symbols. Art, he believes, must be understood within a syntax through a process 
where expression operates by metaphoric exemplification: a process involving the 
transfer of meaning attached to predicates which operate non-literally or 
metaphorically. Danto's theory. on the other hand. sees works of art expressing -
again he sees the process involving a transfer of attributes - what they are a 
metaphor for by the way in which the representation is carried out. He has taken us 
from Goodman's metaphoric exemplification to his own theory which he restates: 
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that a work of art expresses what it is a metaphor for, and the question of the way 
this is carried out - how it is achieved - raises the question of style~ the third and 
final topic he discusses. 
Before Danto leaves the issue of expression and moves on to discuss 
style, he discusses a number of works of art and explains how his own theory of 
metaphor and expression applies to them. The two that are discussed at length are 
Cezanne's Portrait of Madame Cezanne and Rembrandt's Bathsheba with King 
David's Letter (illustration 15) - referred to by Danto as Portrait of Hendrijlce 
Stoeffels [sic] as Bathsheba. I shall briefly examine the second example. Danto refers 
to Kenneth Clark's well-known comment on Rembrandt's Bathsheba - "one looks 
at the unflinching modelling of her round, solid body, which is seen with such love 
that it becomes beautiful" (1978. p.108) - to make his point. Danto believes that a 
comment like this could only apply to a work of art. Applying his theory to this 
painting, he explains that the painting is an expression, a metaphoric exemplification 
to use Goodman's term, of the love Rembrandt felt for his model and lover. 
Hendrickje Stoffels. The central metaphor of the painting is Rembrandt's use of an 
unexceptional and quite plain woman, whose naked body is showing signs of age, as 
a character in the biblical story of Bathsheba: a woman of such overwhelming beauty 
that it drove King David to commit murder to possess her. Danto believes that 
Kenneth Clark's quotation identifies this central metaphor clearly: the metaphoric 
transfer between Rembrandt's 'unflinching modelling' of Hendrickje and how she 
'becomes beautiful' in the context of his depiction of her in this setting. Danto sums 
up his discussion on metaphor and expression: ''the philosophical point is that the 
concept of expression can be reduced to the concept of metaphor, when the way in 
which something is represented is taken in connection with the subject represented" 
(1981, p.197). In other words, the artist can depict a subject. which mayor may not 
itself be metaphorical, metaphorically by the way the subject is expressed. The 
important point is that the manner of representation must be seen in conjunction with 
the actual subject matter depicted. 
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As I have mentioned, the discussion of the way something is represented leads Danto 
into his treatment of style in the last chapter of The Transfiguration 0/ the 
Commonplace. Style is the last of the three major subject areas under discussion in 
this chapter: 'Metaphor, Expression and Style'. Danto begins with the etymology of 
the word 'style', from the Latin stilus, a sharp instrument for writing by incising. The 
stylus, as well as recording the written message, leaves its own mark: the mark of 
how it was done. This gives Danto his initial definition of style: "we may thus resenc 
the term style for this how, as what remains of a representation when we subtract its 
content" (1981, p.197). In the case of style the artist expresses herself in the way in 
which the subject matter of whatever she is representing is represented: it is 
concerned with the relationship between the artist and her representation. 
Danto uses Plato's Ion as an example to analyse this relationship. 
Socrates uses Ion the Rhapsodist to point out the distinction between art (techne, 
craft or artistry) and inspiration. The rather pompous Io~ it will be recalled. 
complains to Socrates that he can recite Homer wonderfully (he is far from modest) 
but the other poets not so well, and he seeks an explanation. Socrates, v.ith gentle 
irony. leads the none too smart Ion to see that art - remember it is Plato's use of the 
term as lechne - can be learnt, but that inspiration is a divine gift. A gift, after all, 
must be given, otherwise it would not be a gift, and, therefore, according to 
Socrates, cannot be acquired by instruction. Each art, like medicine, warfare and 
sculpture (to usc Plato's examples in Ion). has its own knowledge, but poetry is not 
an art in this sense: it is divine inspiration. Socrates uses the famous metaphor of the 
magnet which forms a chain of power to illustrate the way this inspiration is passed 
fTom the author. through the rhapsodist to thc audience. Art. hy Socrates' detlnit ion. 
can be acquired by learning. and if this is so. anynne could be taught to he an artist: 
artists could be chosen at random to work from manuals. rhis is thc crucial point tor 
Danto: the ditll'rence between Ion' s inspired pcrti)m1'Ulce anJ a pcrti)rmancc by 
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someone who ostensibly does the same thing. but using acquired knowledge. marks 
the difference between style and manner. Style is innate. manner can be acquired. 
although Danto adds an important proviso: "though from the outside there may be 
no particular difference to be observed~~ (1981. p.200): he then addresses this 
seemingly contradictory situation. 
Before I do this, I must point out a problem with Danto's \;ew of 
style; one whic~ as I shall explain, he barely acknowledges: the problem of whether 
style can be perfected. On Danto's (and Plato's) view, if style is innate, it cannot be 
perfected. This seems counter to what we see in the works of many artists whose 
style develops and improves over the course of their careers. Danto accepts that 
there is a need for basic skill in art: "of course there is no art without knowledge. 
without skills, without training ... Only when one can draw or play [a musical 
instrument] do questions of style arise" (1981, p.20I). The problem is that he 
regards the ability to draw or playas a threshold: once it is achieved, art can begin 
and style can come into play. But this is surely an over-simplification. As artists 
improve their skills, their inspiration takes off in new directions~ there is a continual 
interaction between skill and inspiration: the latter feeding off the fonner. Danto's 
account of innate style fails to address this developmental aspect of style. It is silent 
on the subtle relationship between technique and contextual influences (social and 
political) on the one hand and the dc\'c/opmenl of inspiration on the other. 
I return to Danto's explanation of the contradiction between two 
indiscernible works of art, one produced by innate style. the other by acquired 
manner. Danto brings into the discussion his distinction between basic and non-basic 
actions: a distinction which appears in one of his earliest published papers from 
1963. ll Actions. Danto believes. can be divided into two fundamental kinds. 
Non-basic actions take place through the agency of another action: thus a person's 
paralysed arm can he moved hy that same person's other non-paraIYSt:d arm: this is 
USt~ Danto. 1963 and 196";\ 
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non-basic action. The basic action is a person normally moving their arm: there is no 
other agency involved. Danto applies the same distinction to co~nitions: he savs: 
~ -
"basic cognitions and basic actions are defined through the absence of the mediating 
cognition and action" (1981, pp.200-1). Ion's performances of Horner are then seen 
as basic actions, but there is no reason why the same performance could not take 
place non-basically: if the necessary instruction and training had been available. 
Style, Danto believes, is close to the fonner performance: it is unmediated or basic: 
he says that "style is the man himself It is the way he is made, as it were. without the 
benefit of having acquired something else" (1981. p.20 1). The second performance 
would rely on manner rather than style: it has been enabled through the mediation of 
art or knowledge. In other words, manner can be perfected. but style is innate. This 
distinction between basic and non-basic perfonnances, Danto suggests. is cruciaL 
and he devotes the remainder of the chapter to examining why this is so. He poses a 
question: why should style relate to basic actions and manner to non-basic? He 
concludes: "I believe that something of deep human importance resides in the 
answer. but I also suspect that something like the difference between what is art and 
what is not may reside here as well" (198 L p.20 1 ). 
The discussion begins by exploring a possible link between the 
indiscernible pairs which he has examined previously and basic and non-basic 
actions. He suggests that the artwork object in the indiscernible pair may be the 
result of a basic action. and the non-artwork, the result of a non-basic action. He 
gives an example: someone could learn to paint in Rembrandfs style. but the crucial 
question. for Danto. is how the paintings were produced. The painter using 
Remhrandt's style would be using acquired knowledge or art (using Socrates' 
usage): however. the results would not be works of art. Danto would sec a 
difference hcl\vcen \\rarhol's multiples. a set of c\e~ da: articles like soup cans. and 
anyone else producing an indiscernible set: the latter would not he art: it would he 
produced in \\'arhol" s style but without the conceptual context within which \\'arhol 
created his works of art. \\'arhol howe\t~r could ha\ c created as many sets of his 
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work as he chose (still works of art), and Mike Bidlo - the appropriational artist _ 
could produce other works of art, indiscernible from Warhol's, because the context 
in which he works is appropriational: he uses Warhol's work as part of his own style. 
Danto suggests that a similar distinction is apparent in moral 
judgements. He takes Aristotle's famous distinction in The Nicomachean Ethics. 
between someone doing temperate actions and the actions of a temperate man. as an 
example. The distinction for Aristotle is concerned with motive: ''but it is not the 
man who does these [temperate actions] that is just and temperate, but the man who 
also does them as just and temperate men do them" (1105b, 1954, p.35). Carrying 
out actions because you know they are temperate is distinguished from doing 
temperate actions because you are a temperate person: the latter is the case of truly 
moral actions. Danto's point is that there is no definitive list of temperate (or moral) 
actions. Being a temperate person requires being temperate in all situations, 
including those which not been encountered before: it is the ability to be temperate in 
novel situations. Danto has chosen this Aristotelian distinction to point to an 
analogue between artistic style and moral judgements. Yet this passage from Book II 
of The Nicomachean Ethics is an inappropriate choice: Aristotle is at pains to point 
out that there is a difference between art and the virtues in this situation. In a section 
just before the one referred to by Danto, Aristotle says: "the case of the arts and that 
of the virtues are not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in 
themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character. but if the 
acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it 
does not follow that they are done justly or temperately." 14 
Staying with the issue of moral judgements. Danto goes on to briefly 
mention Kant: he believes Kant's moral system is based on this same distinction and 
that it also applies to what Kant identified as the faculty of taste. Taste. Danto 
believes, is not something which involves following a set of rules, although someone 
14 IJOja. 1954, p.34. a similar distinction is made later in J 140a-b. 1954. p.141-3. 
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may achieve a tasteful resuh by following such rules. Oanto believes that following 
rules of taste is similar to producing something by using knoWledge or art in 
Socrates' example; however, there can be no set of rules which will make someone a 
person of taste. The same applies to art, and Danto uses three examples to explain 
the point. Firstly, due to his ability to compose a seemingly endless stream of 
marvellous fugues, Bach was accused of using a fugue-producing machine. Danto 
says that had such a machine existed the resulting fugues would have been "logically 
styleless" (1981, p.203) because they would lack the very attributes which would 
create style in a work of art. Secondly, Oanto returns to one of his examples of 
indiscernibles (number seven in our list in chapter two): a tie painted uniformly blue 
by Picasso: anyone could replicate such a tie but the result would be styleless, or 
rather the copy would be in the style of Picasso. Thirdly, Oanto makes a similar 
point generally; he discusses replicas of artworks; exact replicas to be precise. and, 
again, he believes that such a replica will be logically styleless: ''it will perhaps show 
but not have a style" (1981, p.204). The original and the replica may be 
indiscernible, but it is the non-manifest properties that distinguish the work of art: 
the context of its creation, display and appreciation in the artworld. Oanto returns to 
"the intuition that style is the man" (1981, p.204) and begins by offering a word of 
caution: what he has to say in the final section of the chapter is allusive and 
speculative as it relies on another topic. I follow Oanto in mentioning these 
arguments in the knowledge that they are not fully developed in The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace. I return to discuss their significance and the issue of their 
speculative nature in the conclusion. 
Oanto begins by recapitulating his arguments so far: he makes three 
points. Firstly, that our way of seeing the world is as a system of representations. 
Secondly, that how things are represented is as important as what is represented. and 
thirdly, certain features of intensional structures play an important role in how we 
see and represent the world. He expands the point concerning intensionality. making 
the link between intensionality and sentential states: '" have argued that for such 
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characteristically psychological sentences as 'm believes that s' to be true, m must be 
in a sentential state which the sentence s pictures, and that the belief is true if the 
sentential state pictured by s is true" (1981, p.205). He believes there are two types 
of argument supporting a theory of sentential states which he mentions very briefly; 
in a later paper he does develop the arguments at some length. 15 I refer to them in 
passing: a full discussion is outside the scope of this dissertation. Firstly. from 
psycho linguistics: that for thought, argument and language to occur there must be 
some sentential basis to those activities. In other words, thoughts, to some extent, 
must have the form of sentences. Secondly, from cases in psychoanalysis where it is 
shown that certain chains of association - in some well-known cases of fetishism and 
the interpretation of dreams - rely on punning links: the existence of such links imply 
that an acoustical imagery must be at play in the mental sphere. 16 In his earlier paper 
on this subject Danto explains: "this sort of interchange presupposes properties of 
representations - in this instance associated phonetic values - distinct from their 
meanings, inseparable from their representational properties" (1999b, p.125). In 
other words Danto uses the Saussurian distinction; these substitutions operate at the 
level of sounds: at the level of signifier rather than signified. Danto believes that 
these examples from psychoanalysis, if mapped onto an intensional structure, could 
enable his distinction, between what we represent and how we represent it, to 
operate. 
Danto's theory of representation relies on the distinction between what 
we represent and how we represent it, and the claim that how we represent things is 
style. I believe his sharp distinction between what we represent (content) and how 
lSoanto develops his argument in 'Outline of a Theory of Sentential States'. 1984, re-published in 
Danto. 1999b, pp.82-97. 
l'oanto had already developed this idea and discussed a number of cases in detail in 'Freudian 
Explanations and the Language of the Unconscious'. 1978, re-published in Danto. 1999b. 
pp.122-46. 
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we represent it (style) is inconsistent with his earlier discussion of metaphor and 
expression. Recalling the earlier example of Rembrandt's Bathsheba with King 
David's Letter; there Danto argued that what was represented was inseparable from 
how it was represented. His explanation of the power of this painting involved the 
complex metaphorical interplay between content and style; he said this depended on 
"the way in which something is represented is taken in connection with the subject 
represented" (1981, p.191). 
He summarises his theory: that we are representational systems, 
whether it be of words or images (probably both), which he sees as an extension of 
C. S. Peirce's view that man is a sign. Danto mentions and quotes Peirce briefly and 
1 should point out, in passing, his indebtedness to Peirce's theory of signs. Danto's 
view of interpretation owes a great deal to Peirce's triadic distinction between 
object, sign and interpretant. 17 For Peirce signs acquire meaning through their 
relation to subsequent thoughts: what Peirce terms an interpretant; he says: "I define 
a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and 
so determines an effect on a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter 
is thereby mediately determined by the former" (see Hardwick, 1977, pp.80-1). Yet 
Peirce's semiotic theory does not involve a clear distinction between content and 
how we represent it. Peirce's underlying distinction between object, sign and 
17There is an interesting parallel here with the late Paul Ricoeur's theory of interpretation from 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Ricoeur uses Peirce's same triadic distinction in 
developing his 'new triangle of interpretation' where he says: "the object is the text itself; the sign 
is the depth semantics disclosed by structural analysis; and the series of interpretants is the chain of 
interpretations produced by the interpreting community and incorporated into the dynamics of the 
text, as the work of meaning upon itself' (see Ricoeur, 1981, pp.163-4). Ricoeur. as Danto. sees 
interpretation as being incapable of derivation from anterior stages: the process is additive and 
creative throughout. 
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interpretant descnres a process in which a sign always achieves its meaning through 
interpretation; for Peirce there can be no 'pure' content. 
Danto returns us to art because he sees art embodying this 'how' 
element in its process of externalisation or expression; he says: "in art particularly. it 
is this external physiognomy of an inner system of representation that I wish to claim 
style refers to" (1981, p.205). Recalling his previous example: Danto believes that 
style is linked to Ion's inspired performance but not to a performance using acquired 
knowledge or art (in Plato's usage). 
The discussion returns to the issues of belief statements and 
intensionality; he suggests that when we believe something, we tend to act according 
to our beliefs: we refer to the world through actions. We act as though the world is a 
reflection of our beliefs. He highlights the distinction between the avowal and the 
ascription of a belief which he illustrates by referring to two situations. Firstly, 
someone saying she believes x, knowing that x is false; which Danto says is a 
contradiction. This is a lie rather than a contradiction, but the lie makes Danto' s 
point. The idea that in expressing my beliefs I am ideally trying to convey how the 
world is, but when ascribing beliefs to another, I aim to capture not the truth about 
the world but the truth about how that person represents the world. Secondly, 
someone saying that another person believes x, still knowing that x is false, but there 
is no contradiction here. Danto says: '~hen I refer to another man's beliefs I am 
referring to him, whereas he, when expressing his beliefs, is not referring to himself 
but to the world. The beliefs in question are transparent to the believer; he reads the 
world through them without reading them" (1981, p.206). Danto believes this is true 
of representations as well: "I represent the world, not my representations of the 
world" (1981, p.206), and this is why for Danto style is the man: those 
representations are a reflection of the way the man views the world. The 
representations are seen by others but are opaque to their creators: it is for this 
reason that Danto believes Plato's knowledge or art (which is acquired) cannot be 
responsible for style: style must be innate. Danto argues that the distinction between 
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1) the transparency of a belief to the believer and 2) the belief as seen from the 
outside in an attribution of belief is the reason why style is innate. He believes that 
the artist as stylist is unaware of her style; if she is unaware, she cannot have learnt 
it: otherwise she would be aware of it as part of the learning process. 
The problem with Danto's argument goes back to a point of criticism I 
identified previously: Danto's failure to account for the complex inter-relation 
between acquired skills and inspiration (as seen in an artist's style). Danto's account 
relies on an unwarranted dualism: the separation of manner, achieved through the 
acquisition of skills, and style which is innate and therefore incapable of being learnt. 
I can see why Danto links style to personality and why, given this link and the 
previously established link between style and art, we cannot learn to identify an 
artist's style by referring to a checklist. Learning to recognise an artist's style is a 
complex exercise; in making an attribution we must make reference to what we 
know about the artist as a person, their personality, their life and their works. The 
artist's view is their own view of the world and the special feature of art is that it 
enables us to see their view. Danto sums up his view of representation: ~~hat, then~ 
is interesting and essential in art is the spontaneous ability the artist has of enabling 
us to see his way of seeing the world - not just the world as if the painting were like 
a window, but the world as given by him" (1981, p.207). 
In summary I have discussed two criticisms of Danto's theory of 
style. Firstly, the difficulty of his theory allowing style to be perfected, secondly, his 
view is based on a sharp distinction between content and style which is inconsistent 
with his theory of expression and metaphor. He also invokes Peirce's semiotic theory 
which itself denies the distinction between content and style. Danto's quotation 
above brings me to my final criticism of his theory of style: he fails to take into 
account the artist's intention in his explanation of style. If style is innate and 
spontaneous, how can it account for the artist's intention? I have previously said that 
the artist's intention can be unconscious, but it can also be conscious. Danto's 
explanation of style does not show how conscious intention could operate as a part 
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of innate style. It would imply that the artist's intention was part of the conten~ but 
Danto has argued previously that intention is a contextuaL non-manifest attribute 
and therefore cannot be part of the content. 
Danto finally returns to Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture and how one 
accounts for the difference between it and a stack of Brillo cartons: the question he 
set out to answer at the beginning of the book. Danto's answer, he re-affirms, is that 
Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture is a metaphor; the scouring pad box as work of art. 
and it embodies, as the title of his book states, The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace. Warhol's Brillo Box cannot be art by virtue of what it is 
representing; it is after all indiscernible from regular Brillo boxes; it IS a 
representation of the everyday packing cartons. Danto believes that what makes it 
art was its creation and display by a particular person at a particular time as a 
metaphor for the powerful visual imagery of the popular culture which surrounds us. 
and which before that time was widely considered as having no place in art. 
V. Conclusion 
So far I have been primarily concerned with the final chapter of The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace; at this stage it is perhaps worthwhile going back to remind 
ourselves of the overall purpose of the whole book. I reiterate what I said at the end 
of the last section: Danto is trying to explain why Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture is a 
work of art and an indiscernible pile of Brillo boxes is not. Danto believes that to 
address this question requires formulating a definition of art. In the preface he says: 
'~since any definition of art must compass [sic] the Brillo boxes, it is plain that no 
such definition can be based upon an examination of the artworks. It was this insight 
that equipped me with the method I use in my book. in which I pursue that elusive 
definition" (1981. p vii.). In the conclusion to this chapter I shall examine how 
successful Danto has been in his quest for a definition of art in relation to the 
subjects discussed in his final chapter: 'Metaphor, Expression and Style'. 
184 
At this point I should perhaps recapitulate the main claims arising from 
Danto's discussion on these themes: there are four key areas. Firstly. artworks 
embody rhetorical ellipsis: they cannot be paraphrased, they have complex internal 
cognitive relationships and contextualism is involved in interpreting them. Secondly, 
artworks have similar features to metaphors: they are intensional in structure; they 
include reference to a representation. Thirdly, works of art do more than represent 
subjects. The way they represent or the mode of representation is involved in 
understanding them; metaphoric transfer takes artworks beyond the literal. Fourthly, 
artworks are expressive: they embody style which is innate, unlike manner which can 
be acquired. Style is a feature of the artistic process: it enables the artist. 
unknowingly, to allow us to see their way of viewing the world: it is transparent to 
the artist but opaque to the viewer. Finally Danto adds a speculative coda to the 
discussion: he suggests that intensional structures and sentential states playa role in 
how we see and interpret the world. We act as though the world is a reflection of 
our beliefs. Style, he believes, is particularly evident in art and is concerned with how 
we represent things rather than what we represent. 
I should also restate Danto' s six principles underlying art which I 
identified in chapter two; they were: (1) art is the result of human endeavour by an 
artist, (2) artworks acquire a history and a provenance, (3) artworks embody 
meaning (they are expressive), which meaning is a result of the artist's intentio~ (4) 
that meaning requires a subject about which the artist projects a point of view by 
means of rhetorical ellipsis, (5) artworks require interpretation and finally, (6) they 
are produced and interpreted within a historical context. The present discussion has 
focused on principles (1), (3) and (4) which examine how the artist represents his or 
her subject. Chapters one and two have focused more on principles (2). (5) and (6) 
which are concerned with interpretation by the viewer and the historical nature of 
artworks: the contextual element of Danto 's theory of art. 
At this stage it is also necessary to recall the main purpose behind my 
discussion in the first three chapters. My aim was to identify whether Danto's theory 
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provides a definition of art without circularity: without reliance on some reference to 
art, the artworld or culture. In chapter one I examined and rejected the is of artistic 
identification as a way of identifying art. I explained it was too inclusive; it was no 
more than the is of representational identification. I also found Danto's definition of 
the special is to be logically inconsistent. In chapter two I considered Danto' s 
technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts and again I found it wanting as a 
means of identifying works of art. A contextual theory of art, I argued, need not rely 
on indiscernible counterparts: they are philosophically redundant. The one area I 
considered could possibly provide a way of distinguishing art was principle number 
(4) - that meaning requires a subject about which the artist projects a point of view 
by means of rhetorical ellipsis. It will be recalled that this principle was introduced 
into chapter two in anticipation of the full discussion in this chapter. The example I 
chose to illustrate this was one used by Danto himsel( the Loran diagram of 
Cezanne's Portrait of Madame Cezanne: the diagram embodies all the principles 
with the exception of number (4); the Lichtenstein painting embodied all the 
principles without exception. I suggested principle (4) - that meaning requires a 
subject about which the artist projects a point of view by means of rhetorical ellipsis 
- did seem to offer a way of distinguishing art, and in this chapter I have 
concentrated on expounding Danto's views on this principle; the title of the chapter 
sets the subject matter out: 'Metaphor, Expression and Style'. I now intend to test 
principle (4) by asking two questions. Firstly, are there any works of art that do not 
embody the principle? If all artworks do embody the principle, it will be a necessary 
condition. Secondly, are there any non-artworks that do embody the principle? If 
there are non-artworks that embody the principle it cannot be a sufficient condition. 
I consider each question in turn in relation to rhetorical ellipsis and style: the key 
issues in principle number (4). 
I begin by asking whether there are any artworks that do not embody 
rhetorical ellipsis or style. I shall look at three situations where the presence of 
rhetorical ellipsis is questionable: firstly, • plain-speak ing' artworks. secondly. 
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absolute musIc and thirdly, geometrical designs. I begin with . plain-speaking . 
artworks. Danto's claim that art embodies rhetorical ellipsis is criticised by ~oel 
Carroll as being too restrictive. Carroll says that there are artworks which are quite 
simple; what he calls" "plain-speaking' artworks" (1993, p.I01): works which say 
what they have to say in a direct manner without any recourse to rhetoric or ellipsis. 
The example Carroll uses is the last scene from Hogarth's A Harlot's Progress 
(illustration 16) which he says: "has a subject and may even warrant a bit of 
interpretatio~ but not in virtue of having left anything out. Nor is its didactic address 
metaphorical. The moral of the picture is quite literally presented" (1993. p.I 0 I). 
Carroll has chosen this scene from Hogarth for its plain-speaking attributes~ it is 
figurative and part of a clearly presented and well-illustrated series which tells a 
straightforward story. A closer inspection. however, shows that the work is both 
metaphorical and rhetorical. The central metaphor of the series is the young 
woman's life seen as a symbol of the corruption of innocence by the powerful and 
the wealthy. Its tale is clearly told and the metaphor may be obvious. but Moll's 
story is a symbol of the widespread venality and moral turpitude in 
eighteenth-century society~ it is not just about Moll: it is about Hogarth's world. The 
last in the series, Moll's Funeral, is not, as Carroll suggests, simply a picture of a 
harlot's wake. it is the culmination of the metaphor. There are other metaphors: for 
example the theme of sexual disease occurs here and throughout the series. It is also 
rhetorical: we are drawn into the story; we ask questions: who is the child? \\·hy did 
Moll die aged twenty-three as the plate on the coffin states? Contrary to Carroll. I 
believe that this engraving is a good choice to illustrate the rhetorical and elliptical 
nature orart. 18 Finally. Hogarth's work serves as an illustration of style in art: it is 
-- ---_._---
lSCarroJrs choice is strange: on p.I]) of The Tran..~tiguration of the Commonplace Danto hims~lf 
mentions Charles Lamb's comment on lIogarth: "Other pictures \".L' look at. - his prints W~ rl.-ad" 
(from 'On the Genius and Character of\Villiam Hogarth', Lamb, IQI~. p.82). Dantl) also uS(.'" this 
quotation (actllall~ he misqu()lL'S slightl~) as a superscription to chapter si, of The Bu,h/Bod,· 
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instantly recognisable as his own distinct way of representing the world in which he 
lived. 
Figurative art and literature are areas where rhetoric and metaphor are 
easily identified, but what about art fonns where this may not be the case? I now 
move to my second are~ I ask whether absolute music can be considered either 
rhetorical or elliptical? An argument can be put forward that such music is elliptical 
in that the very nature of music is based on rhythm which is essentially an elliptical 
device. Rhythm depends on the anticipation of a coming beat which is a form of 
ellipsis. In my previous discussion I have identified the relationship between ellipsis 
and rhetoric; ellipsis is the omission of something that allows for completion as part 
of the rhetorical process; the invitation or context which sets out the ellipsis is a form 
of questioning, and this occurs in music. There are two problems with this argument: 
firstly, it is that it is too general: it could apply to any and all pieces of music. Such a 
general statement about the nature of music does not help us to interpret or 
understand a particular piece of music. Nor does it help us to distinguish music 
which we consider as art from other kinds of music. however ephemeral or trite they 
may be. Secondly. this elliptical element would seem to apply to any rh)1hmic sound: 
we certainly anticipate a dripping tap that is not usually considered a musical 
arti()rm. It would not help us to distinguish Steve Reich's Clapping .\lusic - which 
consists solely of clapping - from the applause following its performance. 
The objections are addressed by several theories of music: without being 
drawn into a long discussion, I shall briefly mention three. Each takes this hasic 
rhetorical premise and develops a theory of music which is both complex and is able 
to explain particular works. The first is Kendall \\'alton's and is based on a rhetorical 
assumption: that music involves an imaginative cxperience~ the listcner is drawn into 
a dialogue which may involvc motion. resolution and conflict. It is interesting that 
Prohlt'm. Danto. 199<>. 
Walton sees the special power of music as resting with this mixture of imaginative 
freedom and close involvement. The act of imagination is less detenninate than with 
figurative art, but this very lack of a determinate 'subject', Wahon believes, gives 
music its unique power. He says: "it is as though I am inside the music. or it is inside 
me" (1994, p.54). This idea is a reminder of Danto's account of rhetoric which I 
discussed earlier in the chapter: where the involvement of the viewer was suggested 
as a way of explaining the power of art. Secondly, I mention a theory Danto has 
referred to himself: Goodman's concept of metaphoric exemplification. I explained it 
earlier in this chapter when I looked at Danto's discussion of expression: reference 
was made to Goodman's explanation of sad music in his Languages of Art. 
Goodman sees music's expressiveness not as a property of the work but as bearing a 
symbolic relationship to it. Exemplification, as I have explained, can be both literal 
and metaphoric which allows Goodman to bring intramusical reference, such as 
allusion and variation, into his account. Thirdly, a theory of music which relies 
heavily on metaphor: in fact it proposes metaphor as the centraL overarching feature 
of music. Zuckerkandl in Sound and Symbol (1956) sees metaphor as the 
indispensable basis of musical appreciation: an integral part of the imaginative 
participation which music involves us with. Metaphors of space, time and movement 
are seen as an essential feature of music. For example, movement is referred to 
frequently in talking about music, but there is no literal movement: such descriptions 
of music are inherently metaphoric. In summary, there are persuasive arguments for 
absolute music to be seen as embodying rhetorical ellipsis; the three theories of 
music I have mentioned all rely on an underlying element of ellipsis. 
I move on to discuss my third area: geometric ornamentation: do 
artefacts using such designs embody rhetorical ellipsis? I choose as an example a 
painted urn of the Yangshao cuhure (illustration 17); how can these purely 
geometrical designs be considered rhetorical? Wea I can ask how these pots were 
produced and why they were decorated in this way. I can answer the first question; I 
know details of the coiling technique used in the construction and how they were 
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finished and fired. I can also speculate on the reasons for the decorations: for 
example Wilhehn Worringer's ideas of the 'Gothic will to fonn' and the "Gothic line' 
provides a historical and psychological explanation of the urge for abstraction which 
he sees running through the whole of the history of art (see Worringer, 1953 and 
1994). This is not the place to discuss Worringer's theory and other counter-theories 
and explanations of geometrical designs; my point is that the response to these 
objects can be considered rhetorical: I can ask why they were made, why they were 
decorated in this partiCUlar manner. The problem here again is one of 
over-generality: all works of art can be considered rhetorical and elliptical in this 
way; I could say the same of any human act or product, but surely this is far too 
inclusive. 
This point leads into my second question: are there any non-artworks 
that do embody the principle? Before I address the second question, I summarise the 
answer to the first. The discussion has shown that all the artworks I have put 
forward have been shown to embody an element of rhetorical ellipsis. This only 
provides me with an inductive argument: on the evidence of the artworks I have 
examined, rhetorical ellipsis is a necessary condition of art. However, if, as my last 
examples suggests, every artefact, every product of human endeavour, can be 
considered to embody rhetorical ellipsis I am no nearer to finding a sufficient 
condition for art. So, I now consider my second question: are there any 
non-artworks which do employ rhetorical ellipsis? This is easier to deal with; from 
the nature of rhetoric as a form of persuasion, it is clear that rhetoric is frequently 
used in other situations besides works of art. Examples are plentiful: all forms of 
advocacy, political statements, all forms of debate, many newspaper articles and 
most advertisements. However~ I have not provided an argument that all rhetoric 
involves ellipsis; nor do I need to do so. My purpose will be served if I can identify 
some element of ellipsis in the areas of non-art mentioned above: I will have 
identified rhetorical ellipsis outside of the realm of works of art. 
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Without going into detail. I give a number of examples. rel)ing on 
ellipsis to a greater or lesser extent, to make my point. Some advertisements have 
omitted the name of the product altogether: the product name is left out to draw the 
reader or viewer into a dialogue: to become involved in thinking about the product. 
Many newspaper headlines and catchphrases operate on this same principle. 
Advocates frequently ask us to put ourselves in the place of x: we are in\ ited to 
complete our response: we are asked to complete the elliptical element. Politicians' 
failures are paraded and we are left to draw the consequences ourselves. The 
episodic nature of reality television and soap opera rely on speculation about what 
comes next. Noel Carroll finds an example within the artworld. which is not a work 
of art, which satisfies all Danto's conditions, including the requirement to embody 
rhetorical ellipsis (1993, p.l 03-4). He puts forward the artistic manifesto as a 
candidate, and he is surely right in this. At this point I should also mention 
intensionality~ it is clear from my previous discussion that intensionality. in a similar 
way to rhetoric, applies to many sentential structures besides artworks. The answer 
to my second question is clearly that there are non-artworks that embody rhetorical 
ellipsis; it is not a sufficient condition of art. 
The conclusion that rhetorical ellipsis applies to non-art as well as art 
leads to my second area of criticism: the issue of circularity. Rhetorical ellipsis and 
intensionality, as I have explained, provide a powerful account of the uniqueness and 
ineffability of artworks. However. as I have just shown. the concepts apply to some 
non-art as well. So how do we distinguish the intensionality in art from that which 
\ve tind in non-art? Danto relies on his artworld theory. The intensional elements of 
art arc identified as such because art is constituted hy a theory of art: It is this. 
Danto's artworld theory, which enables him to distinguish art from non-art and 
hence to distinguish the intensionality in art from. say. the intensionality I identified 
in adverts. He says a theory is required to take e\'eryJay objects into the artworld, It 
is this which he uses to distinguish \\'arhol's Brillo Box sculpture trom cveryday 
Brillo Boxes, In chapter one I explained thc problem of circularity with the artworld 
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theory and although I provided counter arguments to the circularity claim. I 
concluded that it was a significant problem with the theory. To distinguish art there 
was always some reference back to the artworld or to culture which itself includes 
artistic achievement. In chapter two I discussed George Dickie~s response to the 
problem of circularity: his ideas of inflected concepts. I shall return to discuss the 
issue and give my own response in the final section of the conclusion. chapter fOUT. 
But, perhaps the way Danto expects a definition of art to apply is 
misguided. His search for a definition of art assumes that there is art. on the one 
side, and non-art on the other: that art and non-art can be separated and put into tWl) 
different boxes. He assumes that there is a clear distinction between the t\ .... o: an 
artefact is either art or non-art. An alternative approach is to consider all human 
artefacts and endeavours as having a place on a spectrum ranging from art to 
non-art. The non-art domain could be utilitarian (relating to food. shelter and 
procreation), religious, intellectual or recreational This idea of a spectrum. I believe. 
allows a much more nuanced approach to a definition of art than Danto' s art/non-art 
duality. For example. I can put Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture towards the art end of 
the spectrum, but the Brillo box design itself can also be credited with an artistic 
element albeit of commercial art, although much further towards the other end. This 
approach does address my previous concern by accepting that all human artefacts 
have an artistic element, however small it may be in some cases. It would also accept 
the presence of a rhetorical and elliptical element in all human endeavour. In other 
words. t he rhetorical ellipsis which I have identified in what Danto regards as non-art 
is due to what I believe is the artistic element it contains: because all human activities 
and artefacts. on my view. contain some artistic presence. In a way Danto's point 
holds tirm: rhetorical ellipsis characterises art alone though I would add that there is 
an clement of art in every artefact. \\ nat would be more problematic tor Danto. 
although it is not a claim I am making. would be the claim that rhetorical ellipsis is a 
characteristic not just of non-art (in Danto's sense) hut also of the non-artistic 
clement in artct~lcts which h~ my \ie\\ also have an art ist ic presence. I n:turn ttl 
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discuss this concept of a spectrum of artistic presence in the final chapter: the 
conclusion. 
For the present, however, I need to mention one problem with the 
spectrum idea: how do you place the various works on the spectrum without relying 
on the concept of art. Surely the original problem has just been refonnulated: instead 
of defining art, what is now required is a definition of what constitutes the art end of 
the spectrum. In his 2003 book The Abuse of Beauty Danto adopts a similar 
approach in his discussion of beauty. He sees a spectrum with the beauty of art at 
one end and the beauty of nature at the other; the middle ground is occupied by what 
he calls 'the third realm of beauty': the area where beauty is the result of 
beautification and is seen in a wide range of human artefacts. Danto is willing to 
acknowledge James Harvey, the designer of the original Brillo box, as producing an 
outstanding example of commercial art but not of fine art. Danto still sees a clear 
distinction between the two: "as with the Brillo boxes of Andy Warhol and James 
Harvey, aesthetics could not explain why one was a work of fine art and the other 
not, since for all practical purposes they were aesthetically indiscernible" (2003~ 
pp.6-7, emphasis added). I shall return to look at this question in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
Danto's theory of art has not provided a sustainable definition of art; it 
fails by being over-inclusive: by including non-artworks; it also only provides an 
inductive argument for a necessary condition of art. His theory either requires using 
some aspect of art, the artworld or culture to enable his definition to distinguish 
what is art from what is not art, or it becomes too all-embracing to serve as a means 
of identifying artworks. Unlike George Dickie, who, we saw in the previous chapter, 
is willing to accept a degree of circularity into the definition of art. Danto is 
unwilling to do so. What Danto has provided is a theory which explains the 
structure. features and complexities of artworks, but these attributes apply to some 
non-artworks as well. 
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However, he has provided us with a series of insights which elucidate, 
enrich and infonn the debate on the nature of art. His ideas on metaphoric transfer, 
metaphor as a trope where intention and context work together, intensionality, and 
sentential states are particularly valuable. Danto has identified a parallel structure of 
intensionality in belief statements and artworks. Our beliefs express our view of the 
world, not of ourselves; similarly, when we represent the world, we do so through 
our representations which we do not see: they are for others to observe, and this is 
why they embody our style. In section IVd of this chapter I criticised Danto's 
position on style. I argued that although he is correct in identifying an element of 
transparency in an artist's style, he uses an unwarranted dualism in separating innate 
style and acquired manner. This is particularly so in relation to the complex 
inter-relation between these two elements of art and the contextual issues which 
interact with both. If Danto has failed to define art, he has probed its nature in a 
sustained and brave attempt to answer his original question: why Warhol's Brillo 
Box sculpture is a work of art and an indiscernible pile ofBrillo boxes is not. 
As I have mentioned before in this chapter, since The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace Danto has altered his view somewhat; he now adopts a less 
essentialist position; he suggests his theory identifies some aspects of art rather than 
providing a comprehensive definition of art. He is not suggesting that his is a 
complete definition of art, providing necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather that 
he has identified and justified some features of art: necessary conditions perhaps but 
clearly not sufficient conditions. He has made this point quite clearly in later works: 
"Transfiguration ... arrived at a provisional fonnulation of part of a definition of art 
... This cannot be the entire story, but if I could not get these conditions to hold. I 
am unclear what a definition of art without them would look like. ,·19 
l'oanto. 2000. p.xix. Danto has recently restated this view in his opening address to the 
International Congress at Murcia, see Danto 2003b and 2005&. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusion: Towards a Definition of Art 
We believe that we know something about the things themselves 
when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we 
possess nothing but metaphors for things. 
Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense' (2000, p.55) 
I. Introduction 
At the end of the last chapter I outlined my view of Danto's theory of art. Here I 
begin by summarising the shortcomings and positive elements of his theory. I start 
with the shortcomings; they fall under three broad headings. First, I believe that 
Danto has failed to provide an adequate definition of art; his theory suffers by being 
over-inclusive: its conditions apply to some non-artworks as well as the artworks 
which it attempts to address itself exclusively to. The six principles of Danto's theory 
of art which I have identified in chapters one and two, either singly or as a group, fail 
to provide a sufficient condition for art. The six principles were: (1) art is the result 
of human endeavour by an artist, (2) artworks acquire a history and a provenance. 
(3) artworks embody meaning (they are expressive), which meaning is a resuh of the 
artist's intention, (4) that meaning requires a subject about which the artist projects a 
point of view by means of rhetorical ellipsis, (5) artworks require interpretation and 
finally, (6) they are produced and interpreted within a historical context. His theory 
provides an inductive argument for what remain necessary conditions of art. but they 
are not sufficient to distinguish art from non-art. Second. methodological: I 
identified logical inconsistencies m Danto's concepts of the is of artistic 
identification and his use of indiscernible counterparts. Danto's definition of the is of 
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artistic identification is logically incoherent: the special is simply makes attnbutions 
about what exists (the subject of the artwork) not the artwork itself and it therefore 
cannot impute any intentional properties to art. This is the sense in which Margo lis 
believes that Danto has lost the reality of artworks. In using indiscerruble 
counterparts Danto fails to recognise that the artwork object of the indiscernible pair 
must be discernible at some stage, as art, before the thought experiment can begin. I 
also believe the technique is not necessary to justify Danto' s contextual theory of art; 
although it identifies issues, it is philosophically redundant in the task of defining art. 
Third, his theory is circular: it requires using some aspect of art or culture to enable 
us to distinguish art from non-art - the term culture, of course, itself refers to or 
includes elements of art. I have explained how Danto has moved away from his 
earlier essentialist position, where his aim was to arrive at a definition of art. to his 
later view where he accepts the limitations of his theory which he sees, at best, 
providing and explaining some necessary features of art. This is Danto' s only 
response to the charge of circularity; he puts forward no other argument to explain 
or accommodate the circularity. 
I now look at the positive features of Danto's theory of art. I accept 
that Danto, with the six principles of art which I have identified in his theory. has 
provided many insights into the nature of art. In particular, he has produced a theory 
which encompasses and explains the structure and features of the staggering variety 
of contemporary artworks and practice. His theory is complex: it embodies 
intentionality, historicity, contextuality and intensionality. The last of these, 
intensionality, comes out of Danto' s view of art as embodying rhetorical ellipsis~ my 
criticism of this feature of art, as I explained in the last chapter, was that it was still 
too inclusive. It will be recalled that artistic manifestos, for instance. would have to 
be included in art; I will return to address this question again later and suggest how 
rhetorical ellipsis can be applied to art in a way which avoids the criticism which 
Danto's theory invites. In this chapter I intend to explain my own view on the 
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question of the definition of art; I ask if Danto' s retreat from the essentialist position 
is just~ or if it is possible to arrive at a more sustainable definition of art. 
I shall put forward my own definition of art which has three elements: 
first, I identify a spectrum of artistic presence in all hwnan products or actions; I 
discuss this in section II where it is contrasted with Danto' s insistence on separating 
art from non-art. Section III discusses the second element of my definition of art: 
that art is the result of human endeavour intended for hwnan appreciation; this leads 
to the view that artistic presence embodies both intentionality and intensionality. 
Danto, of course, proposes these concepts as features of fine art whereas I propose 
the concepts apply across a spectrum of artistic presence, and this, I believe, 
fundamentally changes how they relate to the definition which I am seeking. Finally, 
in section IV, I discuss the third element in my definition of art: the claim that art is 
an inflected concept, and that, as suc~ it is impossible to achieve a wholly 
non-circular account of art. 
My definition of art, at least in its first two components, takes a 
traditional form: the first element provides a genus: a wider class to which art 
belongs; the second identifies differentiae or distinguishing features within that class. 
The next section, section II, aims to identify the first component: the genus or wider 
class; section III then seeks to identify the differentiae. I should point out that it is 
not until section III that 'artistic' presence can be distinguished from • political' , 
'religious' or any other type of presence. The aim of section II is to argue for the 
existence of a wide range of human activities and products which exhibit artistic 
presence: I argue against an artInon-art duality or a separate class of fine art. Section 
I II will identify within that wide range, or spectrum, the distinguishing features of 
artistic presence. 
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II. The Spectrum of Artistic Presence 
The primary issue I address in this section was raised in the last chapter: the 
assumption by Danto that art can be identified as a separate category. He believes 
that there are two distinct categories: that artworks can be distinguished from 
non-artworks even though in many cases they may be visually indiscernible. and this 
position runs through the whole of his writings. In 1981 in The Transfiguration of 
the Commonplace he asks why "Warhol's Brillo boxes were works of art while their 
commonplace counterparts, in the back rooms of supermarkets throughout 
Christendom, were not" (1981. p. vi). In 2003 in The A buse of Beauty. as I have 
already explained, he distinguishes between Brillo Boxes as sculpture and Brillo 
boxes as graphic design: "as with the Brillo boxes of Andy Warhol and James 
Harvey, aesthetics could not explain why one was a work of fine art and the other 
not, since for all practical purposes they were aesthetically indiscernible" (2003a. 
pp.6-7). In other words, the term 'aesthetic' for Danto does not mean ~artistic'~ two 
objects can therefore be aesthetically indiscernible even though one is art and the 
other not. I should point out, before I continue, that Danto has modified his position 
on this issue to a degree: I return to discuss this topic later in the discussion. I shall 
now examine how this assumption of a clear distinction between art and non-art 
affects the search for a definition of art. The distinction suggests that, if we can 
separate artworks from non-artworks, there must be some feature of art which 
enables us to do this: some quality or attribute which we find in art but is missing 
from non-art. The search for a definition of art, given Danto' s view of art, is to 
identify this essential feature which applies only to works of art. 
I suggested in the last chapter that this search for the essential features 
of a separate category of art may well be chimerical: I proposed instead that an 
element of art is present, to a greater or lesser degree. in all human activity. I now 
intend to explore this idea in more detail and to see if I can identifY what is essential 
to this all-pervading. artistic element of hwnan endeavour. Recapping, I suggested 
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that all human activity or the products of human activity can be situated on a 
spectrum ranging from art at one end to non-art at the other, and I shall label this the 
spectrum of artistic presence. 1 Whatever human artefact or action I am considering 
could be placed somewhere on this continuum; it could be extremely close to one 
end by virtue of having virtually no artistic content, say, a brick, or it could be 
extremely close to the other end, say, a monochrome painting by Malevich. I have 
shown previously how both of these objects could be placed at either end of the 
spectrum: the brick could be part of a gallery installation and the monochrome 
square, a colour sample. I have also examined how Danto's contextualism explains 
how and why this can happen. Although objects may approach either end of the 
spectrum, they cannot wholly belong to one end or the other. There is no 'pure' art 
and there is no human action or artefact without some artistic element however 
margina~ cursory or minimal it might be. 
I also pointed out the significant difficulty with my concept of the 
spectrum: it leaves me with the question of how to distinguish one end of the 
spectrum from another and how to distinguish artistic presence itself. How do you 
recognise and place objects and actions at the art end of the spectrum? Surely this 
way of approaching a definition of art is merely re-construing the problem: I am 
simply moving the problem from seeking a definition of 'art' to a definition of 
'artistic presence'; I shall return to address this point shortly. However. I believe that 
there is a significant difference and advantage if I adopt this approach. A definition 
of art, accepting there is no clear boundary between art and non-art, will attempt to 
identifY this "artistic presence' across the whole range of human activity and 
artefacts: there is no need to identify the conditions which relate specifically and 
uniquely to a separate class of artworks. I believe that this fundamentally changes the 
type of definition we should expect; it goes beyond a re-construal of the problem: it 
I Although the applications are widely dissimilar, for the idea of the spectrum I am indebted to 
Ronald Hepburn's model of a spectrum of language use. See Hepburn. 1958. 
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changes its nature in a significant way. Instead of seeking defining features which 
will enable us to sort artefacts into two classes, art and non-art, we are looking for 
some aspect or aspects of all human activity which, to a greater or lesser degree, 
endow it with what we call artistic presence. Danto believes anything can become 
art; in doing so it takes on a new character which non-art does not possess. I share 
the view that anything can become art, but, by contrast, I believe it does so simply by 
moving up the spectrum of artistic presence. There is no threshold between art and 
non-art; objects acquire a new position on the spectrum. and I have demonstrated 
how this can happen without any discernible change in the object: it can happen 
simply by virtue of where or how an object is displayed. It does not mean taking on a 
completely new character, but rather in displaying more openly certain features that 
all human artefacts possess. 
Danto in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace discusses William 
Kennick's warehouse thought experiment: Kennick imagines someone asked to sort 
the contents of a warehouse into art and non-art objects.2 He believes that anyone 
could quite successfully complete this task; Danto believes that with the advent of 
pop art, and particularly with works of art like Warhol's Brillo Box sculpture, this 
task would be impossible. On my view, accepting the artistic spectrum concept. the 
thought experiment would be ungrounded and unnecessary: everything in the 
warehouse would have some artistic component. I could ask for the objects to be 
sorted into their relative position on the proposed spectrum: into greater and lesser 
degrees of artistic make-up. Of course, mistakes could be made; the intrepid sorter 
could mistake Brillo Boxes the sculpture for everyday Brillo boxes (Warhol for 
Harvey) unless the former was identifiable in some way: perhaps a label or a receipt 
from Sotheby"s for several hundred thousand dollars! Mistakes such as this would 
not trouble my view of art. With my spectrum approach. the type of definition I am 
seeking is dependent on how I understand art being constituted in relation to all 
2Danto. 1981. pp.60-6. The original thought experiment appears in Kennick. I QS8. 
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human activity or artefacts. The approach does overcome one of my major 
objections to Danto's theory: that his theory is too inclusive. If we accept that all 
human activity has an artistic element, over-inclusiveness ceases to be a problem: the 
fact that anything can be art, or manifest artistic features, will come as no surprise. 
I shall consider the concept of a spectrum of artistic presence in three 
ways; numbers one and two look at some examples, particularly objects situated at 
the extremes of the spectrum, and they provide an inductive argument. The first of 
these looks at the non-art end of the spectrum; I attempt to see if there are any 
human activities without any artistic constituent at all. The second examines an area 
closer to the other end of the spectrum; I examine the boundaries between art and 
non-art, as it is identified by Danto' s form of essentialism, to see if the boundary is as 
distinct as he believes it is. I also see if there are any works of art which might be 
considered as 'pure' art, existing without any other purpose than being works of art. 
Before I leave these first two areas (which looked at examples), I briefly consider 
methodology in relation to inference from examples: my own approach, I argue. is 
abductive (in a Peircian sense), and I refer back to a point made in my introduction 
about Danto's philosophy of the history of art. In my third way of addressing this 
issue I examine two taxonomical approaches which attempt to deduce a definition of 
fine art. First. Aristotle's view of art in his exposition on the intellectual virtues from 
The Nicomachean Ethics, book VI, section 3, and second, Kant's taxonomy of art 
from sections 43 and 44 of The Critique of Judgment. My aim here is to question the 
existence ofa distinct and separate class of 'fine art'; if this class is unsustainable, the 
existence of a spectrum of artistic presence is, at this early stage in my argument. at 
least possible. Following this part of the task, I shall very briefly look at the 
development of the concept of fine art in the history of art. However. before I move 
on to address these three areas. I need to make an initial distinction. I referred to 
human actions or the products of hwnan actions in my idea of the spectrum; I need 
to distinguish here between voluntary and involuntary actions. I am considering 
voluntary actions: I am not considering involuntary actions like breathing. sleeping 
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and dreaming. I accept the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is 
sometimes difficuh to draw; say, when some reflex actions or instinctive reactions 
are considered: the reactions to extreme danger or horror are examples. I should also 
repeat my earlier warning that in this section I am looking at the genus part of our 
definition: the wider class to which art belongs; the next section will identify how 
artistic presence can be distinguished from other 'presences'. 
The first issue I address is whether there are some human activities 
which have no artistic element. Am I correct in believing that all human activity has 
an artistic element? Surely there are some basic human activities that have no artistic 
element at all? I will consider some examples, and I choose gardening as my first. 
The works of Capability Brown, Robert Smithson's landscape interventions like 
Spiral Jelty (1969-70) and Andy Goldsworthy's creations have a clear artistic 
element, but what about, say, a cottage garden or a suburban allotment: do they 
really have an artistic element? I believe that they do; it may not be significant, but it 
is present: I believe it is impossible to do any gardening without making some artistic 
decisions and incorporating some artistic element into the final product. The artistic 
decisions may be at a very basic level and the products mundane, but there is some 
element of artistic presence. Decisions about what is grown, where and how it is 
planted and the way it is cultivated all involve artistic choices. The care of the 
smallest window box involves decisions about flowers or herbs that call on a range 
of cultural references that I have identified in my discussions on art. The cultivation 
of a window box may have a negligible artistic content but my argument is that it has 
some. In other words, human endeavour is contingent: whatever one does could be 
done otherwise; we are faced with choices about how to do or make things. I t is this 
element of how which I believe inescapably brings in artistic choices and hence the 
artistic presence I have identified. This artistic element~ however rudimentary or 
trivial, is applicable to all areas of human activity: even everyday tasks such as 
walking, driving and eating all occur within a culturaJ framework which involves 
some artistic presence. The pervasiveness of this artistic element or presence in all 
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areas of human activity is reflected in everyday speech: in the use of phrases like 'the 
art of ... '; we can fill in the ellipsis by an endless range of terms: warfare, cooking. 
archery, mathematics, football, murder. Remember at this stage I am considering the 
genus part of my definition; the differentiae comes in the next section where I 
distinguish artistic presence from other forms of contingent human activity. 
I argue, to take another example, that it is impossible to build any 
sheker, even a primitive hut or an allotment shed, without some element of artistic 
decision making. This applies to those areas of human activity which were, quite 
universally, before the advent of pop art, considered lacking any artistic element: for 
example kitsch, comics or pornography. All three of these areas have been taken up 
and used by painters, sculptors and photographers who operate in the fine art arena. 
For example the images and style of pornography have been taken up by mainstream 
art. Jeff Koon's explicit images of intercourse, Robert Mapplethorpe's3 use of 
sadomasochistic images in his photographs are examples. Mel Ramos uses soft-porn 
images to highlight the dissemblance in the furtive use of pornography in academic 
art (see illustration 18, the references are to Ingres La Source. 1856). Koons has also 
incorporated the imagery and subject matter of kitsch into many of his sculptures. 
An artist whose work I have aJready discussed, Roy Lichtenstein, has made 
extensive use of hugely magnified images from comics in his paintings. Comics 
themselves and the graphic novel have now been accepted as mainstream artforms. 
This leads me to the second area I promised to look at: the purported 
boundary between artworks and non-artworks; is it as clear as Danto believes it is? I 
have a1ready discussed Warhol's Bri/lo Box sculpture and James Harvey's design for 
the Brillo box: the latter is accepted by Danto as a brilliant piece of graphic design. 
but he still denies it fine art status. In other words. for Danto, Warhol's sculpture 
JDanto was a supporter of Mapplethorpe when the photographer was being criticised for the 
pornographic nature of his work: he also. as I have mentioned before. "Tote a book on 
Mapplethorpe's achievemt~t as an artist. see Danto. 1995. 
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must have some defining feature which makes it art rather than a mere real thing~ 
albeit a real thing incorporating an element of graphic design. I see no categorical 
distinction between the two; both have an artistic element and involve the artist in 
making aesthetic decisions: Warhol's relates to display in museums, Harvey~s to 
display in supermarkets. In other words, in making contingent decisions about how 
something is carried out or how something will look. But even in museums the 
distinction between art and non-art can be blurred: it is not uncommon to see 
examples of outstanding graphic and industrial design on display in museums. and 
the Brillo box design would surely qualify as such an example. There are exhibitions 
today where it is unclear what is art and what is non-art: a recent example is the 
exhibition curated by Marina Warner Only Make Believe. The show is concerned 
with childhood and play; it is a mixture of traditional art on that theme. folk art 
objects and toys.4 I argue that a similar lack of a categorical difference, a difference 
in kind, can be identified in all Danto's thought experiments. I take one example 
which I have discussed before: the Manhattan Telephone Directory for 1980 and the 
indiscernible avant-garde novel Metropolis Eighty. The telephone directory is a 
complex piece of graphic art involving aesthetic decisions in its design; I see no 
difference in kind between these decisions and those facing the author of Metropolis 
Eighty; they have very different intentions and, arguably, very different places on the 
spectrum but both have a clear artistic element: they have artistic presence. I should 
also mention the work of artists who deliberately operate between the traditional 
boundaries of art and everyday life: Sophie Calle being a well-known exemplar of 
this approach (see illustration 19) who uses elements of her own life and other 
peoples' lives as her art. 
I also promised to consider if there are any 'pure' works of art situated 
at the extreme art end of the spectrum and having no other function than being 
4ne exhibition was at Compton Verney House. 25 March - 5 June 2005. see Warner. Marina. 
2005. 
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works of art. What about abstract painting, surely this just is painting without any 
other purpose? But here we must consider why they were created and where the 
paintings are displayed: at a very basic level they were created for display on gallery 
walls or decoration in a home or a public building. So their function, apart from 
being works of art, is display or decoration. I see no difference in kind between this 
aspect of abstract painting and other forms of wall decoration: for example 
wallpaper. I am not suggesting that abstract expressionism is purely wall display or 
decoration, rather that a small element of its make-up can be considered in this way. 
In other words abstract expressionist painting approaches the far end of the 
spectrum, the fine art end, but never reaches it. I consider this argument applies to all 
forms of what are generally considered as 'pure' art. 
Before I move on to discuss my third argument I shall briefly outline my 
methodological approach to the question of defining the spectrum of artistic 
presence. My approach, examining these examples, has been pragmatic, and I should 
say something briefly about the methodology of pragmatism. I have accepted the 
Peircian view that there are three forms of inference: abduction, induction and 
deduction. Peirce believes that pragmatism is "nothing else than the logic of 
abduction" (1931-5, vol. V, p.19) which is the test for any hypothesis because for 
Peirce "every conception is a conception of conceivable practical effects" (1931-5. 
vol. V, p.196). He gives the logical form of abduction as: 
The surprising fact, C. is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course; 
Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true. (1931-5. vol. V, p.189) 
The point, of course, is that abduction is guessing which Peirce believes is the only 
form of inference to provide us with new knowledge. His study of logic led him to 
believe that deduction tells us nothing that we do not already know and that 
induction is simply used as a test for abduction. The distinction between induction 
and abduction he explains is that in induction '''we conclude that facts. similar to 
observed facts are true in cases not examined [whereas in abduction] we conclude 
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the existence of a fact quite different from anything observed '" the former classifies. 
the latter explains" (1931-5, vol.II, p.636). My concept of the spectrum of artistic 
presence is alxtuctive in that I believe it overcomes shortcomings in Danto' s theory 
of art but without claiming it provides a final definition: Peircian abduction, the basis 
of my theory, espouses fallibilism. 
I return briefly to a point raised in the introduction: Danto' s stated 
need to indemnifY his philosophy of art against future counter-examples for which 
purpose, as I explained, he invoked his philosophy of the history of art. If the history 
of art is ended, there can be, according to Danto, no further counter-examples to 
overthrow his definition of art. The pragmatic approach I adopt cannot accept 
Danto's certainty that such an indemnity is possible. Peircian pragmatism, which 
underlies my proposa~ relies on inference based on conceivable objects or actions. It 
espouses fallibilism in what Peirce identifies as the three normative sciences: logic. 
ethics and aesthetics; by this view, claims like Danto's are provisional and radically 
subject to error. The very possibility of indemnity against future counter-examples is 
denied by fallibilism and the logic of alxtuction which, as I have already pointed out. 
Peirce regarded as only capable of providing tentative knowledge. On the Peircian 
view, the only achievable knowledge is based on abduction tested by induction: it is 
guesswork. Danto' s quest for an indemnity is chimerical. 
I move on from my examination of examples to the third argument for 
the concept of a spectrum of artistic presence; I look at two attempts to define art 
taxonomically: the first is from Aristotle and the second from Kant. I question the 
existence of a separate class of 'fine art'; if this classification cannot be sustained. the 
concept of a spectrum of artistic presence is possible. At this stage in my argument, 
it should again be noted, I am dealing with the genus part of my proposed definition 
of art: the wider class to which art belongs. I begin with Aristotle's discussion ofthc 
intellectual virtues in book VI of The Nicomachean Ethics - art. of course. being 
one of the virtues. Aristotle begins by making a distinction between what is 
necessary and what is contingent. The former. theoretical wisdom. includes intuiti\c 
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reason and science. The latter includes first, practical wisdom or phronesis, and 
second, art. Aristotle goes on to make a clear distinction between doing and making. 
Whereas phronesis "must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with 
regards to human goods" (1140b, 1954, p.143), art is "a reasoned state of capacity 
to make" (1140a, 1954, p.141). I agree with Aristotle's distinction between the 
necessary and the contingent: that art is concerned with the contingent. Art is 
concerned with what could be otherwise; the questions of how and why are raised in 
relation to artistic activity. It will be recalled how prominently these two questions 
featured in Danto's account of style in art. Phronesis is distinguished from art 
because it is concerned with deliberative action towards the summun bonum: it is 
coextensive with political science. Aristotle says: "we credit men with practical 
wisdom ... when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is 
one of those that are not the object of any art" (1140a, 1954, p.142). 
My problem is with his next stage: Aristotle's distinction between 
acting and making. It is a distinction which Aristotle regards as so obvious it requires 
no argument: as the reasoned states for acting and making are different "hence too 
they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making 
acting" (1140a, 1954, p.141). I believe this distinction is unsustainable in relation to 
art. In many forms of art, particularly contemporary art, we see much that is 
concerned with action. In fact in a number of contemporary art fonns there is 
nothing more than action: performance art in particular is concerned solely with 
actions. Broadening the definition of 'making' to include performance art simply 
side-steps the issue and renders the term useless for philosophical purposes. It may 
alternatively be argued that performance art is 'making' a record of these 
performances, but the art would exist, as a pure performance, without any further 
record. The record is not the same as the performance: the smell of blood in Franco 
8's performances and the impact on the audience can never be recreated (see 
illustration 20). It could also be argued that perfonnances like Franco 8's are not art 
at all but it will be recalled from the discussion in chapter one, section VI I. that I 
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argued against this view. So I reject Aristotle's second distinction and believe that 
art can be actio~ making or, more usually, is a combination of both. I appreciate that 
allowing performance to be regarded as art could still be compatible with a claim 
that there is a strict separation between art and non-art, but that art includes 
performance. However, at this stage my point in relation to Aristotle is simply that 
art can include both making and doing. I move on to consider if other aspects of fine 
art are similarly too exclusive. 
I look at Kant's definition of fine art in The Critique of Judgment and 
compare my own idea of the artistic spectrum with Kant's views. Kant approaches 
the definition of fine art by providing a taxonomy of art: his discussion on the subject 
comes relatively late in The Critique of Judgment: it begins in sections 43 and 
continues in 44. Section 51 completes the task with the division of the fine arts, but I 
shall not be considering this section here. The reason for the late appearance of the 
subject of fine art in The Critique of Judgment, of course, is that Kant has already 
explained the four moments which relate to all judgements of taste: how such 
judgements must be disinterested, universal and how they embody necessity and 
common sense. The bulk of Kant's philosophical work has already been done before 
he goes on to discuss the question of fine art. I will concentrate on how Kant 
attempts to define fine art in these two sections of The Critique of Judgment. 
numbers 43 and 44. Kant's approach to a definition of fine art operates by a process 
of elimination: it is a six-stage taxonomy which identifies, at each stage. what is not 
art; this leaves a narrower field for consideration at the next stage. and eventually we 
arrive at a definition of fine art itself: fine art is all that is left remaining at the end of 
the process. 
Kant's first stage considers all action whatever. and he moves in the 
second stage to the first of his distinctions: he separates doing or making. art in 
general, from natural effects; the first is work (opus), and the second. an effect 
(effectus). Now, there are two interesting points here: firstly. Kant's opus is very 
similar to my spectrum across which my artistic presence ranges: it is all human 
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action which Kant distinguishes from natural effects, and secondly. Kant calls it art. 
I shall return to these points later. So far I have no disagreement with Kant's 
taxonomy of art. Moving on to the third stage, Kant distinguishes skill or practice 
from theory or knowledge; he is distinguishing art from science. For Kant. science 
follows set rules: it can be understood completely and taught exactly: art, by 
contrast, can never be created by following a set of instructions; it involves 
something more: it involves skill. This is why, for Kant, there can be no 'fine 
science' only 'fine art'. Kant believes that whereas genius applies to artistic 
creativity, innovation in science relies on imagination. The difference being that the 
process of imaginative innovation in science can be demonstrated; in art genius 
cannot be explained. In other words, we can follow innovation in science step by 
step: each step developing from the former in a process which can be explained. The 
emerging artwork, the result of artistic genius, cannot be totally explained by 
reference to what came before. This for Kant clearly separates science from art. I 
accept that scientific innovation can be demonstrated but believe that this does not 
explain why the innovation has occurred. There must be some element in scientific 
innovation which is creative and which cannot be explained by demonstrating how 
the innovation occurs. It is this element which I believe is similar to artistic genius. I 
suggest that the distinction which Kant draws between art and science in section 43 
is in fact much less polarised: that an element of creativity or genius is present in 
scientific thought. Innovation in science is based on and uses empirical data but this 
cannot be used to fully explain it. If this were the case, science would be a matter of 
a priori principles applied to observation. I refer to an example I have used before: 
the difference between the Aristotelian explanation of the swinging stone and 
Galileo's.5 How did the change take place? Kuhn is adamant: ""through Galileo's 
individual genius, of course. But note that genius does not here manifest itself in 
more accurate or objective observation of the swinging body. Descriptively. the 
5see chapter two, section 111. 'Joseph Margolis's Criticism'. 
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Aristotelian perception is just as accurate" (1996, p.119). It is this scientific genius 
which I believe shares creative features with artistic genius and leads us to question 
Kant's distinction between innovation in art and science. John Dewey points to the 
similarities between scientific innovation and artistic creativity: "the odd notion that 
an artist does not think and a scientific inquirer does nothing else is the result of 
converting a difference of tempo and emphasis into a difference of kind" (1980. 
p.IS). 
In the next stage, Kant distinguishes art from craft; what he calls . free 
art' from 'mercenary art'. The former is similar to play: it is carried out without any 
regard to financial reward; the latter is performed for payment, and, he believes. that 
payment or reward is the only reason why such work is carried out. In this latter 
category Kant includes labour (Arbeit) as well as craft (Handwerk). The point I 
make here is one which Kant is aware of himself: he suggests the distinction at this 
particular stage in the taxonomy is not precise. He suggests there is some overlap 
between free and mercenary arts, and we would have to use other means, such as 
talent, to distinguish them; he explains this saying: "to judge whether, in a ranking of 
the guilds, watchmakers should be counted as artists but smiths as craftsme~ we 
would have to take a viewpoint different from the one adopted here: we would have 
to compare [Proportion] the talents that each of these occupations presupposes" 
(1987, p.171, square brackets are in the original). He goes on to accept that some 
crafts may be considered as free arts and concedes that some of his seven free arts 
may well be considered as sciences; he refuses to offer a definitive view on this. 
The fifth stage of Kant's taxonomy distinguishes mechanical art from 
aesthetic art. As Kant gives no examples here, it is difficult to understand the 
distinction he makes; he says: ~~if art merely performs the acts that are required to 
make a possible object actual~ adequately to our cognition of that object. then it is 
mechanical art; but if what it intends directly is [to arouse] the feeling of pleasure. 
then it is called aesthetic art" (1987. p.172. square brackets are in the original). The 
difficuhy is seeing what the motivation is for mechanical art if it is not pleasure or 
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payment (from stage three); perhaps Kant had slavish copying in mind. but even this 
would surely be an attempt to achieve and give some degree of pleasure: to either 
the artist or viewer. I leave stage five without further comment except to note that 
aesthetic art, for Kant, is motivated by and provides pleasure. 
Stage s~ the last in Kant's taxonomy, distinguishes agreeable art from 
fine art. The former links pleasure to sensations, the latter links the pleasure of art to 
some cognitive element; Kant says: "it is fine art if its purpose is that the pleasure 
should accompany presentations that are ways of cognising" (1987. p.172). This 
takes us back to the earlier parts of The Critique of Judgment where Kant discusses 
the nature of an aesthetic judgement or, what is the same for Kant, a judgement of 
taste. Agreeable art produces pleasure solely by means of sensation, fine art relies on 
taste. If the pleasure of art is universal, which Kant believes it must be, he thinks that 
it must rely on reflection rather than mere sensation. Towards the end of section 44 
of The Critique of Judgment Kant says: 'iine art, on the other hand, is a way of 
presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without 
purpose, the culture of our mental powers to [facilitate] social communication" 
(1987, p.173, square brackets are in the original). 
However, the distinction between agreeable art and fine art is 
imprecise in the examples he gives. The examples he gives of agreeable art, for 
instance, are story telling, conversation at the dinner table and what he calls 
table-music: what we would call background music or lift music. These examples 
highlight the problem: why is story telling at the dinner table agreeable art when 
story telling in a theatre, say one of Becket's monologues, is fine art? The difference 
for Kant seems to lie in the concept of genius which he goes on to discuss in 
subsequent sections. However. I leave The Critique of Judgment here: my purpose 
has been to examine Kant's taxonomy of art in sections 43 and 44 and to show that 
the distinction between what Kant calls art which. as we saw at the beginning of this 
discussion .. includes all human action and his concept of fine art is far from precise. 
Kant's attempt to define fine art by a process of elimination is questionable because 
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of the imprecision of the boundaries he proposes at each stage ofhis taxonomy. The 
interesting point for me is that his account of all human actio~ which he calls . art· . 
admits the range of activities and artefacts which I am suggesting form the spectrum 
to which artistic presence applies. At this stage I should stress that my aim has been 
to identify a genus for our definition of art; I shall consider the differentiae in the 
next section. I address the issue of how to identify artistic presence from the wider 
range of human activities and artefacts which form the genus. 
I believe Danto's insistence on a separate category of art is a resuh 
of his inability to shake off the historical and cuhural implications of the acceptance 
of a category of fine art. He accepts the existence of fine art as a category in a tacit. 
but unstated, reliance on a taxonomical approach to art such as the one we have 
examined in Kant's Critique of Judgment. By insisting on the existence of some 
essential feature of fine art which marks it off from other human artefacts or actions, 
Danto becomes, perhaps unwittingly, wedded to a form of essentialism which I 
believe is unwarranted, and, as I shall explain later, limits the applicability of his 
concepts of intentionality and intensionality to a narrow and exclusive field: that is to 
fine art. The historical development of the concept of fine art as a separate and 
privileged category has been well documented. Paul Oskar Kristeller in "The Modem 
System of the Arts' (1997) explains that the rise of the concept of fine art, the five 
'major' arts of painting, sculpture, architecture, music and poetry, is a relatively late 
development in western thought. He traces the transfonnation of the Greek concept 
of techne or craft (which would have included much of what we would now call the 
sciences) into the idea of fine art in the eighteenth-century. Kristeller sees this 
primarily being driven by changes in the structure of society and the new audiences 
for art together with the rise in importance of the art collector. The system of fine 
art, he points out, is a reflection of cultural norms and expectations of a specific 
historical period and thus inevitably changes over time. He says: ··our familiar system 
of the five fine arts did not merely originate in the eighteenth century, but it also 
reflects the particular cultural and social conditions of that time. If we consider other 
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times and places, the status of the various arts, their associations and subdivisions 
appear very different" (1997, p.l 0 1). If a precise boundary between the five fine arts. 
or Kant's seven 'free arts' is subject to change, it is surprising that the distinction 
between fine art and 'other' art remains so prevalent in the artworld and in debates 
on the history of art and the philosophy of art. 
There are a number of theories attempting to explain this; however. I 
do not intend to discuss them here in any detail: they are clearly outside the remit of 
this dissertation. However, I will mention one in passing which gives an indication of 
the range of the historical and sociological factors which account for the rise of fine 
art. John Dewey in Art as Experience relates the rise of fine art to the growth of 
'museum art': he sees the rise of the museum being partly accounted for by the rise 
in nationalism and imperialism where each country and city must have its own temple 
to the arts. He also explains the emergence of the nouveau riche. as part of the 
capitalist system, being responsible for the commercialisation and 
compartmentalisation of art: conspicuous displays of ownership and refined taste 
become the mark of the successful industrialist and entrepreneurial classes. Dewey's 
task is not so much to provide a history or a sociology of art; it is more, as he says: 
''to indicate that theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in a 
realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, are not inherent 
in the subject-matter but arise because of specifiable extraneous conditions" (1980. 
p.IO). I leave this subject now; my next task is to look at this artistic element which I 
believe is present in all human activity and to see how it can be distinguished from 
other aspects of human endeavour. 
Before I do so, I should mention that the criticism of Danto which I 
have outlined has been promoted elsewhere, notably by Richard Shusterman. He 
accuses Danto of putting' Art into a Box', the title of his paper in the collection 
Danlo and his Critics (Rollins, 1993). He believes that Danto. who has written at 
length on the disenfranchisement of art. seems unaware of the disenfranchising t~1 
of the separation of fine art into a distinct category. Shusterman helieves that this 
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categorisation is a by-product of philosophies which insist on essentialist definitions: 
he says that Danto "despite his noble liberational impulse ... instinctively remains too 
faithful to philosophy's hegemonic habit of categorising definitio~ even while 
deploring its original motives and unfortunate resuhs" (1993, p.I64). 
We have Danto's response to Shusterman in the same book in Chapter 
12 'Responses and Replies'. Danto accepts that he is putting art into a box; he says 
quite bluntly: "my job is that of boxmaker" (1993, p.21S). He defends the task of 
philosophy as involvement with the type of analytic categorisation and the search for 
definitions which he employs. He accuses Shusterman of losing sight of the fact that 
the type of pragmatism Shusterman espouses is just another box: "it may be a box of 
a different shape because it structures the universe in a very different way from the 
system I believe in" (1993, p.2lS). Danto also adds a warning that pragmatis~ say 
as outlined in the writings of John Dewey, is not the absence of any syste~ a view 
which Danto sees represented in the writings of Richard Rorty. but the emphasis on 
a more organic approach relying on internal rather than external relationships. Danto 
ends by saying that the philosopher is in truth always faced with a decision about the 
choice of system, not between system and no system. It is this which he believes was 
the great insight of pragmatism: "this was [William] James's deep insight, how one 
must function when a choice has to be made and there is no philosophical basis for 
making it, which is always the case in choosing between total philosophical systems: 
you choose the system in which you feel best, there being no other criteria - for if 
there were one, the choice would be ofa different kind" (1993, p.216). The first part 
of my definition of art, that there is an element of artistic presence in all human 
products and activity. provides a genus: a wider class to which art belongs; my task 
in the next section is to identify differentiae or distinguishing features within that 
class. At this stage, however, I still have no way of distinguishing the artistic 
presence from. say. the religious element of human endeavour; I address this issue in 
the next section. 
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III Intentionality and Intensionalit}" 
In the last section I considered the concept of a spectrum of artistic presence and 
argued that there is an artistic presence in all human activity and in the products of 
all human endeavour. My next task is to provide the second stage of the definition of 
art: the differentiae; how can I distinguish this artistic element or presence from 
other aspects of human activity? My approach to the differentiae refers back to the 
six principles of Danto's theory of art I identified earlier which in a new context. I 
believe, provide the differentiae I am seeking. I shall argue that when the principles 
are considered in the light of the concept of the spectrum of artistic presence, the 
major criticism that the principles are over-inclusive no longer applies. So, the 
second part of my definition of art, the attempt to provide differentiae. proposes that 
art, or artistic presence, is the result of human endeavour intended for human 
appreciation and that its artefacts and actions allow inexhaustible interpretations. 
This is summed up in the terms intentionality (with a t) and intensionality (with an s). 
The issues underlying both the terms have been discussed in detail in earlier chapters; 
my purpose here is to see how they are affected when applied to the spectrum of 
artistic presence rather than to a concept of art based on an artInon-art duality. I 
discuss intentionality and intensionality in turn. 
Referring back to the six principles I identified in Danto's theory of art, 
numbers (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) relate to intentionality; number (4), which I shall 
discuss later, relates to intensionality. although all the principles are interrelated. 
Intentionality covers a broad range of concepts which encompass the artistic 
process. Art, or artistic presence, is the resuh of human endeavour for human 
appreciation; it concerns a subject, about which meaning is embodied: in other 
word~ it is concerned with expression. The production of art (artistic presence on 
my view) and its interpretation occurs within a historical context: these artistic 
products or actions acquire a provenance and a history. The point I made in m~ 
earlier discussion was that many other human act ivities can he identified as having 
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these features; I will look shortly at how relating both these intentional and 
intensional features to the spectrum of artistic presence affects their use in a 
definition of art. Before I do so I return to summarise the key features of 
intensionality. 
In discussing intensionality I shall be referring to the concepts Danto 
identified in the final chapter of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. In my 
examination of metaphor, expression and style in the last chapter I identified four 
claims by Danto. First, artworks embody rhetorical ellipsis; second. artworks 
embody similar features to metaphors: they are intensional in structure and therefore 
cannot be paraphrased. Third, works of art are expressive in the way they depict 
their subjects, and fourth, artworks, in being expressive, embody style. I shall be 
arguing that these four claims provide the final identification of the differentiae I am 
seeking. How far they provide a 'real' definition in tenns of necessary and sufficient 
conditions I will consider after this discussion. It will be recalled in the last chapter 
that I explained how these four claims developed from one of the principles which I 
identified in Danto's theory of art: principle (4) - that meaning requires a subject 
about which the artist projects a point of view by means of rhetorical ellipsis. 
I went on to test principle (4) by asking two questions. Firstly, are there 
any works of art that do not embody the principle? If all artworks embody the 
principle, it will be a necessary condition. Secondly, are there any non-artworks that 
also embody the principle? If there are non-artworks that embody the principle it 
cannot be a sufficient condition. In addressing the first question I examined three 
areas where it was debatable whether rhetorical ellipsis and style was present in art: 
the last scene from Hogarth's A Harlot's Progress, absolute music and geometrical 
ornamentation. In each case I argued that rhetorical ellipsis was present. I concluded 
there was a case. via an inductive argument (to which I later added abduction). that 
art does include rhetorical ellipsis and embodies the four claims I identified abovc. 
The answer to the second question however was affirmativc: there arc many 
non-artworks. to stay with Danto's view of art. which also includc these clements. 
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Expression using rhetorical ellipsis and style is, by this view. a necessary but not a 
sufficient feature of art. 
The problem with Danto's theory, as I have explained before. is that by 
restricting art to certain taxonomical categories his definition becomes 
over-inclusive: it includes many other objects and activities which Danto cannot 
regard as being art - that is within his own delimitation of art. It is this 
over-inclusiveness which moves Danto to draw back from his essentialist position to 
one where he accepts that he is providing some necessary conditions of art rather 
than a definition. The pro.blem of over-inclusiveness is also raised by Stephen 
Davies: he raises it in relation to what he calls the artworld relativity problem (2001. 
pp.173-5 and 177-8). Davies explains the problem as the requirement, in historically 
reflexive accounts of art, such as Danto' s, for the existence of a continuing tradition 
to which the work of art is related in its production and interpretation. As Davies 
puts it: "theories of this kind make art relative to an Artworld" (2001. p.174) and 
"when treated as non-parochial, the theories are incomplete because they do not 
spell out criteria for distinguishing Artworlds from other social arrangements 
displaying similar general structures of relations" (200 I. p.175). 
However, I believe, the difficulty of over-inclusiveness is overcome if 
Danto's six principles are applied to the whole of human activity and human 
endeavour. The concept of the spectrum of artistic presence includes an artistic 
element in all human activity or products, whether they are commonly regarded as 
fine art, craft, or any other activity not normally regarded as artistic. The principles 
in this case cannot be over-inclusive because they apply, to a greater or lesser 
degree. to all human products and activity. Intensionality. which I am using to 
develop the differentiae I am seeking, is concerned with how activities are carried 
out or how objects are produced: it is concerned with that element of human 
endeavour which cannot be paraphrased or replaced. Art. or artistic presence on this 
view. has an element of ineffability which means that it cannot be fully described in 
other words or presented in any other way: it embodies an element of rhetorical 
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ellipsis and shares this feature with metaphor. It may initially seem strange to suggest 
that all human activity embodies rhetorical ellipsis but the point to bear in mind as I 
explained in my discussion of book VI of The Nicomachean Ethics. is that human 
action and products are contingent: they could be otherwise. So we can always ask 
why they were done or why something was produced in a particular way; in other 
words we are questioning how they were carried out. In this questioning there is 
always an element of rhetorical ellipsis present. I am also, it must be remembered. 
talking about a spectrum: towards one end there will be a very small, barely 
perceptible, rhetorical element which may be easily overlooked, as some of my 
examples have highlighted. 
Returning to the taxonomy of art and completing my discussion of 
differentiae I have one final area to consider; one which has not been touched on in 
my discussion so far: I need to explain how my definition of artistic presence 
distinguishes it from religious actions or impulses. I believe the second part of my 
definition of artistic presence - that it is the result of human endeavour intended for 
human interpretation - achieves this: the religious impulse is not primarily intended 
for human appreciation. For the believer, religious doctrines confront her with the 
divine presence: either attempting to explain the presence or, in the case of prayer. to 
address the presence. The religious doctrine may be seen by the atheist as merely a 
product of human activity offered up to human interpretation, but she is still aware. 
even if she does not accept it, that it is an attempt on the part of the believer to 
confront a non-human or divine presence. In the case of art, by contrast, both the 
artist and the audience accept that they are dealing with human creation which 0 f 
course can be used for religious purposes. This point must, however, be viewed in 
relation to the concept of a spectrum of artistic presence: there will be an artistic 
element. to a greater or lesser degree. in all religious activity. There is no . pure' 
religious activity as there is no · pure ' artistic activity. Although the two impulses are 
separated for identification and discussion. they are intertwined by the complex 
interaction of the two spectra: artistic and religious. 
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IV Art as an Inflected Concept 
I refer back to my previous discussion of metaphor in the last chapter; I believe there 
is a parallel with my concept of artistic presence. In my discussion I agreed with the 
belief that the basis of all language is metaphorical and that no literal reading is 
possible. I did, in passing, make the point that another view of language. the 
extensionalist view, accepts that purely literal linguistic usage is possible. To support 
my view of language as metaphor I quoted Ricoeur: "that discourse on metaphor is 
itself infected by the universal metaphoricity of philosophical discourse" (2003. 
p.338). I believe there can be no non-circular account of metaphor because the 
language of that account would be metaphoric. I believe that similarly there can be 
no non-circular description of artistic activity because human endeavour is infected 
with artistic presence which shares an important feature with metaphor: that is that 
they both embody intensionality. Derrida highlights what he calls the 'tropic' nature 
of all human discourse in 'White Mythology': he views metaphor as the unavoidable 
basis of all discourse; there is no way of moving beyond the rubric of metaphor. He 
believes that the only way to overlook this, in philosophical discourse for example, is 
to assume that "the sense aimed at through these figures is an essence rigorously 
independent of that which transports it, which is an already philosophical thesis, one 
might even say philosophy's unique thesis, the thesis which constitutes the concept 
of metaphor" (1982, p.229). 
If there can be no non-circular account of metaphor and therefore of 
art, I must account for this in my definition or accept that it makes the search for a 
definition untenable. I shall address this issue by returning to two points raised in my 
previous discussion of George Dickie's writings. Firstly, I mentioned earlier that 
Dickie makes a distinction between "natural-kind' activities and . cultural-kind , 
activities (2000, p.l 07). Animals display natural-kind activities such as seeking food. 
shelter and the urge to procreate. Humans. and arguably some other species (the 
division may not be strictly between human and non-human). display both 
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natural-kind and cultural-kind activities. For example. referring back to the thr~c 
natural-kind activities mentioned above - seeking food. shelter and procr~ation -
cultural-kind activities relating to them would be: (1) rituals and taboos surrounding 
how we gather, prepare and eat food, (2) the way we design, site and construct 
shelter and (3) social institutions concerned with procreation, such as courtship and 
marriage. Dickie makes the point that cultural-kind activities may be directly 
concerned with how we go about doing natural-kind activities or may be related 
indirectly to them by way of the context of their creation. The latter are more usually 
seen as 'cultural' activities but the former still have an element of cultural pn.'scnce. 
The important point is that in the human realm there is no clear distinction bct\h~cn 
these two types of activity, and, given the link between art and culture, this is 
another way of explaining my concept of the spectrum of artistic presence. The 
artistic element is inherent in all human activity: it is an ineliminable feature 0 f the 
human condition. I now move on to our second point in relation to Dickie: if art is 
apparent throughout human activity as a culturally embedded condition, what does 
this enable me to say about the nature of art? 
In the second chapter I mentioned George Dickie's reference to 
'inflected' concepts; he identified art as an example. In passing, I should point out 
that Dickie's term is quite distinct from Danto' s much later use 0 f the term 
'inflectors' which is concerned with how we interpret artworks as representational 
entities.6 As I pointed out earlier, Dickie's idea of 'inflected' concepts involves a 
turning back of the concepts on themselves in a circular manner: this is because the 
concepts themselves are, as I explained in the last paragraph, situated in a cultural 
context which is itself partly responsible for defining them. Dickie accepts the 
circularity required in defining inflected concepts as an unavoidable. in bet as a 
necessary. part of their constitution. He believes that in creating, appreciating and 
thinking ahout works of art we start from a position of knowledge through our 
cultural embeddedness: "the task of defining 'work of art" is a matter of organising 
and systematizing what we already know and have kno\\ n from early childhood. 
Many other cultural concepts will involve the same kind of circularity: for exampk. 
the concepts of statute law and legislature" (1992, p.113). As the third and flnal part 
of my definition of art, I accept Dickie's view of art as an inflected concept and that 
some level of circularity is inevitable in any definition of art. 
I now summarise my attempted definition of art. I have three claims: 
(1) an element of art is present to a greater or lesser degree in all human activity and 
the products of human activity - this is what I have termed the spectrum of artistic 
presence. (2) This element of artistic presence is the production or presentation of 
artefacts or performances by humans for human interpretation. I t is characterised hy 
its intentionality (with a t) and its intensionality (with an s). It is intentional because it 
embodies meaning, and in doing so expresses a point of vie\\'. Artistic presence is or 
could be, at some time in the future, subject to interpretation which takes place 
within a historical context. It is also intensional: its structure embodies 
representation, rhetorical ellipsis and style, and its results or products cannot he 
replaced or paraphrased without altering their meaning. Finally. (3) art is an inflected 
concept: there can be no wholly non-circular account of art. 
I started the conclusion with three criticisms of Danto's theory of art. 
and I now briefly summarise my responses to these criticisms which I have addressed 
in my own definition of art. Firstly. Danto's methodology: I criticised the is of 
artistic identiflcation as being logically inconsistent and that Danto' s deflnition of the 
special is results in artworks, in Margolis's sense, losing their reality. :\Iso his 
reliance on the technique of comparing indiscernible counterparts fails to reCl)gnisL' 
that the "art' object or objects must be identified perceptually as art before his 
thought experiments can begin. I have addressed these criticisms h: showing that 
neither of these concepts is necessary for his theory of art: they are philosophical!: 
redundant and are not required to justit), a contextual philosnphy of art. Sl'(l)ndly. 
the crit icislll that his theon is o\l'r-inclusiH,·: that its condit iOlh apply tll man\' 
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non-artworks as well as artworks. I have addressed this by m: proposal tor a 
spectrum of artistic presence. If art is present in all human acti\'it:. my Jefinitiun 
cannot be over-inclusive: it will apply to a greater or lesser extent to cvery human 
action or artefact. Finally, the third criticism that Danto's theory of art relies on 
circular arguments: it requires some reference back to 'art' or 'culture' tn distinguish 
art from non-art. I have accepted that art is an inflected concept and that there can 
be no wholly non-circular account of art. 
I end with a final comment on this last point of my response to the 
criticism of Danto's theory (which is also my own third claim about art) - that art is 
an inflected concept and there can be no non-circular account of art. Docs this 
render the search for a definition of art untenable or futile? I he \iC\C noC I take a 
pragmatic view of definitions. They serve to help us understand and appreciate art: 
there is no reason why a 'rear definition couched only in tenns of nccessar: and 
sufficient conditions should apply to art. The first two claims in my definjtion, 
although they explain and help us to understand art, must alwa: s be considered in 
the light of the third: that art is an inflected concept and. as such, is a cultural 
construct. The late Oswald Hanfling put this into perspecti\t.~ very well sa: ing: 
It may be that sooner or later. and perhaps due to the innovatory 
pressures of today's art and the institutional forccs behind it. the 
conceptual geography will have changed to such an extent that the 
word 'arC will no longer mean what it means now. Such a change 
would not. of course, be "merely verbal". It would include fundamental 
changes in the practice and appreciation of art, which in turn would 
entail a different conception of human culture and civilisation. 
(1992, p.39) 
This \iew implies criticism of Danto's philosophy of the history of art: his theury of 
the end of art. \\'hilst a discussion of this is outside the ,",cope 0 r this dis,",crtat ion I 
mention that I disagrl'l' with Danto's histl)rical thesis. I acccpt till' end or the 
Vasari~m and (JrccIlocrgian narrati\l's. but I agrl'l' with lhmtling'" \iew that lhac 
could be fundamental changes in our conception of art in the future. I conje\.:ture that 
perhaps these changes could relate to new non-manifest aims or properties that lil' 
beyond Danto's theory. I have previously commented that my pragmatic approach. 
based on the logic of abduction, denies the possibility of an end to the hi~1ory of art 
in the manner envisaged by Danto. 
The choice of my window-box gardener whether to grow geraniwl1s. 
coriander or marijuana, which, as I have explained earlier. I regard as. in part. an 
artistic decision, must be explained in terms of human culture: in other words with a 
degree of circularity. This does not. however. imply that seeking a definition of m1 is 
futile. Danto's definition of art, despite its deficiencies, has an important place in the 
development of the philosophy of art. It has widened our understanding of what art 
is and what can be art~ it has explained much contemporary art including many new 
art forms that under earlier defmitions would not have been regarded as art. Ilis 
advocacy of a new pluralism in art has emerged directly from his reflections on 
defining art. I believe that Danto' s concepts of intentionality and inknsionaJity. 
divested of their context of an art/non-art duality, provide powerful arguments for 
this pluralistic view of art and an opportunity to re-defme artistic presenCL' as an 
essential element in all human endeavour: an ineluctable part of the human condition. 
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